Daily Report

Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-96-016
Wednesday
24 January 1996

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FBIS-SOV-96-016 *24 January 1996*

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Terrorist Activity

Chechens Basayev, Raduyev Pledge To Continue Attacks

LD2301181096 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1758 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] NOVOGROZNENSKIY January 23 (ITAR-TASS) — Chechen terrorists Salman Raduyev and Shamil Basayev, who headed two major hostage-taking operations in Russia, pledged on Tuesday to continue their terrorist activities until Moscow keeps its troops in the rebel republic and refuses to recognise its sovereignty.

They told a press conference in the settlement of Novogroznenskiy, 50 kilometres east of Groznyy, that they would "continue terror :t acts until Russia withdraws its troops from Chec nya and recognises its independence".

Chechen separatist chief of staff Aslan Maskhadov told the press conference that he himself had not planned Raduyev's attack on the Dagestani town of Kizlyar, but "joined it after it became clear that federal troops had decided to eliminate everybody in Pervomayskoye" where the terrorists were holed up with estimated 100 hostages.

He reiterated that 42 Dagestani hostages, who Raduyev succeeded to take to Chechnya, would be freed without any preconditions, while the captured Russian policemen were viewed as POWs and could be exchanged "all for all" for Chechen terrorists seized in Dagestan.

However, he admitted there had been no contacts with the Russian command on the exchange so far.

The 42 hostages were to be released in Novogroznenskiy on Tuesday [23 Jan], but the separatists said they had decided to postpone the release for one day "for security reasons".

They said they requested from the Dagestani delegation, who arrived to take the hostages, "to get from its government safety guarantees for the people".

However, Novogroznenskiy residents told Tass the delay was caused by the wish of the militants to get the bodies of the terrorists killed in fighting in Dagestan.

Chechen information minister Movladi Udugov complained at the press conference that the international INMARSAT space communication system had switched off his telephone and qualified it as "indulgence to Russian special services".

Chechen Basayev Vows To Continue Fighting

LD2301212796 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 23 Jan 96

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Novogroznenskiy is located 15km from the administrative border with Dagestan. It is precisely here that Aslan Maskhadov's headquarters is located at present. It is here too that the talks with the representatives of Dagestan on the hand-over of 46 hostages brought by Salman Raduyev's from Pervomayskoye are now in their second day. Among the hostages are six women and eight men of the Kizlyar militia. The hand-over was scheduled for 1100. But the buses with the hostages did not appear on the square at the appointed time.

A little later Dudayev's spokesman Movladi Udugov told journalists that the hostages had been dispersed to nearby villages. This had been done to ensure the s fety of the hostages, themselves. Udugov also said that the hostages were demanding to be handed over to public organizations and the Dagestani clergy. Otherwise, they refuse to leave Groznenskiy.

In the evening, journalists were brought into the local school building where Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basayev soon appeared. Maskhadov described Raduyev's operation as successful. He noted that he, himself, had joined in only when it was clear that the federal forces would not let the terrorists out. Basayev said that he, personally, had a taste for combat actions on Russian territory.

[Begin Basayev recording] We shall continue to fight. We shall seize, we shall succeed, we shall seize Vladivostok, we shall succeed, we shall seize Khabarovsk, we shall seize Moscow. We shall fight to the end. And no one will stop us on this path except for Allah. [end recording]

Basayev was delighted by the courage and bravery of the fighters of Salman Raduyev's group.

Tomorrow the hostages will set out for Dagestan. The fate of the 17 men of the Novosibirsk OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] will be resolved a bit later. They will be exchanged for the militants who were captured in the village of Pervomayskoye.

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Chechens Postpone Hostage Release Until 24 Jan

LD2301151396 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1450 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Novogroznenskiy, Chechnya, 23 Jan (ITAR-TASS) — Today's expected release of hostages captured by Raduyev's band in Dagestan is postponed until tomorrow [24 Jan]. This was said at a news conference in the Chechen village of Novogroznenskiy. Attending it were Dudayev's chief of staff Aslan Maskhadov, his information minister Movladi Udugov, as well as leaders of the terrorist groups, Salman Raduyev and Shamil Basayev. They said that terrorist acts will continue until the Russian side accepts the conditions for restoring peace in Chechnya which are being proposed by the Dudayevites.

Chechen Gunmen May Release Ethnic Dagestani Hostages

LD2301164696 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1539 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 23 (INTERFAX) — Representatives of the Union of Russia's Muslims told a press conference in Moscow today that Chechen gunmen were ready to unconditionally transfer to the Union's leader Nadir Khachalayev all hostages who are ethnic Dagestani.

The Union's representatives said Khachalayev was now at Chechnya's Novogroznenskiy village.

The Chechen gunmen made such a proposal to the leader of the Union of Russia's Muslims on Monday evening, the Union's representatives said. They said the Chechen gunmen had transferred to the Union's headquarters a video tape with an appeal from the Chechen hostage-takers' leader Salman Raduyev.

According to various estimates, Raduyev's gunmen are still holding from 46 to 80 captives.

Dagestani Officials Doubt Hostage Handover Will Occur

LD2301174196 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1600 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The civilian hostages seized in Dagestan will be freed tomorrow [24 Jan], the chief of staff of the Chechen formations, Aslan Maskhadov, told a news conference in Novogroznenskiy.

He said the Dudayevites are ready to hand over to the Dagestani authorities 42 hostages, excluding 24 militiamen seized by the Raduyev group. These are considered to be prisoners-of-war and as such they will only be exchanged for the fighters taken prisoner by the federal forces during the Pervomayskoye operation.

The return of the hostages was to take place today, but according to Maskhadov, it was postponed since the Dagestani authorities failed to provide sufficient guarantees for the safety of the hostages. I will remind you that the federal authorities described some of them as accomplices of the Chechen fighters. Meanwhile, in the Interior Ministry of Dagestan, there are doubts that the handover of hostages will take place tomorrow, but they name a completely different reason for this. In the Dagestani Interior Ministry they say that the Dudayevites have put forward unfulfillable terms, under which they want the bodies of the killed fighters to be handed over to them. The investigative group of the General Procurator's Office has not yet completed the work for the identification of the bodies among members of the Raduyev group. The investigators are looking for foreign nationals.

Russia: Raduyev Seen Having Humiliated 'Amateur' Barsukov

MM2401112096 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 96 p 1

[Article by Valeriy Yakov: "Duel Between Raduyev and Barsukov: Professional Wins"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The handover to the Dagestani side of the hostages taken from Pervomayskoye by the terrorists was to have taken place on 23 January in the Chechen settlement of Novogroznenskiy. Then there was news that the terrorists had postponed the release of the hostages until the bodies of the dead gunmen and the prisoners had been handed over to them. The day before, on the evening of 22 January, the terrorists' leader, Salman Raduyev, appeared on television screens for the first time since the events in Pervomayskoye. He embraced the hostages and said that he had around 80 of them, while the hostages thanked the main gunman for saving them from being killed by federal troops. The spectacle was as amazing as it was, in my opinion, humiliating for Russians, whom both the president and his loyal commanders had assured that the gang of terrorists would be defeated. The president, openly exultant, talked to the whole world about the lesson that had at last been taught to Chechen terrorism. And Army General Barsukov, posing with military maps in the background, assured journalists of his victory over Raduyev and cited some anonymous person, who allegedly said that the only things a Chechen is capable of doing is killing, plundering, and stealing. What the general himself is capable of remains unclear, particularly after what happened in Pervomayskoye.

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Essentially a double crime was committed in the Dagestani village. On the one hand, it was a terrorist crime, so obvious and so cynical that comment is superfluous. But, on the other hand, it was a crime committed by the federal authorities, the leaders of the operation, as a result of whose actions an unknown number of civilians and hostages and dozens of officers and men were killed, a peaceful village was totally destroyed, and the backbone of the gang nonetheless escaped and is continuing to dictate terms.

The "carefully planned" — according to the president — operation, judging by its results, was planned and carried out in the most incompetent manner. The most dangerous sector of the border with Chechnya (where Raduyev subsequently broke through) was covered by 37 men from special forces. I know that because I spent three days with them. But why did the commanders, who placed a triple armored ring not around the village but around their own headquarters, not know?

Raduyev is alive and plainly exultant. He certainly did learn a lesson from the federal authorities, who gave a demonstration of what they can do and what they are worth. This lesson will probably inspire the gunmen to an even more cynical, perhaps far more cynical, challenge to the power departments. Raduyev, the professional saboteur and terrorist, has own his duel. No wonder — he was dealing with an amateur. What one does wonder is what victory was commander Barsukov celebrating? Maybe the fact that he himself was not taken prisoner, but remained unscathed?

Moscow NTV Shows Footage of Raduyev in Mountain Hideout

LD2301182396

[FBIS Report] Moscow NTV in Russian at 1600 GMT on 23 January carries, during the "Segodnya" program, a 3-minute item containing footage, which is attributed to REUTER, of Salman Raduyev in his Chechnya mountain hideout. Video shows snow-covered valley and a house, fighters indoors, and Raduyev saying that Pervomayskoye shamed the Russian Army because it could not take the village in three days and nights, despite all its Alpha, Sobr, tanks, and Grad installations. The NTV correspondent says, "There is only one detail in Mikhail Barsukov's report that Raduyev does not dispute. The fighters really did break through barefoot." Raduyev says he lost no more than 20 percent of his men, the correspondent adds, commenting that this figure is as hard to verify as the federal statistics. Raduyev is shown saying that a fresh combat mission awaits his Tigers of the Caucasus in the next week, given that they did not die in Pervomayskoye.

Russia: Correction to 'Chechen Raduyev Interviewed on Hostage Handover'

LD2401063196

[Correcting referent item for source and program name; from the "Vesti" newscast]

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "Chechen Raduyev Interviewed on Hostage Handover," published in the 23 January Central Eurasia DAILY REPORT, page 2: Page 2: Make sourceline read LD2301093196 Moscow Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0800 GMT 23 Jan 96. Make subslug read from the "Vesti" newscast.

Russia: Missing Stavropol Workers Still Not Located

LD2401113696 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1118 GMT 24 Jan 96

[By Nikolay Stayzhkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] STAVROPOL, January 24 (ITAR-TASS) — The Chechen and Ingush authorities as well as the administration of the neighbouring Stavropol Territory have not found whereabouts of 29 Stavropol builders who were abducted by Chechen rebels in the town of Achkhoy-Martan last December.

The workers of the Argomontazh joint-stock society headquartered in Stavropol were restoring eight schools, three hospitals and a bakery in the Achkhoy-Martan and Urus-Martan districts as well as in the village of Tolstoi-Yurt of Chechnya. Rebels captured the builders in Achkhoy-Martan.

A delegation of the Stavropol territorial administration and law enforcement bodies which arrived in Chechnya, coordinates search operations.

ITAR-TASS learned at the territorial administration here on Wednesday that Garon Khamkhoyev, plenipotentirary representative of the Ingushetia president in the Stavropol Territory, several Chechen officials and a group of Chechen elders participate in the search operations.

Gunmen did not even permit to bring home, to the city of Zelenokumsk, the body of a hostage, Semyon Kozhukhov, who died in captivity.

The talks with rebels are dragging feet.

Stavropol governor Pyotr Marchenko gave orders to stop business trips of builders to Chechnya until authorities of that republic provide security guarantees.

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Political Reaction

Yeltsin Allocates Funds for Restoration of Chechnya

LD2401113596 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1111 GMT 24 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 24 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin has issued a decree today, envisaging that 16.2 trillion roubles raised by all financial sources and around one billion U.S. dollars received in foreign credits should be allocated to the economic and social restoration in Chechnya this year.

The decree contains instructions to the Russian government to work out in two week time a federal purpose-orientated programme of the restoration in Chechnya proceeding from the funds envisaged by the decree.

Yeltsin Orders Compensation to Dagestan Hostages, Victims

LD2301181996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1805 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW January 23 (ITAR-TASS) — President Boris Yeltsin decreed on Tuesday [23 January] to pay compensations to the "victims of the terrorist act" staged by Chechen militants in Dagestan who include the hostages, their relatives, the owners of the ruined houses in Kizlyar and Pervomayskoye, as well as civilian doctors who helped the wounded.

The presidential press service said the government was instructed to determine the amount of compensation and to use the emergency situation fund for paying compensations to those whose housing had been destroyed and for the restoration of municipal buildings in Kizlyar.

The government was also instructed to help authorities in Dagestan to eliminate the consequences of the terrorist act as soon as possible.

Dagestan Minister Says Hostage Problem 'Finally Settled'

LD2401125496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1116 GMT 24 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MAKHACHKALA, Jan 24 (INTERFAX) — The problem of the transfer of hostages from the hands of the militants to Dagestan has finally been settled, Deputy Interior Minister of Dagestan Valeriy Beyev told INTERFAX Wednesday.

The hostages are expected to be handed over to representatives of the Dagestani leadership later today in the village of Novogroznenskiy (Chechnya).

The agreement on this was reached Tuesday during the talks between a Dagestani delegation and Chechen rebel commander Aslan Maskhadov. A total of 46 hostages who figure in the list handed to the Dagestani side Monday will be transferred to Dagestan.

"Signs of stabilization have become apparent," Beyev said, commenting on the situation in Dagestan following the hostage crisis in Kizlyar and Pervomayskoye. The situation is under control, he added.

Russia: Duma Makes Statement on N. Caucasus Hostage Incidents

MM2301195296 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 24 Jan 96 p 2

["Statement by the State Duma in Connection with Terrorist Attacks in the North Caucasus: 'Wisdom Should Be Shown'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma regards the tragedy that took place in the North Caucasus with great alarm and apprehension.

The events in the city of Kizlyar and the village of Pervomayskoye, and the terrorist action against the passengers of the ferry in the port of Trabzon, have once more made the public in Russia and the rest of the world shudder.

The negotiation process to resolve the long drawn-out crisis in the Chechen Republic is deliberately being disrupted and agreements that have been reached on a number of questions are not being implemented. The statement by high-ranking Russian Federation officials on the situation being under control does not in many respects reflect the true situation.

The statement says that the State Duma more than once put forward an initiative for a peaceful resolution to the conflict and is once more confirming its position, but practically none of the State Duma proposals addressed to the Russian Federation President and the Russian Federation Government for resolving the crisis in the Chechen Republic have been taken into consideration.

The most recent actions of both Dudayev and his accomplices and henchmen, whose goal is to engulf the whole of the North Caucasus in war using extreme forms of terrorist actions, urgently raise the question of putting a stop to the bandits' activities.

At the same time, the State Duma urges that unjustified actions putting completely innocent people in danger and especially those leading to their death should not be permitted.

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Concern is being caused by the fact that foreigners took part in actions on Russian territory which are not in keeping with the generally accepted norms of international law and with the laws of any civilized state.

We express our deepest condolences to the multiethnic people of Dagestan in connection with the death of innocent civilians, and our sympathy to all relatives of the dead and injured, the statement says.

The State Duma is in favor of active and direct participation by representatives of the republics, krays, and oblasts of Russia's south in a stage by stage political settlement for all conflicts.

Russia: Communists Request Official Report on Dagestan Crisis

LD2301175496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1539 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 23 (INTERFAX) — The Russian government, the leadership of the Federal Security Service, the Interior Ministry and the Prosecutor General's Office must officially inform the State Duma of the recent tragic events in Dagestan, a leader of the Communist Party faction, Viktor Zorkaltsev, said in an request sent to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin Tuesday.

"Speaking of the events in Dagestan in his last four interviews, the Russian president misinformed the Russian public and the world community four times," said Zorkaltsev, who is also the chairman of the State Duma Committee on Relations with Public and Religious Organizations.

"This happened because of purposeful or accidental distortion of information received by the country's top official from presidential sources," Zorkaltsev said.

Zorkaltsev urged the Russian prime minister to "suspend the funding of the restoration operation in Chechnya and publish in the media a report on the hostage rescue operation in (Dagestan's) Pervomayskoye (village)."

Russia: Grachev: Some Bosnian Mojahedin May Go to Chechnya

LD2301202496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1911 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 23 (INTERFAX) — Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev does not rule out that part of the Mojahedin who fought for the Bosnian Muslims in former Yugoslavia may go to Chechnya.

"We are following the possible development of the situation, but I think it is too early to raise this issue yet," Grachev told INTERFAX in Moscow Tuesday.

He believes that the Mojahedin will stay in Bosnia "for some time longer."

According to various sources, from several hundred to several thousand Mojahedin fought on the side of the Bosnian Muslims. After international peace implementation forces were brought into Bosnia, the Mojahedin stopped their activities and began leaving the Balkans.

Russia: Negotiation With Chechen Rebels Seen as Most Effective

LD2401111896 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0800 GMT 24 Jan 96

[Commentary by M. Taki; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Video shows archive of Pervomayskoye hostage crisis] It is almost two weeks since Raduyev's terrorists seized civilians in Kizlyar. Some of the hostages have still to obtain their freedom. The operation by the federal power agencies damaged Raduyev's band considerably but not all the hostages were freed. Some were killed during the storming of Pervomayskoye.

Today the situation is reminiscent of the beginning of events in Kizlyar, albeit on a smaller scale. The difference is that the hostages are no longer in loyal Dagestan but in Chechnya, on territory out of the federal forces' control. As a result, the methods for freeing the hostages are once more under debate. Both last summer in Budennovsk, thanks to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's involvement, and this January in Kizlyar, thanks to the Dagestan leadership, most of the hostages were released during talks with the gunmen.

The conclusion is obvious: As long as our power bodies are incapable of freeing hostages speedily and with minimum loss, the path of negotiation with the bandits remains the most effective, however regrettable that is.

Russia: Doku Zavgayev Cited on Chechen Situation

LD2301231496 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 1610 GMT 23 Jan 96

[Studio interview with Doku Zavgayev, head of the Chechen Republic, by correspondent Andrey Razbash; from the "Rush Hour" program — live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted: biography of Zavgayev] [Razbash] As I flicked through the newspapers of five years ago, I got the impression that at that

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time the situation was the opposite to what it is now. [passage omitted] To what extent do you think Moscow and the country's leadership are responsible for a person like Dzhokhar Dudayev coming to power?

[Zavgayev] Our republic at the time was Chechen-Ingushetia. It was politically stable and had a good standard of interethnic relations. [passage omitted: more on how good it was] I do not think that the country's leadership of that time was to blame in any way. There were certain individuals in the leadership who managed to cut out a career for themselves. [passage omitted] They were the ones who found Dudayev and his people, supported and funded them generously. [passage omitted]

Khasbulatov was one such person. We put him forward as our parliamentary candidate at the time, although he never lived in the republic and had nothing to do with our people. But once upon a time he came to me, asked me to put his name forward, and I supported him. I thought that since he lived in Moscow, mixing there in intellectual circles he would be our good mouthpiece. Unfortunately, the situation proved to be quite the reverse. Yes, Khasbulatov is above all one of those people who are responsible for ruining our republic. Unfortunately, he is still cherishing his unhealthy interest in the republic. [passage omitted]

[Razbash] There is the view that Moscow and certain Chechen forces are trying to have the situation in Chechnya cocooned, that is, to turn the Russian-Chechen conflict into an internal Chechen or an internal North Caucasian one. Has this view any political grounds?

[Zavgayev] In my view the interests of many forces converged on the territory of the Chechen republic. Look at those who came to Pervomayskoye in Dagestan, for instance: Among those detained and killed, there are foreigners. What has brought them here? Can they really be attracted by the Chechen national idea? I think this problem should be considered in a broader sense. And if we want to bring order to one of the republics in North Caucasus, we cannot confine ourselves to taking measures on that territory. We must look at the circle of adjacent territories and countries. Who has dug in there, so to speak? What are their interests? Especially when these interests are unhealthy. Look at Chechnya: Emissaries, weapons, money are being sent to our territory. All this is being generously funded. Various centers are being created. When there is talk of the Russian-Chechen conflict, this is either a voluntary misconception or we are being fed somebody's propaganda. There is no conflict between the national ideas of Russian and Chechens. There is no such thing. [passage omitted]

For instance, a ferry was seized in Turkey. The main terrorist, according to the press, apparently fought both in Abkhazia and Chechnya. What does this Turk want in Chechnya, one wonders? I want to say that again: The problem is by no means solely a Chechen one. The problem has been foisted on the Chechen people. The name of the Chechen people is being exploited, although nobody asked the Chechen people what they wanted. Take the allegation, for instance, that Chechnya has become independent. But was there a referendum about it, and when were the Chechen people asked whether they want to pull out of our Russian state? When was this referendum? When were they asked? They have not been asked. A bunch of self-styled leaders used the name of the Chechen people to threaten Russia and cities. [passage omitted]

[Razbash] Is this currently a criminal rampage in Groznyy or what? Or perhaps nationalists and Dudayevites are to blame? Can the government control the situation there?

[Zavgayev] Before I answer your question, I have to outline several points. First, according to figures, in the last two months crime has been falling. While six to 10 weeks ago, the federal forces came under fire 40 to 50 times, now this figure has fallen to eight to 10 times. In other words, the current figure is 50 to 70 percent down on what it was. The number of actual crimes has fallen also by 70-75 percent. At present every day we register five to six, maximum 10 crimes. In the past the figure was 30 and 40. [passage omitted] Today more than 60 percent of people of nonpensionable age have no permanent job. The objective situation contributes to the crime situation. So, when we talk about ways of putting things right, we must first create jobs and give people things to do, give young people an opportunity to study at schools, colleges, and universities. That is, we must revive the republic, thereby pulling normal people out of the criminal environment. [passage omitted]

Russia: Muslim Leader Hits Authorities Over Pervomayskoye

MM2401124896 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 96 p 1

[Report by Tatyana Morozova: "Let Holy Ramadan Save the Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the opinion of Khamid Yakhin, chairman of the "Nur (Light)" all-Russia Muslim public movement, Russia's lack of a united Muslim political organization which would protect the interests of almost 20 million Russian Muslims in the legislative assembly or in the political arena was one of the reasons that led to the Kizlyar and Pervomayskoye tragedies.

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"We supported Yeltsin's actions when he turned to the Dagestani leadership for assistance," Yakhin said. "We had no doubt that a peaceful solution to the conflict was possible. On our part there was understanding for the actions of the Dagestani Government, which did everything possible to avoid bloodshed. But unexpectedly for everybody events started developing according to a completely different scenario. As regards human casualties, blatant lies or disinformation went to the center, the president. The Russian leadership, in order to tighten their grip on their jobs, is prepared to sacrifice the Russian, Chechen, and Dagestani peoples.

"It is the holy month of Ramadan for all Muslims. So we should not lose the opportunity to cleanse ourselves before the Almighty and not only in prayer but also in deed to finally find a way to solve all the accumulated problems peacefully."

Russian Embassy in Turkey Retains Enhanced Security

LD2201145796 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1357 GMT 22 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 22 (INTERFAX) — The enhanced security measures implemented by the Russian embassy in Ankara and the Russian diplomatic missions in other countries, following the seizure of the Avrasya ferry by pro-Chechen gunmen, will be in effect for some time, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Albert Chernyshev told INTERFAX in Moscow Monday.

He said the Turkish authorities will continue to patrol the Russian diplomatic missions and places frequently visited by Russian citizens.

He did not say how long these measures will be in effect. "It's clear, however, that they will last for more than two months," he said.

He pointed out that security measures had been tightened not only in Turkey, but also in other countries in the area with a large Chechen diaspora.

"The pro-Dudayev militants' moves are forcing us to be on guard and ensure our citizens' proper security abroad," said Chernyshev. "On the other hand, we must not go too far," he added.

According to his sources, the Avrasya ferry, which the gunmen left last Friday, is to arrive in Sochi during Monday night.

Military Activity

Russia: Federal Troops Carry Out 'Raids' in Groznyy

LD2401063496 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0622 GMT 24 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW January 24 (ITAR-TASS) — Federal troops carried out three raids in Groznyy searching for militants and weapons, a spokesman of the fedeal command told Tass by telephone on Wednesday adding that two strongholds of the militants had been surpressed during the operations.

He said there were no losses among Russian servicemen in Chechnya in the past 24 hours, but characterised the situation as "complicated, but controlled".

The spokesman said a 700-gram explosive had been found during the raids, as well as five grenades, one grenade launcher shell, 3,260 catridges and 14 detonators.

Russia: Remains of Chechen Gunmen To Be Returned 24 Jan

LD2401130196 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1208 GMT 24 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MAKHACHKALA, Jan 24 (INTERFAX) — Some 42 dead bodies of Chechen gunmen, killed in the fighting for Pervomayskoye, Dagestan, when the federal units freed the hostages, will be transported to the Novogroznenskiy settlement, Chechnya, Wednesday.

The corpses will be transported by representatives of Dagestani national movements, including Avar, Kumyk and Lezghian movements, sources in the Dagestani government told INTERFAX.

The ceremony of the transfer of the bodies will be attended by deputy of the Dagestani parliament Akhmed Gamzatov and senior priest of the Khasavyurt mosque Magomedsaid Abakarov.

The corpses remaining in Khasavyurt will be returned to the gunmen later, after being identified in the search for foreign mercenaries. According to federal information, 153 dead gunmen were found in the Pervomayskoye area after the fighting.

At first, the return of dead bodies was an obligatory condition of the Chechen gunmen for their liberation of hostages. However, negotiations by Dagestani government representatives with head of the Chechen rebel staff Aslan Maskhadov resulted in an agreement on liberation of hostages Wednesday regardless the time of the return of the dead bodies.

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Dagestani representatives left for Novogroznenskiy this morning.

Russia: Over 200 Militants Killed in Pervomayskoye Crisis

LD2301145296 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1322 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 23 (INTERFAX) — According to unofficial reports, approximately 180 Chechen militants were killed during the hostage crisis in Pervomayskoye, Dagestan, a high-ranking official from Russian power ministries told INTERFAX.

He said about 30 dead bodies of gunmen were discovered during a special search operation, in addition to the bodies of 53 gunmen from the group led by Salman Raduyev.

"There are a number of proofs that they were terrorists, not killed hostages," the official said. Most of them were holding arms. The identification of some of them will require additional efforts, though. Some of the dead could be hostages.

The official said the search continues because Chechen gunmen killed during the several days of fighting in Pervomayskoye could have been buried, but such burials have not been discovered so far.

Together with the 29 Chechen militants killed in Kizlyar, the total losses of Raduyev's group during the Dagestan raid exceed 200, according to preliminary results.

More Chechen Assaults Rumors Fuel Idea of Arming Cossacks

MK2401085896 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Jan 96 p 3

[Commentary by Nikolay Konstantinov: "Security of the North Caucasus Is Not Guaranteed. Arming Cossacks Would Further Confuse Situation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the time hostages were taken by Dudayev's fighters in Kizlyar and Pervomayskoye, repeated reports came in saying Basayev's grouping was moving toward Mozdok. At the same time, Russian media has repeatedly reported that Basayev has broken through to the territory of Abkhazia. Finally, there have been fresh rumors recently that Dudayev's fighters are preparing to take over the Vladikavkaz airport in North Ossetia.

In the wake of a failed attack on the airport, news sources say, a Russian troops checkpoint on distant approaches to the airport came under fire. As a result, one Russian serviceman was lightly wounded. The fire came, according to law-enforcement agencies, from the Ingush village of Kantyshevo. The impression is that some "third force" once more wants to sour the situation between the two republics on the eve of negotiations between the governments of North Ossetia and Ingushetia.

According to informed sources, 99 percent of the terrorist acts that occurred during the four past years in the zone of responsibility of the former temporary administration in the Republic of North Ossetia and the Republic of Ingushetia were committed with impunity. This makes you think that the federal structures are not coping with their duties. In the wake of the tragic events in Stavropol [Kray] and Dagestan, where rebels could travel hundreds of kilometers across territories controlled by federal troops without being stopped, you naturally wonder how this can happen. The situation in the North Caucasus is heating up. When the question of disarming the people is being put at the top of the list, there is a hectic discussion at the very top on how to arm the cossacks, and even the Main Directorate of Cossack Forces is being created.

Answering a question recently on why they are afraid to arm the cossacks, Terek Force Hetman Vladimir Shevtsov stated that had the cossacks been armed with automatic rifles instead of truncheons during the Kizlyar developments, there would have been less casualties among the civilians and more among the [Chechen] fighters. The hetman put it straight, "Let them give us weapons, and we will impose order in Chechnya in a very short time. We will destroy all the bandits, including Dudayev."

If you recall the words of Federal Security Service Director Mikhail Barsukov that all Chechens are bandits, murderers, and thieves, it only remains to give weapons to the cossacks. It is easy to guess what consequences such a step may entail.

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CIS, China Closer To Compromise on Border Arms Reduction

LD2301180296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1646 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By Grigory Arslanov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 23 (ITAR-TASS) — A Russian Foreign Ministry expert said on Tuesday the 18th round of talks on reducing arms on the former Soviet-Chinese border has brought its participants closer to a compromise. The talks which started five years ago involve a combined team of Russian, Kazak, Kyrgiz, and Tajik diplomats and military experts and their Chinese counterparts.

Chinese sources in Beijing also confirmed that a "certain progress" was achieved at the talks.

The expert who spoke on condition on anonymity said that the sides are drafting an "authoritative and extensive document" to define troops and arms to be withdrawn from the border zone. He reminded that the participants had earlier agreed on an "intermediate" confidence-building document. However, specific numbers are still subject to discussion, the source said.

The draft agreement will be completed by late March-early April, 1996, when Russian President Boris Yeltsin is planned to come to China. The next round of the talks is scheduled to take place in Moscow in April 1996.

Russia's Karasin Comments on CIS Summit's Agreement on Abkhazia

LD2301191896 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1823 GMT 23 Jan 96

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 23 (INTERFAX) — The decision adopted at the CIS summit in Moscow to apply "measures toward a settlement in Abkhazia, Georgia," does not mean Abkhazia's blockade. None of the measures is aimed against the population of Abkhazia, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin told journalists at a briefing in Moscow today.

The decision "in principle, reiterates support for Georgia's territorial integrity and denounces the destructive position of the Abkhazian side, obstructing a political solution to the conflict and to the return of refugees and displaced persons."

"The document warns CIS states against the sale or supply of arms and ammunition to the zone of the conflict, against any technical advice, military aid to Abkhazia, and the recruitment of their citizens for fighting in Abkhazia and urges CIS countries to strive for the return of their citizens, serving in Abkhazia's armed forces today," Karasin said.

"Without Georgian government consent, CIS countries will not carry out trade, economic, financial, transport or other operations with the Abkhazi authorities," Karasin stressed.

Yeltsin, Moldova's Snegur Urge Settlement of Dniester Conflict

LD2301200596 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1917 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By Aleksandr Valiyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 23 (ITAR-TASS) — The presidents of Russia and Moldova in their joint communique of January 19 called for a rapid settlement of the conflict between Moldavia and its breakaway Dniester enclave.

Russian Foreign Ministry senior spokesman Grigoriy Karasin told a briefing today that the statement of Boris Yeltsin and Mircea Snegur is to hasten solution of the major issue barring normalisation — the drafting of a document to lay down a special political status of the Dniester enclave within Moldavia.

Karasin quoted the Russian and Moldovan presidents as pledging their readiness to act as guarantors of the special status.

He pointed out that Yeltsin and Snegur "have not taken up the task of specifically defining the content of the Dniester region's status". This should become the subject of accords to be negotiated by delegations of Moldova and its enclave, Karasin explained.

The task now is to recruit without delays the pre-existing negotiation format and to head for a specific document, he said, adding that the Russian president's envoy to the talks, Yuriy Karlov, was ordered to step up mediation of the drafting process.

CIS: ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 24 January

LD2401064396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0609 GMT 24 Jan 96

["Press Review" — ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 24 (ITAR-TASS) — Today's Russian newspapers centre on the aftermaths of the events in the Daghestani city of Kizlyar and the village of Pervomayskoye. The government newspaper ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, printing a statement of the State Duma (Russian parliament

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lower house) on the terrorist acts in the North Caucasus, calls for displaying wisdom and for abstaining from extreme views when accessing the events in Chechnya and Daghestan.

The duel between head of the Federal Security Service Barsukov and ringleader of the terrorist gang Raduyev in Dagestan ended in a complete flop of the first and a victory of the second, since Raduyev turned to be a professional in this engagement, writes the IZVESTIYA newspaper, commenting on the appearance of Raduyev on television live who again dictated conditions for a release of hostages to Moscow.

The trade union newspaper TRUD claims that all Russians are now in the grips of fear. The latest events in Dagestan have generated this atmosphere of fear. Hostages are taken all over the world. A terrorist act may happen in any country," the daily writes.

"But people do not live by fear alone there. But we do live, because we witnessed things which are probably more dreadful than war. Wars end sooner or later. But the dreadful events of January we saw on TV screens and read in newspapers, have no start or end."

The PRAVDA newspaper describes "the landscape after the battle" in the village of Pervomayskoye the following way: "The combat operation of local importance in the village of Pervomayskoye where almost 2,500 federal troops overpowered, at long last, Raduyev's gang, whipped off a political storm in Moscow.

"'The victorious' assault which was called upon to demonstrate firmness and resoluteness of Russian authorities in the struggle against terrorists as well as to raise the rating of the president in the starting election race, has led to diametrically opposite results."

IZVESTIYA carries an open letter of State Duma member Sergey Kovalev, well-known human rights activist, to President Boris Yeltsin.

Kovalev accuses the president of a gradual retreat from democracy, an attempt by his administration to turn the country in a direction opposite to the one which was proclaimed in August 1991 and of reviving "inhuman might of the state machine standing over human rights, law and people".

In the article "Authorities looking for ways of self-preservation", the newspaper illustrates, as it were, thoughts expressed in Kovalev's letter. "Authorities do not need now even a democratic facade," the daily notes. "Because it is only a hindrance in its struggle for its preservation."

This idea is echoed by a claim expressed by Andranik Migranyan, editor-in-chief of the MOYA GAZETA weekly, who writes that "Yeltsin chose a strategy connected with a serious adjustment of the course and reshuffling of his team before the presidential elections".

The ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI newspaper, close to presidential quarters, examining the balance of political forces after the general elections, stresses that "democrats evidently took the most unlucky political decision over the past few years: they took, as well as left-wing radicals, an irreconcilable position to the president and the government".

The newspaper writes in the article "Democrats clear road for 'the Reds'" that such a tactical move only eases a victory of left-wing forces in their struggle for power. In this situation, "Boris Yeltsin counts on a support from the Federation Council (Russian parliament upper house)", the newspaper continues.

The daily draws this conclusion by analysing the president's speech at the opening of the first meeting of the new Federation Council. In the opinion of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, "Boris Yeltsin read out a draft of his election platform at the upper house".

State Duma deputy speaker Sergey Baburin claims in PRAVDA that "it is impossible to create a broad people's front without the Russian Communist Party (KPRF)" in Russia. "The opposition puts forth before the KPRF a question on forming a broad people's front," Baburin writes, "since only the KPRF, as a leading party, can help to create such a front and be the main influential force in it.

"However, this party may scuttle this idea if it tries to monopolise the representation of the interests of all voters," Baburin stresses.

The KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA reports a sensation: a snow man was seen near the village of Gryzlovo in the Dolgorukovskiy district, Lipetsk Region, centre of European Russia.

Local newspapers published "evidence of casual meetings between villagers and a human-like being covered with silvery wool".

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Moscow To Play Active Part in Bosnia Peace Implementation

LD2301165096 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1539 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 23 (INTERFAX) — Russia will continue to play an active part as a member of the contact group on the former Yugoslavia and the supervising committee for the operation to implement the Paris peace agreement on Bosnia, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin told a briefing in Moscow today.

In the next few days, Russian representatives will be sent to the structures for the civilian operation: the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission and the apparatus of High Representative Karl Bildt, Karasin said.

Russian diplomatic sources told INTERFAX this would happen in early February.

Russia considers it important to continue the activity of the contact group, including at the present stage of the decisions' implementation, Karasin said. However, "Moscow also sees some other difficult moments, primarily regarding the future of the Serbs living in Sarajevo and relations within the Muslim-Croat federation," he said.

Representatives of the contact group's member states discussed the implementation of the Paris peace agreement during their visit to Sarajevo on January 18, Karasin said. In the contact group's delegation, Russia was represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolay Afanasyevskiy, he said.

The contact group's delegation held a meeting at Bildt's headquarters and met with the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic and Haris Silajdzic, Karasin said.

SACEUR General Meets Grachev, Praises Russian Troops in Bosnia

LD2301182796 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1816 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By Mikhail Shevtsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 23 (ITAR-TASS) — The Russian peace-implementation contingent for Bosnia is well-trained, equipped and commanded, Supreme Allied Commander Europe [SACEUR] General George Joulwan said during the meeting with Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev on Tuesday.

Joulwan is on a working visit to Russia.

He said during his talks with Grachev that he sees the start of the Bosnia peace operation as smooth. The conflicting parties are moving their heavy weapons and troops from the disengagement areas.

A total of 42,000 troops have come to Bosnia by now, with the final force of 60,000 to be deployed within months.

The entire Russian brigade is to be in place on January 27-28.

Thirty-four states have contributed their peacekeeping contingents to the international peace implementation force (IFOR). Pakistan and Jordan have offered the contingents too.

There have been 2,000 flights to ferry troops to Bosnia, and 300 trainloads of military equipment have been moved into the region.

Grachev described as a key challenge the heading off of armed clashes between the conflicting parties.

"Anything must be done for the operation of the multinational force to go off without shooting," he said.

Grachev announced his plan to go to Bosnia in early February to see the progress of the peace operation.

NATO Chief, Russian Defense Minister Meet in Moscow

LD2301160196 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1407 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 23 (INTERFAX) — Commander-in-Chief of NATO Forces in Europe General George Joulwan arrived on a working visit to Moscow Tuesday, Russia's Defense Ministry told INTERFAX.

The same day he met with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev.

The program of Joulwan's visit to Russia includes a meeting with chief of the General Staff of Russia's Armed Forces Mikhail Kolesnikov, and a visit to an airborne formation stationed in the city of Naro-Fominsk near Moscow.

General Joulwan will discuss the operation of multinational forces in Bosnia with the Russian leadership and Russia's and NATO's interaction in the framework of the Partnership for Peace program.

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Russian Army Commander: Russia Willing To Scrap Chemical Weapons

LD2301173796 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1712 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 23 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian experts want a broader cooperation between Russia and the U.S. in chemical weapon disposal programmes, Russian military commander Major-General Viktor K .olstov said in an interview with ITAR-TASS on Tuesday.

Kholstov, who is deputy commander of Russian radiation, chemical and biological protection troops, commented on the Pentagon-released report on the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons.

He said Russia and the U.S. exchange this information and expert delegations, adding that cooperation is speeding up the two states' disposal programmes.

Russia was the first to report its store of chemical weapons, Kholstov said, and media were in an unprecedented move allowed to publish sites of their storage.

The Russian chief of staff officially recognised that Russia has 40,000 tonnes of warfare toxic agents, and the figure was found consistent with all extrapolated evidence.

Kholstov cited the Russian government's decree which mandates destruction of toxic agents at sites of storage, in keeping with Russia's programme.

He said the disposal process would employ environmentally safe technologies worked out by Russian scientists.

Blister agents are earmarked first for recycling, Kholstov continued.

As for safety of storage, Kholstov stressed that all Russia's yperite, 90 per cent of lewisite and the bulk of toxic mixtures are stored in steel tanks.

Mines and artillery shells loaded with minor amounts of yperite are stored in settings controlled as rigorously as tanks and casks with chemical agents, Kholstov said.

He added that the U.S. employs a less reliable practice of storing the warfare toxic agents in aluminum casks.

According to Kholstov, the chemical stockpile declassified by the U.S. suggests the country's intention to retain close to 10,000 tonnes of toxic agents for "studies, development, trials and evaluation."

He added that this describes a pragmatic approach of the U.S. to weapon disposal, and Russia would do well learning this lesson.

Karasin: Russia, United States Working Hard Together

LD2301165296 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1539 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 23 (INTERFAX) — Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin said that Russia and the United States are working laboriously and continuously to implement all the agreements reached between Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton at their meeting last May.

These agreements concern issues of security, economics, internal legislation, and so on, he said.

He was asked by INTERFAX to comment on a recent article in the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE daily which says that Moscow is dragging talks on nuclear issues.

According to Karasin, the same refers to the agreement on the transparency and irreversibility of the cuts of nuclear weapons, said Karasin. "The past contacts have allowed the sides to get a better understanding of each other's approaches to the issue in order to define optimal ways of implementing the agreements," he said. According to Karasin, the work is proceeding normally.

As for the Russian-U.S. agreements on the shutdown of plutonium-producing reactors, their implementation is tied, in particular, to the joint search to find so-called alternative powers, i.e. sources of electricity and heat for the population which currently receives electric power from plutonium reactors, said Karasin.

He said that Moscow counts on a step-by-step implementation of the May Russian-U.S. agreements.

Karasin Says Russia 'Concerned' Over Norway-U.S. Exercises

LD2301162196 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1613 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By Vladimir Suprun]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 23 (ITAR-TASS) — Russia is concerned over the planned Norwegian-American military exercises in the Russia-bordering Finnmark province of Norway, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin told a briefing on Tuesday.

He quoted Norway's decision, announced in October of the last year, to drop its self-imposed restrictions on joint military activities with NATO troops in its Russia-adjoining areas.

According to official Oslo, the reversal of the decision, dating back to the late 1950s, does not challenge

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Russia's interests and aims at drilling peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, including those with Russia's part.

However, what is happening is different from this claim, Karasin said. The Russian Foreign Ministry has evidence that U.S. special operations units have come to Norway to drill jointly with Norwegian forces operations in the setting of the northern wintry landscape, the spokesman said.

"The aim of the decision to reverse the self-restrictions is becoming quite obvious," Karasin said, adding that whatever the scale of the exercises be, they only provide the proof that Russia's concern is valid.

Russia: Seleznev, Roving U.S. Envoy Discuss Duma Agenda

LD2301200395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1544 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 23 Jan (ITAR-TASS) — State Duma Chairman Gennadiy Seleznev has briefed U.S. Special Envoy James Collins on the new line-up of deputies and the chamber's legislative priorities. During their meeting, held today, Seleznev said in particular, that the previous State Duma had left a rich legacy of 500 legislative acts. Some of the most topical ones have passed their second reading, for example a law on human rights. According to Gennadiy Seleznev, it is essential to speed up the process of adopting a criminal code and tax code, a report from the State Duma Press Office received today by ITAR-TASS says.

Answering questions from the U.S. representatives about western investment in the Russian economy, the Duma chairman stressed that "we have no interest in infringing the rights of western investors. We want to create a coherent legislative foundation that will uphold the interests of both western and Russian businesses, which at the present time are operating in a legal vacuum."

The sides dwelt on the Chechnya issue which, the Duma chairman believes, can be solved "by extracting the rotten teeth — Dudayev and Basayev, who have blood on their hands." That said, "problems in the Caucasus cannot be solved through war," Gennadiy Seleznev considers.

The sides discussed ratification by the Russian and U.S. parliaments of the SALT treaty and also interparliamentary cooperation.

Russia: Yeltsin Spokesman on Upcoming Council of Europe Vote

LD2301185796 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1825 GMT 23 Jan 96

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 23 (INTERFAX) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin finds it necessary to underscore a number of important issues in connection with the upcoming voting in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on Russia's admission to this organization, a statement issued by presidential spokesman Sergey Medvedev on Tuesday [23 January] said.

He quoted Yeltsin as saying that "Russia has been and will be firmly adhered to the fundamental principles of democracy and human rights."

"The progress made by our country in this area in the last few years is undeniable and has been generally recognized. But Russia knows very well that there is still a lot to be done," he said.

The international community "could see that Russia does not backtrack from the constitutional principles of election of members of legislative and executive branches of government in our country," Yeltsin noted.

In particular, he stressed that elections to the State Duma "were conducted as scheduled and, as has been generally acknowledged, were free and democratic."

The elections of the president, governors and local bodies of power are still ahead. Work is underway to strengthen the independence and increase the effectiveness of the judicial branch, he added.

The Russian leader considers it necessary to take into account the fact that "for the first time in Russia's centuries-old history, it has fundamental democratic freedoms: the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, the freedom of the activity of public and political organizations," he said.

Yeltsin believes that "in the present situation, a negative decision on Russia's admission to the Council of Europe would mean, to a considerable part of the Russian public, support, although indirect, for the side which is trying to resolve the Chechen issue by inhuman, terrorist methods."

"In a broader context, this will be interpreted as a refusal to support those who are struggling for democratic principles and democratic institutions in Russia," the spokesman said.

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De Charette Stresses French, Russian 'Concurrence' of Interests

BR2301150196 Paris LE FIGARO in French 23 Jan 96 p 3

[Report signed "L.M." and "I. de Ch.": "Council of Europe, Moscow's Membership Compromised"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Will Russia receive a further political slap in the face due to Chechnya at this Thursday's [25 January] Council of Europe? And how will such a rebuff be received? A year ago now, the Chechen conflict led to the freezing of Russia's application for membership, bolstering the paranoia of a Russia persuaded that the entire world was against it.

The question should have been on the agenda of the visit to Moscow by French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette, which began yesterday. But at their joint news conference, Mr. de Charette and his Russian counterpart Yevgeniy Primakov underlined in particular the "concurrence of Russian and French interests." I did not find Mr. Primakov a hardliner, but a cordial and warm person," the French minister observed. Questioned about Chechnya, he reminded his listeners that France was "in favor of Russian territorial integrity," and that it "condemned the hostage-taking," while emphasizing "the genuine emotion aroused in France by the methods" used to end the crisis. [passage omitted covered in ref]

Russia: Lukin on Moscow's Chance for Council Admission

LD2301191396 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1825 GMT 23 Jan 96

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] STRASBOURG (FRANCE), Jan 23 (INTERFAX) — Chairman of the State Duma committee for international affairs Vladimir Lukin hopes that Russia will be admitted to the Council of Europe at the session of its Parliamentary Assembly opened in Strasbourg Monday [22 January].

There are various points of view on Russia's admission in the Council of Europe, Lukin told Russian journalists in Strasbourg Monday. "Some believe that we have not matured legally and therefore should not be admitted, while others say we should be admitted precisely so that we will mature faster," he said.

The session will consider Russia's admission on Thursday, January 25.

Russia will be admitted with a small majority of votes, Lukin predicted. Germany and Chancellor Helmut Kohl personally, France and many other states support Russia's admission, he added.

A number of Central European and Baltic delegations oppose the admission, Lukin said.

The Council of Europe will be able to better influence democratic processes in Russia, if the latter becomes a member of "one of the most important democratic clubs of Europe," Lukin said.

"Admission to the Council of Europe will be a very useful thing for us, if we want to learn something at all," Lukin said, referring to Europe's experience of democratic development which may be very useful for Russia.

At the same time, Lukin underlined that the Council of Europe took the events in Pervomayskoye "quite hard." He added, "the extreme unprofessionalism and neglect of human life shown during the hostage release operation made a most shocking impression on the Council of Europe."

"This has resulted in a situation when Russia's prestige fell very low, while the number of those who do not want us in the Council of Europe has grown," he stated.

If Russia is rejected, it is unlikely to try again, Lukin suggested. He recalled that Moscow had applied for admission as far back as in May 1992, but the Council of Europe repeatedly postponed its consideration.

Today's session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe elected Germany's Leni Fischer as its new chairwoman. Fischer was born in 1935 and actively participated in the German feminist movement. In 1976, she was elected to Bundestag. Since 1995, she was deputy chairwoman of the Parliamentary Assembly.

Fischer replaced the former chairman, Miguel Angel Martinez, who resigned.

Russia: Berdennikov Calls UN Disarmament Conference 'Promising'

LD2301174296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1715 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By Konstantin Pribytkov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GENEVA January 23 (ITAR-TASS) — The Russian delegation at the UN disarmament conference in Geneva, where the issue of a general nuclear test ban treaty is being discussed, is satisfied with the beginning of the work and hopes the treaty would be drafted without delays.

"I assess the beginning (of the conference) as promising", head of the Russian delegation Grigoriy Berdennikov told TASS on Tuesday.

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He said the special test ban committee had been restored at the first session and 37 countries would negotiate the test ban treaty within its framework.

"This was not easy, because some delegations proposed to link the issue to the creation of the committee on nuclear disarmament which many western states categorically opposed. If such a link took place, there would be a considerable delay in the talks, unfortunately", Berdennikov stressed.

He expressed hope that the draft treaty would be ready this year as it had been requested by the UN General Assembly.

The main problem is the verification issue because "there is no such a monitoring system in any of the existing treaties", Berdennikov said.

He added that Russia had proposed to deploy a seismic and radiological monitoring station at each test ground which would level the positions of all participants.

Another problem is whether nuclear tests in peaceful purposes should also be banned.

"From the very beginning we were for the general nuclear test ban", Berdennikov said adding that the "zero option" proposed by the United States, Great Britain and France is actually the same idea.

China, however, would like that tests in peaceful purposes be allowed.

"This is categorically rejected by all western and non-alligned states at the negotiations", Berdennikov said.

Moscow Wants Proper Verification for Test Ban Treaty

LD2301173896 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1655 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By Vladimir Suprun]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW January 23 (ITAR-TASS) — Russia urged a reliable verification system for the general nuclear test ban treaty which is currently being drafted at the disarmament conference in Geneva and proposed to deploy a monitoring station at each test ground.

The verification system should be "global, undiscriminative and economically unburdensome", Foreign ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin told a briefing on Tuesday.

He said that the treaty "should envisage sufficient verification measures which would satisfy all states-participants".

The spokesman stressed that the main characteristics and parametres of the international monitoring system agreed upon by experts in Geneva "in general meet the tasks of controlling the implementation of the future treaty".

However, he added that the proposed networks of seismic and radiological monitoring stations differ considerably in their capabilities.

"Taking this into consideration, Russia proposes to deploy such a station at each nuclear test ground which would allow to level the monitoring conditions and will not cause an increase in the cost of the future verification system", Karasin said.

Russian proposals would ensure "an efficient, balanced and undiscriminative character of the international monitoring system" and will help strengthen trust and promote an early completion of the work on all the verification aspects.

Russia: Karasin: Iraq's Decision To Start Dialogue With UN Welcomed

LD2301160596 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1407 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 23 (INTERFAX) — Russia welcomes Iraq's decision to enter a dialogue with the U.N. secretary general on the implementation of the humanitarian resolution 986, passed by the Security Council to ease the plight of Iraqis at a time of international sanctions. Briefing journalists in Moscow today, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin described the Iraqi move "as a politically correct step".

In line with the resolution 986, Iraq will be able to export under international control a certain amount of oil for buying food and medicines.

Moscow wishes the talks with the U.N. secretary general would start as soon as possible in a constructive way, Karasin said, recalling a recent meeting in Moscow between the Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov and the Kuwaiti deputy foreign minister al-Shahin.

Russia: Primakov, Iran's Velayati Discuss Bilateral Relations

LD2301174896 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1717 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Kuzmin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tehran, 23 Jan (ITAR-TASS) — The Russian and Iranian foreign ministers discussed the state of bilateral relations by telephone today. During

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this first contact between 'Ali Akbar Velayati and Yevgeniy Primakov, as head of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the sides spoke in favor of expanding cooperation at regional level.

The IRNA agency has reported that Velayati expressed the hope that 'the Russian Government will work for the deepening of relations with Iran."

Russia: Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin Meets With PRC Envoy

MM2301124596 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jan 96 p 1

["Own information" report: "Questions of Cooperation With the PRC Discussed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting has taken place between Russian Federation First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin and PRC Ambassador to the Russian Federation Li Fenglin.

Questions of the development of friendly and mutually advantageous relations between the Russian Federation and the PRC in the cause of strengthening international security were discussed.

Diplomat: PRC Border Talks 'Will Not Weaken' Russian Security

LD2401115996 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1056 GMT 24 Jan 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Grigoriy Arslanov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Beijing, 24 Jan (ITAR-TASS) — The talks on the reciprocal reduction of armed forces near the border, conducted previously between the Soviet Union and China and now between the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan on the one side and the PRC on the other, will not result in a weakening of Russian security. This was how special envoy Genrikh Kireyev, head of the joint delegation, commented today on the 18th round of talks which have ended in Beijing.

These talks have been going on for six years and claims by certain Russian mass media that they will result in a weakening of our country's security and the creation of a vacuum in the 100km zone near the border, do not correspond to reality, the diplomat noted. "These talks will not weaken the security of the Russian Federation or the level of defense of our border one iota," stressed the head of the delegation.

The Russian diplomat told ITAR-TASS that during the 18th round the sides had discussed the structure and content of the future agreement in a positive and constructive atmosphere. The talks demonstrated the coincidence or proximity of the positions of the sides on the majority of issues concerning the content of the agreement. From the very outset, he said, the sides had demonstrated a desire to reach a mutually acceptable agreement and to move towards each other.

Military and military-technological cooperation between the Russian Federation and People's Republic of China had formed a good basis for constructive talks on the reciprocal reduction of armed forces in the border areas.

According to the Russian diplomat, there is no question of any withdrawal of our troops from the border, which could cause a vacuum to form in the 100km zone. Forces will be cut, but not withdrawn. The state border will be defended. Both sides have an equal interest in agreement. It will be politically very important for further development of friendship and cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, the Russian special envoy emphasised.

Russia: Future Course of International Food Aid to DPRK Viewed

SK2401044496 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in Korean 1200 GMT 23 Jan 96

[Commentary by station commentator (Valeriy Surikov) from the "Today's World" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vice ministers from the United States, Japan, and the ROK will hold a meeting in Honolulu, Hawaii, on 24 and 25 January. At the meeting, they will discuss mainly the three countries' efforts to provide food aid to the DPRK. In this connection, station commentator (Valeriy Surikov) states:

According to the materials acquired from the World Food Program of the United Nations, the DPRK's minimum annual grain demand is six million tonnes. Last year, however, it rained very heavily, and one third of its land was damaged due to the flood.

The total damage caused by the natural disaster reached $15.5 billion and left nearly half a million people homeless.

Finding it difficult to rehabilitate the country on its own, the DPRK leadership requested the world for food aid. The world accepted the request in sympathy.

Some countries sent food to the DPRK. Following the recent DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the international aid, the delegates from the United States, Japan, and the ROK decided to hold the meeting in Honolulu, Hawaii.

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The statement expressed gratitude to the international community for its aid and noted that the damage caused by the flood was indescribable.

However, the DPRK may reject humanitarian aid from the international community in the future. According to the DPRK leadership, the humanitarian aid from the international community involves a political attempt to interfere with the domestic affairs of the DPRK.

As James Laney, U.S. ambassador to the ROK, said in an interview with a Seoul television network, the U.S. Government is ready to continue offering food aid to North Korea even though the DPRK Government does not make an official request for it.

Laney said that food aid to North Korea is indispensable because its food shortages will have a serious effect not only on the domestic situation of North Korea, but also on [words indistinct].

According to analysts, Japan and the ROK will support the U.S. decision to provide food aid to North Korea. However, the problem is the form of the aid. The aid will be offered not in the name of the governments of these countries, but through an international organization, such as the International Red Cross Society.

Moscow To Join Korean Organization if Guaranteed Major Role

LD2301191296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1814 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By Nikolay Geronin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SEOUL, January 23 (ITAR-TASS) — A Russian Foreign Ministry official said on Tuesday Russia will join the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) if its major role in the body is guaranteed and interests of the Russian nuclear industry are accounted for. He spoke after Russian-Korean consultations which were held in Seoul since Saturday.

"We are prepared to discuss specific proposals on Russia's joining KEDO which was established, in particular, to ensure substituting graphite-moderated nuclear reactors with reactors using light water," Yevgeniy Afanasiyev heading a foreign ministry department in charge of Asia told ITAR-TASS.

Afanasiyev who also led the ministry's delegation at the talks said the sides made a "significant progress" in approaching an agreement on establishing embassies in counterpart countries. "But some questions are still to be settled," he noted. However, he was optimistic about the undertaking.

Another item on agenda was economic cooperation, including ways to promote South Korean investment in the Russian economy and build ties between the Asian state and the Russian Far East. The sides also discussed several prospective projects which could involve China and other states of the region as well.

Afanasiyev said that, although bilateral turnover boosted to three billion dollars in 1995, this was below the countries' potential. South Korea's turnover with China makes up 17 billion dollars, he remarked.

The sides also exchanged opinions on measures to ensure peace and security on the peninsula.

Russia: Panov on Japanese Premier's Address to Parliament

LD2301171596 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1407 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 23 (INTERFAX) — Moscow sees nothing new in comments on relations with Russia made by Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto Monday, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Panov told INTERFAX Tuesday.

In a speech in parliament, the Japanese prime minister stressed the need to accelerate the settlement of territorial dispute with Russia in 1996 to normalize bilateral relations.

"That is the permanent stance of the Japanese government," Panov remarked.

He said Moscow's attitude to the problem was stated several days ago by a Foreign Ministry spokesman. "We see no need to amend it," he stressed.

At a Moscow briefing last week, ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin said the territorial problem belongs to the most difficult and delicate. "The historical and practical experience of bilateral relations has shown that it cannot be resolved overnight," he said.

According to Karasin, the key to the problem lies on the road of large-scale all-round development of bilateral relations at a fundamentally new level.

Panov said Moscow stands for the speedy expansion of relations with Japan on the basis of the Tokyo declaration crowning the October 1993 summit talks.

"If the Japanese government wishes to step up contacts with Russia, we will only welcome that," the deputy minister stressed.

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Moscow Ratifies Social Security Treaty With Spain

LD2301195796 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1901 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By Liliya Kuznetsova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 23 (ITAR-TASS) — Ratification of the treaty on social security between Spain and Russia took place in Moscow on Tuesday [23 Jan]. The treaty regulates relations of the two countries in the field of social protection of citizens of both countries.

In accordance with the treaty which will come into force in 30 days, when granting pensions and allowances each of the sides undertook to take into account a labour record of a citizen who had it on the territory of the other country.

It is envisaged to pay pensions on a proportional basis that is each side will pay pensions at the sum proportional to a labour record received on its territory, Boris Dolotin, head of the press service of the Ministry of Social Protection of the Russian Federation, told ITAR-TASS.

Dolotin stressed the importance of a clause in the treaty on social security of persons of Spanish origin who more than 50 years ago, at children's age were taken to the Soviet Union and now returned to their homeland.

One year of payments of donations to the Spanish pension fund will be taken into account to all of them numbering about 500.

In accordance with Spanish legislation this gives "children of war" as they are called in Spain, the right to receive old-age allowances, disability pensions and pensions in the event of a loss of the breadwinner.

Taking part in the ceremony of an exchange of ratification instruments were Eugenio Bregolat, Spanish Ambassador to Russia, and Lyudmila Bezlepkina, Minister of Social Protection of the Population of the Russian Federation.

Russia: Draft Oil Transit Agreement With Azerbaijan Approved

MM2401112996 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 96 p 11

[Russian Federation Government decree No. 1265, signed by Russian Federation Government Chairman V. Chernomyrdin and dated Moscow, 26 December 1995: "On the Conclusion of a Treaty Between the Russian Federation Government and the Azerbaijani Republic Government on the Transit of Azerbaijani Oil Through Russian Federation Territory"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Federation Government decrees that:

The draft Treaty Between the Russian Federation Government and the Azerbaijani Republic Government on the Transit of Azerbaijani Oil Through Russian Federation Territory and the draft Russian Federation Government Statement Accompanying the Signing of the Treaty (appended) (Footnote) (Not published), which were submitted by the Russian Federation Ministry for Fuel and Energy and the Russian Federation Ministry for Cooperation With Member States of the CIS and coordinated with the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other interested federal executive branch organs, be approved.

It is deemed expedient that the Treaty be signed and the Statement publicized by the Russian Federation Government chairman.

[Signed] Russian Federation Government Chairman V. Chernomyrdin

Russia Faces Caspian Oil Transit 'Blockade'

MM2301124696 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (Economic Union Section) in Russian 20 Jan 96 pp 9-10

[Part one of series by Aleksey Chikin: "Transit With a Hidden Agenda. New Oil 'Entente' Blocks Russia's Black Sea Ports"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The "competitive struggle" among the once fraternal republics of the Caspian region for "monopoly" possession of the Caspian oil transit route for exports to the Far Abroad is still not abating. In principle, as is known, both the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which "operates" on Kazakhstan's continental shelf, and the international consortium for the extraction of oil in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian have signed agreements with the Government of the Russian Federation for the oil to transit its territory — through pipelines linking the Caspian region with the Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse.

But agreements have also been signed with Georgia on Caspian oil transiting its territory — through the Baku-Tbilisi-Batumi pipeline (with a spur to Poti). It is also envisaged that a proportion of Azerbaijani Caspian oil will be pumped through a pipeline which starts in southwest Georgia (Meskhetia) and transports oil to the Turkish port of Cayhan on the Mediterranean. Another fact of note is that construction of the Georgian-Turkish pipeline and modernization of a number of sections of

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the Baku-Batumi-Poti pipeline started in the autumn of 1995. At the same time similar modernization work on the Russian pipeline route (the Guryev-Astrakhan-Elista and Nevinnomyssk-Tikhoretsk sections) will start at the beginning of this year.

A factor holding back the development of the Russian transit pipelines' throughput capacity is the present situation in Chechnya, across which the main pipeline section of the Caspian-Black Sea transport and transit system runs: The pipelines from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan actually meet near Groznyy. And so it is precisely from Chechnya that Caspian (and also Chechen) oil could be pumped to the ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse.

But, although important, Chechnya is not the only constraint on starting and increasing the volume of oil pumping across Russia.

According to a recent statement by Terry Adams, president of the international oil operators consortium (AMOC), "Azerbaijani oil will transit both Georgia and Russia.... The availability of the Georgian option is extremely important for maintaining political balance in the Caucasus." Mr. Adams also believes that we are talking not only about oil transiting Georgia but also — with the aid of the Baku-Batumi-Poti route — about the creation of a transport corridor between the Caspian and Black Seas.

....At the end of December 1995 the No. 27 television (decimeter) channel AMTV carried a documentary made by Germany's Deutsche Welle radio and television company about the economic and political situation in Georgia and that republic's strategic role in ensuring the transit of Caspian oil for export. The film cited remarks by Georgian President E. Shevardnadze that Georgia has agreed to a number of conditions to ensure the preferential pumping of Caspian oil across its territory. Mr. Shevardnadze noted that the transit of Caspian oil will bring additional investment into the Georgian economy and strengthen its relations with the West and also with Azerbaijan.

And the commentary accompanying the film hints at a possible attempt by Russia to obstruct "Georgian-Turkish" transit using Abkhazia or groupings opposed to the present Georgian leadership....

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, who visited Tbilisi in mid-December 1995, stated that Germany is opposed to any attempt to obstruct the transit of Caspian oil through Georgia and Turkey.

In brief, the Russian Federation's preferential right to Caspian oil transit is still in question.

To this day the Russian Federation and Georgia have not agreed a number of issues linked to the transit of Caspian oil or the coordination of the operation of the Transcaucasus and North Caucasus oil pipeline systems. On the contrary, according to the foreign press, the rivalry between Moscow and Tbilisi over the transit of Caspian oil is intensifying, which does not testify to a readiness on the part of Georgia and the Russian Federation to take mutual domestic and foreign economic interests into account.

The Turkish Government, which of course has an interest in attracting a proportion of the transit to its territory, is a definite influence on the position of AMOC and the Azerbaijan Government with regard to the priority of any given transit route.

In addition to creating an international consortium for the construction of an oil pipeline between Meskhetia (Georgia) and the port of Cayhan in 1994, the Turkish Government, in the words of Emre Gonensai [name as transliterated], special adviser to the Turkish prime minister, will found in 1996 a "Project Company," consisting primarily of Western firms, which will "ensure the creation of the infrastructure for the transportation of Caspian oil."

Mr. Gonensai considers that the Russian option requires much greater investment — between $450 and $500 million — whereas the entire scheme for transit through Georgia needs only $238-240 million. This factor could make the Russian Federation by no means the main "transit country," and furthermore, as noted above, corresponding work has already begun in Georgia and Turkey and is scheduled to start in the North Caucasus.

Another equally important factor is the restrictions which Ankara imposed in 1994 — for operational and environmental reasons — on the passage of big tankers through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. It typical, however, that it is primarily Russian tankers which are subject to sanctions in this strategically important region because of their alleged "enhanced accident rate." Ankara has ignored and continues to ignore the Russian Federation's repeated protests, and in general, according to assessments from many sources, Turkey intends to limit international shipping through the Bosporus-Sea of Marmara-Dardanelles-Aegean Sea system (and vice versa), with the limits being primarily imposed on the shipment of oil and petroleum products.

It is obvious that these actions by Ankara "fit in" with its intention to win the transit for Caspian oil for its transport systems and ports. It is also typical that Georgia has not yet protested against the "blocking" of the Black Sea-Aegean Sea straits — exports of oil from Batumi and Poti (and from Russian, Ukrainian,

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and also Romanian and Bulgarian Black Sea ports) are only possible through these straits. Incidentally, we are talking about a kind of "blockade" of oil exports from Russia since it is strictly Russian oil — from the Volga region, the Urals, and West Siberia — which is exported from Novorossiysk and Tuapse (and partially from Ukrainian ports).

Tbilisi's eloquent "silence" at Ankara's actions in the Black Sea-Aegean Sea region are linked with the construction of the Georgian-Turkish oil pipeline from Meskhetia to Cayhan (1,330 km) and thus with Turkey's readiness to "share" the dividends from the restrictions on shipping in the straits; and Georgia correspondingly has no intention of "excluding" Turkey from Caspian oil transit.

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Political Issues

Yeltsin Receives Aides, Defense Minister

LD2401100296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0953 GMT 24 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 24 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin received today morning his aides Yuriy Baturin and Aleksandr Livshits, who are responsible for security problems and economic matters respectively, ITAR-TASS was told by Presidential Press Secretary Sergey Medvedev. He said that Yeltsin's meeting with Baturin was devoted to the discussion of pressing problems linked with security and military construction in Russia. A wide range of questions, pertaining to the economic policy, was discussed during the President's meeting with Livshits.

Then the President received Defence Minister Pavel Grachev. The Presidential Press Secretary said that they were expected to discuss several party problems, as well as some tasks of military construction in 1996.

The President will continue today the planned series of meetings with newly elected heads of regional administrations. He will meet Head of the Maritime Territorial Administration Yevgeniy Nazdratenko. Medvedev presumes that they will discuss financial aid to that Territory and ways to settle the Federal Budget's debt to it, especially payment of wages to the working people of that part of the Russian Far East.

Later, the President will receive First Vice-Premier of the Moscow government Vladimir Lesin. They will discuss matters linked with the capital's building industry.

Yeltsin, Novosibirsk Oblast Governor 'Exchange' Opinions

MM2401111496 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 24 Jan 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "How To Improve Social Situation in Novosibirsk Oblast"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin yesterday continued his series of meetings with newly elected oblast administration heads. Vitaliy Mukha, head of Novosibirsk Oblast Administration, who has been elected the new governor and began his duties 29 December last year, visited the Kremlin. There was a very constructive exchange of opinions. Vitaliy Mukha shared his plans with the Russian president, primarily those connected with improving the social situation in Novosibirsk Oblast.

Yeltsin Signs Edict Granting Deferment of Tax Liability

MM2401111896 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 24 Jan 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Tax Debtors Gain Deferment"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Boris Yeltsin has signed an edict "On the Granting to Enterprises and Organizations of a Deferment on the Payment of Amounts Owed Prior to 1 January 1996 in Respect of Taxes, Fines, and Penalties for Violations of Tax Legislation." The edict is aimed at normalizing Russian enterprises' financial position by restructuring their debts to tax control organs and budgets at various levels.

Yeltsin Urges 'One Candidate From Democratic Forces'

MM2301160996 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by Anatoliy Stepovoy: "Because of Soldiers' Mothers President Was Almost Late for First Session of Federation Council"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Police cordons were set up on the street in connection with Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin's arrival at the Federation Council. But they could not prevent a group of soldiers' mothers getting into the Federation Council building and unfurling homemade banners demanding the restoration of law and order in the Army and the cessation of the bloodshed in Chechnya.

While Boris Yeltsin was on the platform the numerous journalists were kept in the conference room by the presidential and parliamentary security service. It was only after the president moved toward the exit of the building that the journalists were granted freedom of movement.

It was at that time that something occurred that was not on the official agenda. In response to a loud call from Mr. Voronin, leader of the duped investors, to approach him Boris Yeltsin, after a certain pause, agreed to take this step. Aftering receiving a petition and instructions from the duped investors to run for a second term, Yeltsin said that he still has to regain his strength, and he complained about his doctors, who are not yet allowing him to play tennis. The last thing Boris Nikolayevich said at the Federation Council was this: "Let us nominate one candidate from the democratic forces, or else you will cause Russia so much harm that then...." Yeltsin did not say what might otherwise happen.

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After the senior senator, A. Galazov, had taken over the chairmanship of the first session of the Federation Council the credentials commission was elected. After a 30-minute recess this commission's chairman, Yu. Nechikov, confirmed the powers of the upper house's 170 members. They include presidents, city soviet chairmen, heads of administrations, governors, and leaders of legislative and representative bodies from 80 components of Russia. There are still six vacancies for Yaroslavl, Sakhalin, Tambov, Kaluga, Ivanovo, and Chita Oblasts.

The age profile of the new Federation Council is as follows: 12 senators under 40 (7 percent), 75 aged 40-50 (43.6 percent), 72 aged 50-60 (41.2 percent), and 13 over 60 (7.6 percent). There is just one female senator, Valentina Pivnenko, chairman of the Republic of Kareliа Legislative Assembly's House of Representatives.

The main task facing the Federation Council on its first day of work was to elect the chairman of the chamber and his deputies. The senators spent a great deal of time and effort devising the mechanism for the election of the speaker. Many people insisted that candidate speakers be nominated secretly.

Three candidates were nominated at the Federation Council session. They are Yegor Stroyev, head of the Orel Oblast Administration; Nikolay Fedorov, Chuvash Republic; and Eduard Rossel, governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast. Nikolay Fedorov and Eduard Rossel withdrew their candidacies. The result being that Yegor Stroyev's candidacy is unopposed on the ballot paper. Thus the name of the upper chamber's new speaker is effectively known before the secret ballot.

Soskovets Seen Behind Yeltsin's Nomination for President

MK2401101296 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 24 Jan 96 p 1

[Report by Olga Gorshunova: "Metallurgists' Initiative. President Nominated for Second Term"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Few people were confused by the news that Boris Yeltsin has set up an electoral staff to nominate a certain "mysterious incognito," not himself, for president. Preparations for reelecting Yeltsin began long ago. Yet more proof of that is the nomination of Boris Yeltsin to run for the second term the day after Yegor Gaydar's statement.

The nomination ceremony was held at the building of the Russian Federation Metallurgy Committee on Tuesday [23 January]. The initiative group, which brought together delegates of metallurgy industry workers' collectives, comprised such geographically diverse regions as Chelyabinsk, Belgorod, Irkutsk, and other oblasts — a total of the country's 10 largest metallurgy enterprises. Gathered in Moscow, their representatives unanimously agreed with each other without making alternative proposals on any of the items on the meeting's agenda: from discussing their presidential nominee's candidacy to electing an organizing committee to steer the campaign.

Those who called for the nomination of Boris Yeltsin (there were no other proposals) gave laconic and unsophisticated reasons for their stance. The "new economic policy" suits them. In a casual conversation with your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent, the same representatives were talking about the prospects of well-being and prosperity the reform opens up before them. If a Communist becomes president, they asserted in unison, their enterprises will be nationalized. Meanwhile, no one else is "visible on the horizon" apart from the Communists. Furthermore, "you don't change horses in midstream."

The "rural workers," as an interviewee from Belgorod Oblast called himself, are paid their wages on time. Formerly, he said, the town of Staryy Oskol, where the Stoylenskiy Mining and Refinery Combine is located, was a typical out-of-the-way place little known to anyone. Now its stores are filled with goods; all sort of celebrities come to town, too. Foreigners are no rarity there either — not as investors, though: They come to the combine as regular specialists.

The view of the metallurgy committee leadership was also based on the sector's successful performance and optimistic forecasts. The sector, as speakers at the meeting said, is actively using new technologies. This does not pose a threat of unemployment that could affect lots of workers, however. Compared to other industries, metallurgy is thriving. First, because its commodity is in demand on foreign markets. Second, the industry's prosperity is aided by the current special political situation. So representative and well-organized a get-together could only be held under the guidance of an experienced supervisor. Who could this be? The answer can be found if we consider another logically arising question: Why were the metallurgy workers, and not representatives of a different, albeit also prosperous, industry chosen to nominate Yeltsin? Why not banks or the military-industrial complex, or traders, or oilmen? I do not think that the metallurgy workers put forward the initiative because their industry is thriving. At least this was not their main reason.

The crux appears to be the country's chief metallurgist, Oleg Soskovets, not a group of industry workers; according to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's informed

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sources, he is to head the Russian president's electoral staff. The first results of his activity are already evident.

Lebed Tops Popularity Poll as Russian Presidential Candidate

LD2401090396 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0800 GMT 24 Jan 96

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] [video shows poll charts with still photographs of politicians] The Public Opinion Foundation has published some interesting figures. According to the results of a sociological poll on the theme "If a Russian presidential election were held next Sunday, for whom would you vote?", four candidates would very likely reach the second round: Aleksandr Lebed with 14.9 percent of the vote, Gennadiy Zyuganov with 14.2, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy with 13.6, and Viktor Chernomyrdin with 12.5 percent.

At the same time, a second round could only take place — in other words, there would be a turn-out at the polls of over 50 percent of the voters — if one of two pairs were fighting for the presidential seat: Lebed and Chernomyrdin or Zyuganov and Yavlinskiy. In the first scenario, Lebed would win with 65.4 percent of the vote while in the second Yavlinskiy would win with 54.5 per cent.

Russia: Action Committee Registration To Be Completed by 2 Mar

LD2301164496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1407 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 23 (INTERFAX) — Registration of action committees proposing candidates for the post of Russian president is to be over before March 2, Central Electoral Commission member Viktor Karpunov told INTERFAX on Tuesday, citing the electoral law.

The law allows five days for the checking of papers submitted by action committees.

A registered status authorizes a committee to collect signatures in support of its candidate. A candidate needs a minimum of 1 million signatures to be allowed to run.

Signature lists and other papers needed for a candidate's registration must be presented to the Central Electoral Commission no later than 6:00 p.m. on April 16, Karpunov said.

Russia: Sobchak Interviewed on Communists, Presidential Election

LD2301193496

[FBIS Report] Moscow NTV in Russian 1635 GMT on 23 January carries an 18-minute live interview with Anatoliy Sobchak, mayor of St. Petersburg and member of the Federation Council, by Pavel Lobkov in the NTV studio for the "Hero of the Day" program.

Anatoliy Sobchak, who was "the only person publicly to oppose the election of Yegor Stroyev" as chairman of the Federation Council, says he is "very concerned about this election because today both chambers of parliament are headed by representatives of the Communist Party, and orthodox communists at that — party functionaries well known for their views. This could play a very negative role not even so much today as tomorrow, in the run-up to the presidential elections and in particular after those elections, depending on who becomes the next president of Russia."

Sobchak says the Communist Party had managed to take virtually the entire parliamentary leadership, and that Stroyev, as a disciplined party man, would do what the party prescribed. Challenged by Lobkov, who suggests the Federation Council has little political influence anyway, Sobchak says this is due to the inactivity of the Federation Council of the first convocation, which failed to wield influence regarding the war in Chechnya, for example.

Asked about his attitude toward Boris Yeltsin, Sobchak says Yeltsin was elected in the previous presidential elections as the representative of the democratic forces and Yegor Gaydar's rejection of Yeltsin as a candidate will certainly make it difficult to find a single candidate representing the democrats in the forthcoming election. Sobchak refuses to make any predictions about possible presidential candidates.

Sobchak says his first action in the new Federation Council will be to propose changes in the structure of the chamber committees. He concludes his interview by saying: "I would like once again to call on everybody to heed the voice of wisdom and do everything to stop the Communists."

Yavlinskiy Interviewed on Chechnya, Yeltsin

AU2301192496 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 22 Jan 96 pp 110-112

[Interview with Yabloko Chairman Grigoriy Yavlinskiy by unidentified SPIEGEL correspondent; place and date not given: "This Is Yeltsin's Vietnam"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Grigoriy Alekseyevich, you were prepared to offer yourself to the

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Chechen terror commandos as a hostage. Would that have made any difference to the violent way in which Moscow has resolved the problem, with the use of bombs and artillery?

[Yavlinskiy] Certainly. If my offer had been accepted, the events that happened could have been avoided. All the hostages would have been rescued and, at the same time one, we would have had the basis for comprehensive talks. After all, the Chechen conflict is suppose to be solved, not exacerbated.

[DER SPIEGEL] Did the military and politicians consider the safety of the hostages?

[Yavlinskiy] No. That is something our military people have never learned.

[DER SPIEGEL] Even though there were promises that, this time, there would only be a surgical operation, so to speak?

[Yavlinskiy] Our army, the former Soviet Army, has been taught to kill. It has always been told that the enemy must be destroyed. Our soldiers are not prepared for any other kind of operation, either psychologically, morally, or professionally.

[DER SPIEGEL] In that case, they should not be ordered to perform such duties as in Pervomayskoye.

[Yavlinskiy] My party has been saying that for a long time. Inside parliament, we have been demanding that the army be kept away from domestic unrest. But our opponents, the communists, are opposed to this idea.

[DER SPIEGEL] The wave of hostages goes further — 29 energy experts in Groznyy; and almost 200 tourists, half of them Russians, on a ship in the Black Sea. Would you negotiate with Chechen President Dudayev about the new prisoners taken by his commandos?

[Yavlinskiy] Immediately. I wrote to Yeltsin and told him to call Dudayev and suggest to him an immediate release of the hostages, and then immediately undertake negotiations on all thorny issues. That is the only way to resolve the conflict. In order to set such a process in motion, it is extraordinarily important for Yeltsin to pick up the telephone, call Dudayev, and tell him: "Let the innocent people go."

[DER SPIEGEL] General Aleksander Lebed, who forced peace on Moldova in 1992, suggested to Yeltsin without success that, if he were in full command, he would end the confrontation in Pervomayskoye with as little bloodshed as possible. Would you have given him command?

[Yavlinskiy] I think this offer was quite naive. One cannot compare the Moldovans and the Chechens. The two peoples are warlike for quite different reasons. Besides: When one reads all the reports about the chaos among our troops in Dagestan, not even a man like Lebed could alter much.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why does not Moscow simply allow Chechnya to leave the federation?

[Yavlinskiy] The war was not really caused by any desire to leave the federation. This desire did not manifest itself until later. The war started when a disobedient local ruler opposed Moscow. In Germany too, one province refused to support the constitution.

[DER SPIEGEL] It was Bavaria.

[Yavlinskiy] Well, mountain people are obstinate. Only in Russia has this obstinacy been opposed by harsh pressure. A counter-government has been conjured up out of a hat and supplied with weapons, so that two opposing forces can fight each other. It is no surprise that the Chechens want to break away.

[DER SPIEGEL] This has never surprised us, but it has surprised your president.

[Yavlinskiy] Basically, Yeltsin wanted to score points with this war. It all started with Zhirinovskiy's election victory in 1993. In the Kremlin, they thought they could teach the disobedient Caucasians a lesson with violent means. They thought that would impress people in Russia.

[DER SPIEGEL] Does this mean that Yeltsin has launched his election campaign for a second presidential term with this attack on Dagestan?

[Yavlinskiy] In any case, he wants to be rid of the troublesome Caucasus problem at the start of his election campaign. But the way in which he is dealing with the problem does not augur anything good at all.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you still have any doubts that Yeltsin wants to run for president again?

[Yavlinskiy] Yeltsin has a tendency to alter his concepts at lightning speed. He knows how to move very craftily and subtly. He does that all the time. Some of the things he has done — the formation of all these staffs and committees — is absolutely against the law. But no one is surprised. There are no longer even any debates on this matter.

[DER SPIEGEL] The man who stopped the putschists in 1991 has turned into a man who lets the tanks roll and even fire. Will the voters honor him for it?

[Yavlinskiy] The parliamentary elections have clearly shown what the Russian voters think of Yeltsin. Russia Is Our Home — the party of his prime minister,

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Chernomyrdin — captured all the potential Yeltsin votes, and still gained less than 10 percent of all votes. If Yeltsin had appeared on the ballot papers instead of Chernomyrdin, the result would have been even more pitiful.

[DER SPIEGEL] So Yeltsin has no chance of staying in office for another five years?

[Yavlinskiy] Right now, definitely not.

[DER SPIEGEL] What about in June?

[Yavlinskiy] I do not see where he is going to get votes from. If he continues to act this way, he will get no extra marks. He has plunged our country into a military adventure. This is Yeltsin's Vietnam. One does not get out of a blind alley so quickly.

[DER SPIEGEL] The parliamentary elections have shown that not even the Democrats are making much of an impression on the reform-weary people any more. Is Yeltsin now seeking to make his mark by taking sides with the victorious Communists?

[Yavlinskiy] Such a volte-face is quite imaginable.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why has he now dissociated himself from his last remaining comrades in the democratic camp — the pro-Western Foreign Minister Kozyrev, his Chancellery chief Filatov, and now the champion of privatization Chubays?

[Yavlinskiy] Because the communists emerged from the Duma elections as victors. When Zhirinovskiy won the previous elections, Yeltsin started the war in Chechnya. Now that the communists have won, he is finishing off the last remaining Democrats.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are the new people in Yeltsin's favor indicating that they are turning their backs on the West and the democratic course? I have in mind Nikolay Yegorov, Yeltsin's former rapporteur on Cossack issues, who is now leader of the Kremlin apparatus.

[Yavlinskiy] Perhaps this means that officials in the Kremlin are going to be issued with Cossack hats. After the hostage drama of Budennovsk, Yegorov was dismissed from his post of minister for nationality issues. And after the hostage tragedy of Kizlyar, he once again received an influential post. Of course this is a signal.

[DER SPIEGEL] What conclusions do you draw from this?

[Yavlinskiy] At that time, our Duma faction demanded the resignation of all those responsible for the Caucasus war, and especially for the erroneous decisions reached in Budennovsk. Yeltsin did not want to sacrifice Defense Minister Grachev and Lobov, secretary for national security, but the ministers of security, internal affairs, and nationality issues had to step down. If Yegorov now makes a comeback, we will take a very serious view of this. On the other hand, Yeltsin is going to continue to propagate proximity and neighborly relations with the West. With personnel decisions like these, Yeltsin hopes to be whip up support among the people.

[DER SPIEGEL] In vain, if we understand you right?

[Yavlinskiy] The citizens are merely waiting for him to step down voluntarily. That is the only way he can please the people nowadays.

[DER SPIEGEL] It would please you, his competitor, especially.

[Yavlinskiy] I continue to respect Boris Yeltsin as a man and as a personality. He opened the door to politics for me, after Gorbachev had accorded me personal liberty. I will never forget these things. But when it comes to political and economic matters, I am Yeltsin's avowed opponent.

[DER SPIEGEL] The Moscow writer Tretyakov advises Yeltsin to form an alliance with you if he should offer you the job of prime minister. Would you accept such an offer from the Kremlin?

[Yavlinskiy] First, he would have to have to meet my demands very closely, in other words stop the Chechen war and provide clear safeguards for the continuation of the reforms — the abolition of monopolies, and macroeconomic stability. He would also have to give me free reign in all cabinet issues and in the shaping of our relations with the West. In fact, I see myself only at the tip of a democratic government with a president who is firmly committed to a democratic course.

[DER SPIEGEL] Can Yeltsin afford to pay such a price to reach an alliance with you?

[Yavlinskiy] You are asking me something that is rather improbable.

[DER SPIEGEL] If you were president, what would you do about Chechnya?

[Yavlinskiy] I would conclude a treaty with the Chechens on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a discontinuation of action outside Chechnya, pull our troops out, establish an interim status for the republic, and, after a while, hold a referendum on whether or not Chechnya should remain a part of Russia. Our current policy is narrow-minded. How can there be serious dialogue if the people in Chechnya are being bombed and nothing else?

[DER SPIEGEL] Thank you for this interview, Grigoriy Alekseyevich.

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Politicians View Changes, Yeltsin's Reelection Chances

MK2301150696 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 23 Jan 96 p 2

[Roundup of answers to "Questions of the Week" by Yegor Gaydar, Vyacheslav Nikonov, Arkadiy Volskiy, Sergey Ivanenko, Vladimir Lysenko, Konstantin Borovoy]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Questions of the Week

1. Why do you think precisely this moment was chosen for dismissals in the government?

2. Can this be interpreted as a beginning of adjustments in the economic and political line? Can we say that certain figures have been sacrificed?

3. How can the changes affect the political situation (including public opinion) in the summer on the election eve? In particular, will the "sacrifices" and adjustments help Boris Yeltsin or Viktor Chernomyrdin broaden their electorate?

Yegor Gaydar, leader of the Russia's Democratic Choice party:

1. In my view, these dismissals are timed to coincide with the results of the parliamentary elections and are an extremely unwise way of responding to their results.

2. I think that the risk of attempts at adjusting the economic policy exists and is fairly great. As for the political line, it has already been adjusted to the maximum.

3. Yes, they undoubtedly can. It is another matter that, like in chess, sacrifices can be justified and unjustified. In my judgment, in this particular case the style of the sacrifices is reminiscent of those made by Ostap Bender during the famous ch ss tournament [the protagonist of 'Twelve Chairs,' a novel by Ilf and Petrov, pretending to be a grand master, did not know how to play and was losing piece after piece].

I do not think that the aforementioned changes will have a positive impact in terms of broadening Boris Yeltsin's or Viktor Chernomyrdin's electorate. First, personnel changes have considerably weakened the government and will inevitably lead to fairly unpleasant economic consequences. This will result in the aggravation of social problems, particularly those relating to the payment of wages.

I think that, to all appearances, we can talk about attempts to cause some shifts in the electorate and to pull some votes away from Zhirinovskiy. I think that this strategy is extremely ineffective.

Vyacheslav Nikonov, president of the "Politika" fund, doctor of history:

1. I am convinced that the choice of the time can be attributed only to one thing: President Yeltsin has decided to run for reelection. Otherwise, he did not need to make any changes in the government at all or to react to the results of the State Duma elections with dismissals. Meanwhile, reacting to the voters' state of mind, which clearly shows a leftward swing, and to the mood of his own team, wishing to have Yeltsin reelected, the president has made a decision to "put his house in order" before the main political event of 1996.

2. Undoubtedly, sacrifices were made. But these were not sacrifices on the altar of Yeltsin's rapprochement with the Communists, who demanded the scalps of Kozyrev, Chubays, and Filatov. The president has never made any decisions under anyone's pressure, especially under Communist pressure. The sacrifices were made for the sake of changing the image of his team, which can now look in the voters' eyes more pragmatic and pursuing practical matters, not ideology. Yet, this image may well fail to materialize. As for the policy adjustment, it is too early to talk about that. New appointments are not yet finished, and we have yet to look at the complete set of persons who are going to reinforce the administration. Yet, a very narrow choice of possible alternatives in the socioeconomic policy raises doubts as to the possibility of adjusting this policy in principle.

3. Yeltsin, not Chernomyrdin after all, I am sure about that. They will be of help, but not very much so. Of course, the popularity of many of the dismissed people left much to be desired and for the president their presence was more of a liability than an asset. Again, there are ready scapegoats who can be blamed for political debacles. But, alas, the dissatisfaction with the Yeltsin policy is related not so much to individual people as to the specific results of this policy — in the economy, in Chechnya, and so forth. Whatever adjustments might be made, if at all, they will not bring about a universal prosperity by June 1996.

Arkadiy Volskiy, leader of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs:

1. I think that dismissals in the government are connected with the State Duma elections one way or another. Some were caused by the alternative: a Duma seat or a government portfolio. Others stem from the mood of the voters who gave preference to those who campaigned under the slogan of adjusting the course of

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reform, particularly in the area of privatization and the social plight of the majority of people.

2. If we talk about long-term factors, reforms will continue. There is nowhere to retreat from them. As for economic and political adjustments, they are indispensable. Life is not standing still. It creates yet more problems in the economy and in politics.

Russian industrialists and entrepreneurs have categorically rejected the raw-material, semicolonial path of Russia's development, which was embarked on by the Gaydar team. They insist on adjusting the reform mechanism. The essence of this adjustment is to decisively replace the current financial-monetarist direction of reform by a policy aimed at a production growth and a strong emphasis on the social protection of the people. In my view, we should finally fully specifically flesh out the term "industrial policy," which has already become trite. I think that the key problem is to choose fully balanced national priorities. This, in turn, will speed up the settlement of what are now the most urgent problems.

There is another important thing: Without retaining and thoroughly modernizing the industrial potential, it will be impossible to ensure Russia's national security nor strengthen it as a key world power. Here politics and the economy are mutually intertwined. A poor industrial base has never elevated anyone.

3. How the executive branch will react to the voters' criticism will largely be determined by the upcoming presidential election. It is not a matter of "sacrifices." Finding them will be as easy as anything. The crux is decisionmaking. It is just as important to enforce them at all levels. You can find a huge number of fine words. In this regard we are probably "ahead of the entire planet." But as for specific decisions and, particularly, their enforcement we are far from first place.

And yet another remark of substance. You must be able to tell the truth on any question, be it economic or political. Competition is only possible on the basis of the truth and real actions.

Sergey Ivanenko, deputy chairman of the "Yabloko" faction:

1. Because the Communists won the elections a month ago. The resignations of the most notorious politicians, who are categorized in the government as "democrats," is overtures toward the voters who gave the party of power the cold shoulder in December.

2. Please note: The resignations of Kozyrev and Chubays were offset by the appointment of Nikolay Yegorov, fired over Budennovsk, as the presidential chief of staff right during the Pervomayskoye operation. It is not personnel changes but real actions to change the political line that confirm a policy change. Yet, an adjustment of the current policy cannot be ruled out. Boris Yeltsin is capable of rather abruptly changing his stances. So, he responded to Zhirinovskiy's victory in 1993 with the Chechnya war. It is also possible that he may approach the presidential campaign with a program turned toward the left forces. All the more so because in thi capacity he will look more advantageous compared to the prime minister, who keeps repeating, "We will not change anything! We are continuing the course of reform!"

3. I do not see any chances for Boris Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential election. December has shown what support the president got by proxy, through Viktor Chernomyrdin: 10 percent. He would have gotten even less had he contested the elections himself. Furthermore, there is yet another problem, which is, perhaps, the most important at present: He pulled Russia into a war similar to that in Afghanistan. Such actions cannot be forgotten nor forgiven.

Vladimir Lysenko, State Duma deputy, the "Russian Regions" faction:

1. This time is related to the end of the parliamentary elections and Yeltsin's decision to run for president (of which I am certain). These dismissals mark the start to phased personnel changes that will be carried out until the month of June. Yeltsin is removing politicians from his entourage who are pulling down his approval rating. As for Chubays, it was a miracle that he worked so long after Gaydar. Yeltsin currently behaves as a pragmatic person. The logical conclusion of the reshuffles would be the replacement of Chernomyrdin, probably by Soskovets, with about two months to go before the election.

2. In order to win the elections, Yeltsin is ready to make changes in his political program because it is not popular among the people. In the near future, changes will be made toward more state regulation of the economy. The IMF's decision will also be of significant importance. If it does not release the promised $9 billion, this will be, on one hand, a blow at Yeltsin because the country depends on this money, and, on the other, this will give the president a free hand, and he will embark on a rapprochement with the opposition.

3. The most realistic presidential candidates are Zyuganov, Zhirinovskiy, Yavlinskiy, Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin, and Lebed. Apparently it is the candidates of the "party of power" and the Communists who will make it for the second round. The "party of power" is unpopular, but the elections have shown that not more than 30 percent of the population support the

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Communists. This gives the democrats a certain chance. It would be much more difficult for Yeltsin if Lebed becomes a single candidate of the left and moderately national-patriotic forces. In this case, the chances of the "party of power" would be very slim.

Konstantin Borovoy, State Duma deputy:

1. The authorities are trying to survive. Had it been enough to kiss Zyuganov in the ass to pacify the Duma, we would have learned about changes in the procedures and protocols of the Russian government; in particular, on the introduction of the procedure for reconciliation (kissing) between the president (prime minister) and a dominant faction leader.

2. Had the Communists demanded that the president's wife be sacrificed, this option would have been considered by his team.

It is senseless to speak about a change of the course because the latter is now simply nonexistent. The name of today's course is "Messrs. Communists: What's your pleasure?"

3. The contempt in which Russian citizens, his former supporters and opponents alike, hold the president considerably simplifies the electoral situation for the president: "There are no chances of reelection whatsoever."

Russia: Stroyev Nomination Sign of 'Broad Communist Offensive'

MM2301155896 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by Valeriy Konovalov: "Yegor Stroyev's Second Coming"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As this issue was being published the procedure for the election of the Federation Council chairman was still going on. However, Yegor Stroyev, head of Orel Oblast Administration, was being named as the most likely candidate as the new speaker long before the new Federation Council's work begins.

But whereas there were few doubts about who would become the new speaker, the assessments and forecasts about what this means for the alignment of forces at the top and the possible consequences of this election differed sharply.

Yegor Stroyev, aged 59, is indeed quite a contradictory figure. He is entirely without scandal and is not even noteworthy in appearance although he constantly contrives to remain on view, unlike many of his comrades. In the past, during perestroyka, he rapidly climbed the ladder of party and Soviet work to the very top — he became CPSU Central Committee secretary for agriculture. In the process he gained the reputation of being a reformer and was the very opposite of the conservative Ligachev. It was he who gave impetus to the large-scale private farming movement in Orel Oblast and even today his "proteges" from that time are still among Russia's prosperous private farmers.

After August 1991 and subsequent events Stroyev's star seemed to decline. He returned to Orel as a mere director of a fruit science research institute. But life changed and he was needed again. He won the election as head of the administration and began his second ascent. Like the first time, he became head of the oblast again. Then he gradually acquired the aura of a worker promoted to an administrative post — the leader who is about to be asked to play a leading role in the capital. In any event people in the Orel region have had no doubt about that for a long time. And Stroyev's name is constantly mentioned in the upper echelons of Russian power.

There is nothing surprising here. He is a strong leader, and they are always valuable. He has a wealth of practical experience and is no stranger to science — it is not a question of a doctorate but of his constant contacts with scientists. He is familiar with world experience and is guided by it. And he never allows himself to get carried away or rush ahead of himself. It has to be said that Yegor Stroyev has done at least as much, if not more, in practice for the promotion of our reforms than many of those who count themselves committed reformers.

Stroyev's political complexion is more complex. That is why the democratic camp has quite a few misgivings about him. Not without reason. Stroyev himself is quite liberal in his views and fairly progressive in economic practice but on the other hand he is firmly linked to the Communists and in the current situation could be a channel for their influence. His second coming in the upper echelons of power is symptomatic as an important bridgehead for a broad Communist offensive. Certain hierarchical rules have even been observed in the process: While the former editor of PRAVDA has become the speaker of the lower house, a former Central Committee secretary has been sent to the upper house....

Stroyev is a reformer, a governor, and a pragmatist — a figure who would suit many as speaker. But what kind of speaker might the Communist Stroyev be in the present situation — that is the question.

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Yeltsin's Blunders Said Bringing Communists to Power

MK2301074596 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 20 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Bekker: "Staff Exercises"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The tactics of the Communist faction in the State Duma, which has elevated Gennadiy Seleznev as high as speaker, showed that the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF] is capable to ensure its numerical superiority for the adoption of the required decisions by aptly regrouping its forces. On the same day, the Duma victor appeared in the television program "Hero of the Day" and said that the next thing to do was to form working bodies of the lower house as quickly as possible and to get down to legislative activity. It can be presumed that parliamentary creativity of Zyuganov's party will be largely directed toward weakening Boris Yeltsin's position before the June election as much as possible.

Ivan Melnikov, executive secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the Communists, is convinced that the December election was a "nationwide 'no-confidence' vote" in protest against the government's course and that the "party of power" has found itself in isolation. During the presidential campaign, the CPRF will obviously try to further undermine the present executive branch so as to bring the regime down on 16 June.

In my opinion, it is economy that will be chosen as the axis of the main thrust. The same Mr. Melnikov is saying openly that the Communist faction in the State Duma will first of all make amendments to the approved federal budget. If the Communists manage to pass laws on indexation and the redemption of state debts to enterprises and people, the budget will surely fail to hold on. If this is further supplemented by laws on a rise in minimum salary and pension levels and on the support of domestic commodity producers, the budget can be kissed good-bye altogether.

Of course, if the Communists themselves were in power they would hardly "cut the legs" of the budget because, once collapsed, it would bring the pressure of hyperinflation onto the whole population, and the ruling party would be buried under the wreckage. Being in opposition, however, it is probably not considered a great sin to adhere to "the worse, the better" principle. In addition, the president, by his policy, has lately driven himself into a situation in which it will be difficult for him to veto overtly populist and ruinous laws only a few months before the election. Moreover, Boris Yeltsin is striving to overtake his opponents and is stamping his feet on his team and is demanding that wage arrears be settled immediately and funds be allotted to a "protigi" factory in Krasnoyarsk. The word "saboteurs," bellowed threateningly, was probably meant to frighten and demoralize staffers at the Economics and the Finance Ministries, who disapproved of giving away budgetary elephants on the instructions from the electoral headquarters. [passage omitted]

Such a turn of events will further aggravate the budgetary problems of the cabinet of ministers, and the work of its economic component will be reduced to a quick response to current issues. The reforms will virtually come to a standstill, and by summer the situation can become hard to control. Thus, as a result of his fatal blunders, Boris Yeltsin, at the finish of the election campaign, will give the opposition such a huge amount of weighty arguments about which it could have never thought.

A power which shows poltroonery at the last moment and backs away ingratiatingly is not respected by people. People extort as much as possible from rulers who show decrepitude of their morals and willpower but vote for those who are young and energetic.

History is merciless: It has offered Yeltsin a chance to leave with dignity, but he — apparently having lost a sense of reality — will probably not be able to seize this opportunity. To my mind, he will not have to bother himself and his electoral headquarters with a second round of voting. People will have to make a "sensible choice" from other persons.

When anything the power is doing acts against it, this seems to be termed agony.

Sources Say Liberals' Days in Kremlin 'Numbered'

MM2301152996 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 96 p 1

[Report by Valeriy Vyzhutovich: "Authorities Seeking Means of Self-Preservation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Those who were expecting the president's speech at the opening of the first Federation Council session to provide an assessment of recent Russian events were disappointed. Restricting himself to setting tasks for the members of the upper house and to offering them the standard congratulations, the head of state deliberately ignored the burning political events of the day. Admittedly, at a meeting with foreign investors the previous day, Boris Yeltsin had announced that, clearly, he would agree to run for a second term. And then Yegor Gaydar informed the public that he would ask the president not to. This almost firm presidential "yes" to run again and the equally impressive "no" to

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this intention coming from not just anybody but the primogenitor of Russian economic reforms marks the end of Boris Yeltsin's five-year love affair with the democrats, who have been devoted to him and betrayed by him.

The nomination of the current president for a second term, if it were to happen, would be, in Gaydar's words, the best possible present for the Communists. Just as Yeltsin's removal as first secretary of Moscow City Committee in 1987 was the best possible present for the democrats. The new authorities are being as catastrophically short-sighted in nominating Yeltsin as the former authorities were once fatally thoughtless in removing him.

Presidential aide Georgiy Satarov informed this IZVESTIYA observer that his boss's electoral chances are pretty good. According to Satarov's forecasts, the second round will see Yeltsin running against "one of the Communists." But even the official optimism befitting a Kremlin official's comments on his boss's prospects was not forthcoming from the presidential aide's lips. The seditious question "who will beat whom" (if, of course, the election goes ahead) is not currently being openly discussed in the offices on Red Square since it is almost obviously preordained. The team of political rescue workers comprising staff analysts, advisers, and speechwriters is seeking and is totally failing to find any reliable means of breathing a second Kremlin life into the guarantor of their future careers.

Satarov hinted that there is a generous abundance of options available for the president's election scenarios and that these, needless to say, will not be made public. But the clever tactical tricks already being prepared by Yeltsin's entourage and the mysterious "all-Russia presidential election headquarters" will convince few of the public. A far more absorbing strategy is to compete with Zyuganov and his party in the battle for the communist voters.

Satarov denies the existence of such a strategy: "We cannot ban the president from fighting wage delays on the basis that the Communists have taken up that banner." Well, Yeltsin always had a weakness for populist temptations even during the happier times for him, when flirting with the people — who had not yet exhausted their store of faith in the authorities — was not so dangerous. But now the authorities are into their death throes. In order to finish them off, the Communists intend to make amendments to the budget. They are also preparing laws on increasing the minimum wage and pensions, and on indexing and repaying money owed by the state to enterprises and the population. Should the president sanctify all this with his signature — which seems to be the way things are headed — hyperinflation would finally finish the regime off.

Even such a virtuoso as Georgiy Satarov is no longer being all that successful in his constant and inescapable duty — shared by all presidential aides — of interpreting every action, decision, word, and gesture of the Kremlin boss exclusively in his favor: "There is no need to incite panic about certain resignations and appointments. What has actually happened? Filatov's policy has given way to the administrator Yegorov. Kozyrev has been replaced by Primakov, about whose professionalism there can also be no doubt."

Assessing the publicly stated intention of the new leader of the Presidential Staff to carry out a personnel reshuffle in the subunit under his control, Georgiy Satarov said that he does not see any political subtext to it. At any rate, both he and other presidential aides on the liberal wing (A. Livshits, Yu. Baturin, M. Krasnov) are still working calmly, Satarov reported. IZVESTIYA has obtained information from other sources indicating that the days of the Kremlin liberals — the last ones left after the personnel changes — are numbered. In general this seems to be true, as does the persistent talk claiming that an edict removing Yevgeniy Yasin from the post of minister of the economy has already been drawn up. On the other hand, the nomination for upper house speaker of Yegor Stroyev — the current governor of Orel, who was formerly first secretary of the [CPSU] oblast committee there — has been agreed with the president. Yeltsin has personally received his former Central Committee comrade and given him his blessing.

The authorities have even stopped needing a democratic facade. Kozyrev, Filatov, Chubays.... These "decorative indulgences" have been scrapped under the plan to restore the old social structure. This plan is close to being put forward for public approval, along with Boris Yeltsin's candidacy — following the glorious Soviet tradition.

Duma Deputy Kovalev Sends Resignation Letter to Yeltsin

MM2301183696 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 96 p 2

["Open Letter to B. Yeltsin" from State Duma Deputy Sergey Kovalev; undated]

[FBIS Translated Text] To Russian Federation President B.N. Yeltsin.

Mr. President!

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For the past six years I have considered it my duty to do everything to further the policy that, despite all reservations, could be called the "democratic transformation of Russia." For a long time this policy was strongly associated with your name. You were head of a state that was following a democratic path, and at first you were even regarded as leader of the democrats. As long as you remained within the framework of that course I considered myself your ally, while in those cases where your steps diverged from the general direction of progress or dramatically slowed down its pace, I was your loyal opponent.

Russia's road to freedom did not promise to be easy. Many difficulties were obvious in advance, many arose unexpectedly. To overcome them all of us — the authorities, society, every individual — had to make difficult and even tragic decisions. The main things that the country expected of you were the will for change, and honesty. Particularly honesty. In electing you, Russia saw before it not only a politician prepared to destroy the old state system, but also a man sincerely striving to change himself, his views, his prejudices, the habits of power. You convinced many people — me included — that humanist and democratic values could be, for you, the basis of life, work, and politics. We were not blind: We saw all the obkom [oblast party committee] and Central Committee patterns that persisted in your behavior. But after all, when it came down to it, all Russia was struggling against itself, like a man subject to a terrible vice. Without necessarily loving you, we understood you.

However, in recent years, while continuing to assure your listeners, in every public speech, of your immutable commitment to democratic ideals, you began — at first slowly, and then increasingly relentlessly — to change the course of the state policy you led. Now your administration is trying to steer the country in exactly the opposite direction to that proclaimed in August 1991. That confronts me with the need publicly to define my own position.

I will not recall all your numerous mistakes and miscalculations — there will be plenty of people willing to do that. It is not a question of specific failures, but of the reasons for them: the fundamentally wrong choice of priorities and criteria in state policy.

Beginning at least in late 1993, you have consistently chosen not those decisions that would have strengthened the force of law in a democratic society, but those that revived the blind and inhuman might of the state machine which is above right, the law, and individuals. Your enemies claim that you did this to strengthen your own personal power. But even if that is not the case, it does not change things.

In the tragic days of fall 1993, I decided, not without serious inner doubts, to support you; I do not absolve myself of responsibility for that support. I believed that the use of force was at that moment a dire necessity in the face of the civil war that threatened to break out at any moment. Even then I realized that the October events could lead to a situation where the supreme powers would start regarding violence as a convenient and routine instrument for resolving political problems. But I hoped for something else: that, having overcome the crisis of legitimacy and created the beginnings of a legal base for Russia, the president and government would do everything possible for the country's peaceful and free development. The choice of alternative depended very largely on you personally, Boris Nikolayevich. I believed you would choose the latter path. I was wrong.

The 1993 Constitution endows the president with enormous powers, but it also places enormous responsibility on him, namely: to be guarantor of citizens' rights and freedoms, to ensure their security, and to safeguard law and order in the country. How have you used those powers? How have you handled the responsibility vested in you?

You have virtually stopped the judicial reform which was supposed to make the judiciary really independent of the other branches of power. You have begun openly preaching the principle "let the innocent suffer, as long as the guilty are punished."

You announced, amid much publicity, the start of a fight against organized crime in the country. To that end you gave enormous powers, going beyond the bounds of right and the law, to the power structures. The result? Criminals still roam free, while law-abiding citizens, without having gained security, are forced to tolerate the tyranny of people in uniform into the bargain.

You stated that your goal is the preservation and strengthening of the Federation's territorial integrity. The result? The ignominious and incompetent civil war that has been raging in the North Caucasus for more than a year now.

In the guise of strengthening Russia's defense capability you have cut short all attempts at a military reform that would have given Russia effective and up-to-date armed forces. The result? Expenditure on the army is increasing and the number of generals has reached indecent levels; in order to justify their existence, terms of service are being extended and draft deferrals abolished. Yet officers and men are impoverished.

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ragged, and hungry. And the traditions of humiliation, lack of rights, and corruption are as strong as ever. So why be surprised if tens of thousands of young people avoid this medieval press-ganging like the worst possible evil?

You talk about open politics, about glasnost and publicity, and at the same time you sign secret edicts concerning the most important affairs of state, you create closed institutions, and you veil in secrecy more and more information on the work of the structures of power and the situation in the country. The presidential decisionmaking mechanism has become almost as secretive as it was in the days of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. It is no secret that in your activities you rely increasingly on the special services and on their system of closed information. Can you really still fail to see how unreliable and tendentious it is?

Your personnel policy is emerging increasingly distinctly with every day that passes. Initially there were a good many competent and selfless people around you. But you were also more than willing to welcome those whose only merit was personal devotion to you. Gradually this latter principle — the party-soviet principle — in the selection of staffers became the main one: People who did not possess that quality to the necessary extent were ousted from your Staff and other government structures. What is even worse is that even within the narrow circle of those who are "devoted without flattery," a kind of natural selection took place: Those who were most successful in their careers were those who, as was obvious to the whole country, were pursuing their own personal interest — and think yourself lucky if it was not a criminal interest. The result? Look into the faces of your colleagues today, and you will stop wondering why the country does not trust your henchmen, and therefore you.

Yet you, and in your wake all the top state officials, do not care one jot for public opinion. At times of crisis, instead of open and honest explanations, you and the leaders of state departments appointed by you deign to offer us lies so obvious and hopeless that it is simply staggering. The fragile bridge of trust between society and the authorities that was erected with such difficulty in the face of a century of tradition has been broken down again.

Just over a year after the October events in Moscow, you unleashed the Chechen war. The disregard for the law, the flouting of the Constitution, the demoralization and disintegration of the army, the flagrant incompetence of the special services, the inept careerism of the top elite in the power departments, the clumsy and cynical lies voiced by the state's top people — all this was manifested here to the full. But in this crisis another characteristic of the regime created by your policy became terrifyingly apparent — the total disregard for human life as such. If 20,000, 30,000, or 40,000 people died: So what? We do not even no precisely who they were and how many of them there were — civilians, Russian soldiers, gunmen.

Blood has always been cheap in Russia, especially under the Bolsheviks. But you brought a new, "democratic" and "humanist" impetus to this ignominious national tradition. For a whole year in Chechnya "constitutional order" and "citizens' rights" were being restored by bombs and missiles. The farce of the "free elections" led (and were bound to lead) to the collapse of the already fragile hopes for peace in the region. In exactly the same way, in Pervomayskoye, under the banner of releasing the hostages, you carried out a cruel punitive act (and it failed, too) whose real aim was certainly not to save the innocent people who had been seized by terrorists. Both the violence itself and the hypocritical attempts to conceal it beneath fine words are on your conscience.

Did you understand, you and the fools who pushed you into the Chechen war, that the blood that was spilled would spring up again in the shape of intolerance, vengeance, lies, and violence? And that this evil harvest would overwhelm even the useful things that you have done for Russia?

I am far from wanting to put all the blame on you alone. The totalitarian system, on which a serious but perhaps not mortal blow was inflicted, is defending itself by its characteristic means: by generating crises, corrupting the population, supplanting social values. Your personal guilt lies in the fact that not only did you not block these tendencies, you actually encouraged them. Maybe you think you are building a Great Russia for the good of its citizens? No, your policy today is capable only of recreating in the shortest possible time a state that is open to lawlessness. In other words, you are restoring the old Bolshevik mire, only for the time being communist terminology is replaced by anticommunist rhetoric. Your possible successors will remedy that defect.

You began your democratic career as a feisty and vigorous fighter against official lies and party despotism and are ending it as the docile performer of the will of cynical power-lovers from your entourage. You pledged to build a state of the people and for the people but have constructed a bureaucratic pyramid on top of the people and against them. In the process you, while having abandoned democratic values and principles, have ceaselessly invoked democracy so that some naive person might still think even now that there

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are "democrats" in power in the Kremlin. Your policy has compromised this very term, and if democracy in Russia is to survive (and I believe it will) it will survive not because of but in spite of you.

Another thing which is personally bitter to me is the fact that you have failed yourself, being unable to develop from an obkom secretary into a person. Yet you could have done.

You made your choice. Soon we, too, will be choosing. Today you are presenting yourself as the only alternative to Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy. In vain: You have more affinities than differences. And if we have to choose between you, our free expression of will be more like choosing a protection racket [kriminalnaya "krysha"]. Many people will grudgingly cast their vote for the one from whom they will expect a little less in the way of extortion and danger. I am congenitally resistant to both "reds" and "browns." But I am not going to vote for you. And I will not advise other decent people to do so.

I considered it my duty to stay in your administration, albeit "on a voluntary basis," so long as my status enabled me to resist even a little, even in individual instances, the anti-legal and anti-human tendencies in state policy. Maybe these opportunities have not been fully exhausted even now. But I can no longer work with a president whom I do not regard as either a champion of democracy or a guarantor of the rights and liberties of my country's citizens.

I inform you that as of this date I am no longer chairman of the Commission on Human Rights Under the Russian Federation President, or a member of the Presidential Council, or a member of other presidential structures.

I think you will not regret my departure. I feel the same.

Kovalev: Reshuffle Demonstrates Yeltsin's 'Senseless' Position

LD2301181496 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 23 Jan 96

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer Svetlana Sorokina] State Duma Deputy Sergey Kovalev today announced his resignation from the post of chairman of the Human Rights Commission under the president of Russia. He also said he had left the Presidential Council as well as other councils and commissions of Yeltsin's administration. This is what Sergey Adamovich [Kovalev] said today while explaining the reasons for his resignation:

[begin recording] [Kovalev] The recent cadre reshuffle shows the monstrous and absurd position of the president, a position which is in my view senseless. He believes he will find support and find his place among the national patriots or Communists, God forbid.

Nothing of the sort will happen, because they do not need him. He simply refuses to support the democrats who brought him to power in a difficult struggle. And my resignation statement...

[Unidentified correspondent, interrupting] How is it connected with the recent events?

[Kovalev] It is directly connected with the recent events, with blood and with lies: the bloodshed that the top persons in the state are to blame for and the lies which were uttered by the same mouths. [end recording]

Russian Presidential Council Member Resigns; Cites Chechen Policy

LD2401075296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0716 GMT 24 Jan 96

[By Nadezhda Potapova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] YEKATERINBURG, January 24 (ITAR-TASS) — Prominent lawyer and Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Sergey Aleskeyev today forwarded to Boris Yeltsin his resignation from the Presidential Council and the Human Rights Commission under the President of the Russian Federation.

"From the very outset of the hostilities in Chechnya I have declared that they contradict the legal and constitutional principles of a civilised state," Alekseyev told ITAR-TASS. "The events in Pervomayskoye, where many defenseless people have suffered, have shown where such a policy can lead to," he added.

The scientist believes that the latest events have shown that a shift from democracy to forcible methods of solving problems was under way in the country. "I, just as many other public leaders of Russia, cannot and do not want to be involved in this," he stated.

Prominent human rights champion Sergey Kovalev, leader of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" Party Yegor Gaydar, and eminent publicist Otto Latsis had resigned from the Presidential Council somewhat earlier.

Medvedev Denies Mass Exodus From Yeltsin's Presidential Council

LD2401113296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1115 GMT 24 Jan 96

[By Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 24 (ITAR-TASS) — "Withdrawals of some members from the

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Presidential Council cannot be described as having a mass character," said presidential spokesman Sergey Medvedev.

In an interview with ITAR-TASS Medvedev said that the people who had recently quit the Presidential Council had formal membership in the Council since they had not taken part in the work of this consultative body for a long time. The recent sessions of the Presidential Council had a thematic character and were timed to coincide with certain steps the president thought necessary to discuss with experts, and also with Yeltsin's important visits abroad, Medvedev said.

During the past week the Presidential Council was abandoned by prominent publicist Otto Latsis, leader of the "Russia's Democratic Choice " party Yegor Gaydar, human rights activist Sergei Kovalev and scientist Sergey Alekseyev. In Medvedev's opinion, the majority of them have long terminated membership in the Council de-facto and the fact that Yeltsin satisfied their request to quit the Presidential Council has confirmed the situation de-jure, the spokesman said.

Initially, there were 28 members in the Presidential Council, whereas now, the number of its members is 23.

Russia: Human Rights Commission Expected To Lose More Members

LD2401111996 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 0900 GMT 24 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Yet another member of the presidential Human Rights Commission quit that organization today — Sergey Alekseyev, the famous human rights activist. [passage omitted]

You will remember that human rights activist Sergey Kovalev quit the Presidential Council and the Human Rights Commission yesterday. In his open letter to the president, Kovalev said he can no longer consider Yeltsin a proponent of democracy and guarantor of civil rights and liberties.

[begin Kovalev recording] There comes a time when all practical considerations have go to the devil and a completely different law applies — the law of moral compatibility or incompatibility. In this case, I simply could not take new decisions. This was preceded by desperate appeals to the president, appeals which, it has now emerged, went unanswered and did nothing to slow down the awful tragedy being played out here in full view. [end recording]

[Announcer] Meanwhile, it cannot be ruled out that there will be further departures from the presidential Human Rights Commission in the next few days. Commission member Mikhail Arutyunov spoke to Ekho Moskvy.

[begin Arutyunov recording] The president should say: Yes, the commission is necessary; although it subjects me to tough criticism, the commission should exist. Then there would be no reason to leave the commission. Provided he neither infringes nor ignores the commission as such, does not cut the commission's apparatus to the limit as is now the case, and does not transfer the apparatus to the control of the citizens' appeals directorate, we can stay in the commission. The conditions are that its opinion should not be ignored; it should be an autonomous body; there should be provision for the work of its apparatus which is subordinate to the commission chairman. If these conditions are not met, then it is pointless to carry on. [end recording]

[Announcer] I can add that, according to Arutyunov, a meeting of the commission is due to take place on 5 February. The annual report on the state of human rights in Russia will be discussed. This document will be sent both to the president and the mass media. The members will then discuss their involvement in its work.

Luzhkov Views Nomination to Yeltsin's Campaign Headquarters, Chubays

MM2301140796 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jan 96 p 2

[Interview with Mayor of Moscow Yuriy Luzhkov by Yelena Prygunova; place and date not given: "Yuriy Luzhkov: 'I Am a Pathological Optimist'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Everything is stirring and moving at the top levels of Russian power. Resignations, appointments, and rumors — that is politics today, its alpha and omega. Among our "talking heads" the mayor of Moscow is a rare exception in the public's eyes — he is someone who is noted not just for his words but for certain deeds and actions. Nonetheless, you get the impression that attempts are being made to drag even him into "big-time politics" that is past its best....

[Prygunova] Yuriy Mikhaylovich, what was your reaction to your appointment to the president's campaign headquarters as Soskovets' deputy? Was it serious? Or was it something akin to public pressure?

[Luzhkov] Actually, there has not been any appointment yet. There has been a discussion, and I know of the proposal.

[Prygunova] Whose was it? Yeltsin's, Soskovets', or somebody else's?

[Luzhkov] I think it was agreed with and supported by the president. Who came up with the idea is not so

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important. The main thing is that the proposal has been consciously accepted by me.

[Prygunova] But you have this image of a strong economic leader far removed from political intrigues. That, to my mind, is a major advantage....

[Luzhkov] Of course, the new appointment would mean participating in the political life of the state. But when fundamental questions bearing upon the country's future crop up, and when decisions are being made on which direction the state will move in, I cannot be thinking about my "image." You surely must see that the state is at a crossroads. We could swing toward radical communism. We have already had radical democracy, we are only just starting to get moving, and suddenly we would be going to the other extreme. Obviously, if the Communists were to come to power they would try to bring in a system which has already been tried and proved to be bankrupt. So we need to seek a middle way — without veering left or right.

[Prygunova] Are there any grounds to the rumors doing the rounds all last week that Luzhkov is allegedly being groomed to take over from Chernomyrdin? Do you know about this? Or do you prefer not to know, not to hear about it, not to notice it?

[Luzhkov] I know these rumors are out there. The person involved always gets to hear them. I'm afraid I have nothing sensational to tell you. I am not planning to leave Moscow.

I have said a thousand times that Moscow is my job. I love it, I feel I can be useful here, and I am not tempted by other, albeit higher-ranking, jobs. Rumors are all very well, but I will not agree to any proposals.

[Prygunova] Yuriy Mikhaylovich, could you comment on Anatoliy Chubays' resignation? Do you feel victorious?

[Luzhkov] I feel absolutely no satisfaction or joy in this regard. I consider the decision to have been right but, sadly, very belated. Chubays has harmed Russia — for me that is clear. I don't have the time to attack him now — let the Prosecutor's Office deal with it. The economy needs a new privatization concept. Those privatized enterprises which are operating successfully should go on working and not be touched. Those enterprises which have failed need to be immediately returned to state ownership and helped to get back on their feet and sort themselves out. That will be a difficult and gradual process. What has been sold for a pittance — or, more accurately, squandered — should be looked at as closely as possible from the standpoint of the law.

Next — depositors. The state should have protected its citizens from villains. I believe that we need, first, to find those villains — even involving Interpol if they are abroad — and sentence them. Second, we need to settle up with the people, perhaps using a special loan bond. This will be a slow process but it does offer a solution.

[Prygunova] Do you really believe there is a solution?

[Luzhkov] I am a pathological optimist.

Soskovets Views 'Errors' in Russia's Reform Program

LD2401112396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1116 GMT 24 Jan 96

[By Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 24 (ITAR-TASS) — First Vice-Premier of the Russian government Oleg Soskovets has called to shift orientation towards a domestic manufacturer. Addressing a collegium (board) of the Russian Committee for metallurgical industry today, Soskovets said that there had been many errors in the course of reforms caused by attempts to take over the experience of market reforms in other countries and directly apply it to Russia without taking into account Russia's specific conditions. This experience will have to be admitted as negative," Soskovets said.

"In the present stage, it is necessary to make a structural and financial manoeuvre in the direction of the correction of the government and, in particular, in the social sector," he added.

Soskovets came out in favour of concentrating funds at more technologically advanced industries, tightening control over the efficiency of budgetary allocations, improving taxation policies and establishing price control over products produced by natural monopolies.

Russia: Yavlinskiy Says Gaydar's Criticism of Yabloko 'Not Serious'

LD2301163796 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1407 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 23 (INTERFAX) — The leader of Yabloko movement Grigoriy Yavlinskiy finds the criticism of his program by the chairman of Russia's Democratic Choice party Yegor Gaydar "simply not serious". In an interview with INTERFAX Tuesday he commented on Gaydar's statement at a Monday news conference in Moscow.

Gaydar claimed the programs of Yabloko and the Communist Party are close, which manifests itself in inflation-provoking provisions and "imperial tones in discussing foreign policy priorities". He urged Yabloko

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to revise several planks of its program and expressed readiness for cooperation in that case.

"Gaydar offered us talks yesterday. We have always been ready for talks and are ready to explain our program to him as much as is necessary," Yavlinskiy said.

As regards Gaydar's suggestion to discuss Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin as a democratic presidential candidate, if he decides to run, Yavlinskiy said it would be the same as Boris Yeltsin and regretted that Gaydar did not understand this.

Primakov Urges Russia's Regions To Coordinate International Efforts

LD2401105696 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1051 GMT 24 Jan 96

[By Yuriy Kozlov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW January 24 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian Foreign minister Yevgeniy Primakov called on the regions of the country, which often maintain their own international links, to coordinate the activities with his ministry and to strictly share powers in the business.

"A strict definition and distribution of powers between bodies of state authority of the Russian Federation and its subjects is, probably, the most important problem of the construction of the Russian state at present", he told a session of the consultative council on international and foreign economic relations on Wednesday which unites regional representatives.

Primakov, making clear that international efforts should, first and foremost, work for the benefit of the whole country, said the interaction of the regions with his ministry should help solve three tasks: "the preservation of Russia as a great power, the strengthening of its territorial integrity and the all-round development of its regions".

"By now much has been done to streamline the development of international links of the subjects of the Federation, to draft common approaches, unified legal terms on the whole Russian territory", he said.

"A new stage is beginning", Primakov added explaining that the task now was to better use the links both in the interests of the state and of the regions, "as additional channels of cooperation with other countries".

Primakov also said special attention should be paid to the development of economic, cultural and humanitarian relations with CIS countries.

Russian Justice Ministry Confirms Shumeyko's 'Reforms' Movement

LD2301171296 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1407 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 23 (INTERFAX) — Russian Justice Minister Valentin Kovalev on Tuesday handed over the registry certificate of a new national movement called Reforms-New Policy headed by movement leader Vladimir Shumeyko.

Ministry checks have confirmed the movement has 56 regional branches, a ministry spokesman told INTERFAX.

Military & Space Issues

Yeltsin Promises To Pay Military Salaries, Finance Social Programs

LD2401123996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1215 GMT 24 Jan 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW January 24 (ITAR-TASS) — President Boris Yeltsin promised Defence Minister Pavel Grachev at a meeting on Wednesday to pay allowance arrears to servicemen from the federal budget as well as to finance social programmes for Russian armed forces, ITAR-TASS learned from a source, close to the Russian defence minister.

Grachev reported the president on the talks with General George Joulwan, NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, which were held in Moscow.

The minister also received instructions from the Russian leader in connection with Grachev's trip to the Kazakh capital Almaty on Thursday where the sides will discuss specific questions of cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan in defence.

Yeltsin and Grachev also discussed questions of military upbuilding in 1996. Personnel issues were not discussed, the source reported.

Duma Urges Yeltsin To Reconsider Defense Ministry Move

LD2301155996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1538 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 23 (ITAR-TASS) — The State Duma called President Yeltsin not to be in a hurry to have implemented the Defence Ministry's decision to re-subordinate Russian airborne units to military districts.

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The Duma's address to Yeltsin as the commander-in-chief says the planned move to re-subordinate airborne brigades and divisions is of dubious help to the progress of the long-proclaimed reform of the Russian armed forces.

This cardinal decision involving the defence capability of the army and fates of the military and their families may not be taken behind the scenes, without consulting those involved, the statement says.

According to the Duma, putting this decision in practice would be an end to airborne units which had been formed for decades and to airborne forces as a type of troops with a proven record of efficiency.

Yeltsin Dismisses Defense Industry Committee Chairman Glukhikh

MM2301161596 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 24 Jan 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Officially"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Russian Federation President B.N. Yeltsin has issued edicts relieving the following from their posts:

V.K. Glukhikh, chairman of the State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry, in connection with his transfer to other work; [passage omitted]

Russia: Glukhikh Dismissal Said To Be 'Tremendous Loss'

MM2401091796 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by Igor Chernyak: "Who Did Not Like Viktor Glukhikh?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yeltsin's edict relieving Viktor Glukhikh of his post as chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry came as a total surprise to the committee.

"There did not seem to be any obvious preconditions for this decision, nor has there been any serious criticism of the State Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry from the government or the press," Committee Press Secretary Yuriy Chervakov said. "What is more, Glukhikh was quite recently, on Chernomyrdin's initiative, appointed chairman of the Interstate Commission for CIS Military-Technical Cooperation, and was appointed by government decree chairman of the organizing committee for the first international exhibition of seaplane elements. If his dismissal had been long in the pipeline, these decisions would simply not have come about. What has happened over the last few days? Might the edict have been signed in connection with mistakes in privatization, as happened with Chubays? There have certainly been attempts to sell for a song enterprises of tremendous importance to the country's security. But Glukhikh opposed this — you only need to recall his tough stance in the situation with 'Rybinskiye Motory' or the Sukhoy Experimental Design Bureau. His objections also met with presidential support. But to blame Glukhikh for that is to attempt to lay the blame at someone else's door...."

Representatives of the defense industry elite have put forward a few other hypotheses in addition to these ideas,. First, the president's decision is seen as a reaction to the fact that the overwhelming majority of military-industrial complex enterprises voted for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation or the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia in the recent elections and that Glukhikh, unlike Grachev, "failed to direct" the process into the channel required by Kremlin inmates. Second, he permitted "too much freedom" among his subordinates — the reference being to statements that the president and his entourage found awkward. Third, everyone agrees that Yeltsin signed the edict at Soskovets' prompting: In the art of office intrigue Glukhikh has patently lost out to Yeltsin's unofficial "heir," who has recently been extremely busy.

Be that as it may, Glukhikh's departure was viewed with patent regret by both the State Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry and the military-industrial complex. "This is a tremendous loss for us," one interlocutor said. "And, importantly, this does no good for the cause."

It became known yesterday that Zinoviy Pak, general director of the "Soyuz" Federal Center for Dual-Purpose Technologies, has been appointed to replace Viktor Glukhikh.

Russia: Glukhikh Replacement 'Good Specialist, Excellent Organizer'

MM2401112896 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 24 Jan 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry Leadership Replaced"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By edict Boris Yeltsin yesterday relieved Viktor Glukhikh of his duties as chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry [Goskomoboronprom] in connection with his reassignment.

By another presidential edict Zinoviy Pak, formerly general director of the "Soyuz" Federal Center for Dual-Use Technology, was appointed Goskomoboronprom chairman.

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The new Goskomoboronprom chairman is well known in the scientific world. He has developed unique technologies for utilizing rare types of fuel. Professor Pak is a doctor of technical sciences and an academician of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences.

Making the decision to appoint the new Goskomoboronprom leader, Boris Yeltsin looked at several candidates. But he selected Zinoviy Pak, whom he knows to be both a good specialist and an excellent organizer with a good grasp of theory and practice at the macroeconomic level — which is very important in his new position, the Russian Federation president's press secretary stressed.

Russian Army's Use Must Be Authorized by Federation Council

LD2301202896 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1911 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KAZAN, Jan 23 (INTERFAX-Eurasia) — Armed Forces must be used on the Russian territory only with authorization from the Federation Council, Tatarstan Parliament Chairman Vasiliy Likhachev told INTERFAX-Eurasia.

On January 18, the Tatarstan parliament proposed amendments to the Russian Constitution and the Law "On Defense" which would rule out the use of the Russian Armed Forces on the Russian territory without authorization from the upper chamber.

Likhachev believes that such amendments would ensure the legal regulation of ethnic relations and render impossible the use of the army to resolve internal political crises if its use is not authorized by the Federation Council.

The Tatarstan parliament also passed a statement January 18 on the need to cease hostilities in Chechnya and resume talks.

Russia: Kokoshin, Designer Discuss Missile Development Scheme

MM2401114096 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 96 p 1

["Own information" report: "Prospects for Developing Missile Technology Discussed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Andrey Kokoshin, Russian Federation first deputy minister of defense, met 23 January this year with Gerbert Yefremov, general designer at the well-known "Mashinostroyeniye" Science and Production Association (city of Reutov, Moscow Oblast).

Questions of the prospects for developing missile technology within the framework of the long-term armament program and drawing up a project to be implemented by the Ministry of Defense jointly with the State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry, the Russian Space Agency, and other departments were discussed. Special emphasis was placed on the need to seek new, nonstandard solutions, to concentrate resources in the most important areas, and to optimize the system of collaboration in the development and production of complex types of arms.

Federal Assembly

Russia: Three Federation Council Deputy Speakers Elected

LD2401101096 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0951 GMT 24 Jan 96

[By Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 24 (ITAR-TASS) — Three Vice-Speakers of the new Council of the Federation (Upper House of the Russian Parliament) were elected here today. They include Vasiliy Likhachev, Chairman of the Tatarstan State Council, recommended by the "Greater Volga" Association, Oleg Korolev, Chairman of the Lipetsk Regional Duma, recommended by representatives of Central Russia, and Valeriy Zubov, Head of the Krasnoyarsk Territorial Administration, recommended by the "Siberian Accord" Association. Korolev and Zubov were members of the Federation Council of the first convocation.

Their candidatures were accepted by Council Speaker Yegor Stroyev in keeping with the provisional procedural rules. According to the rules adopted the day before, the Council of the Federation is to have three Vice-Speakers. However, a motion was tabled today during the discussion of the said candidatures to elect a fourth Vice-Speaker from the Northern Caucasus. This proposal is now being discussed.

Russia: Fourth Deputy Council Speaker Elected

LD2401100596 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0951 GMT 24 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 24 (ITAR-TASS) — Members of the Council of the Federation have amended the provisional procedural rules of the Upper House of the Russian Parliament, which said that it should have only three Vice-Speakers. In their opinion, the southern regions of Russia, where several "hot spots" are known to exist, should have their representative in the leadership of the Council. They elected President of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic Valeriy Kotov to this post.

Kotov was a member of the Federation Council of the first convocation.

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Russia: Stroyev Elected Federation Council Chairman

LD2301134396 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1300 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Yegor Stroyev has been elected chairman of the upper chamber of parliament, with 147 votes cast for him and 19 against.

Russia: New Council Speaker Outlines Aims

LD2301155896 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1535 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 23 (ITAR-TASS) — The newly elected Federation Council speaker Yegor Stroyev, taking over the upper house from Vladimir Shumeyko, vowed to serve the interests of Russia's political and budgetary federalism.

He said at his debut news conference today that he would have refused to be elected as a full-time speaker, and was set to combine the leadership of the house with his post of the Orel region's governor, without detriment to work in either post.

Stroyev cited as his key concern Russia's independent food programme as an alternative to the present food imports.

He told the conference that the Central Russian Economic Association, of which he is chairman, had drafted and submitted to the government a food programme.

Asked about the situation in Chechnya, Stroyev said he "always opposed" the use of force in Chechnya.

"Guns speak where politicians fail," he said, adding that "the North Caucasus has ten regions and twenty leaders, and the war should not have been begun with such a powerful representation in mind".

Stroyev stressed that he had run for the first-convocation Federation Council and for regional governorship as a maverick.

"And I remain an independent," he said.

According to Stroyev, bids for [as received] forge party platforms in the previous legislative elections were unsuccessful.

"Today there is a party of populism and a party of people who think realistically and understand the difficulties of the people," he explained, describing himself as part of the latter.

Stroyev voiced the hope that the newly elected Federation Council "will not be engrossed in political bias, and this will make the new membership different from State Duma deputies".

Russia: Zhirinovskiy Welcomes Yeltsin's Parliament Speech

LD2301132296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1320 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 23 (ITAR-TASS) — "The Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia will be ready to back the executive arm of government if the living standards of most Russians are improved by the correction of the course of reforms," LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy told a press conference at the State Duma here today.

"We liked the Russian President's speech to the Council of the Federation, delivered today" he stressed. "This speech," Zhirinovskiy added, "puts correct accents on terrorism in Russia and on the further course of reforms. Though we are an opposition party, it will be practically impossible for us to criticise any aspects of the work of the executive authorities if they correct the course of reforms in the interests of all the Russian population," the LDPR leader stressed.

Russia: Communists Said 'Quietly Aggressive' in Duma

LD2301161096 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1558 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW January 23 (ITAR-TASS) — The first days of the work of the new Russian State Duma showed that the Communists, who have over a third of seats in the lower house, are very reserved in their conduct so far, but may soon get more aggressive.

The Communists and their allies are dominating in the lower house, but not that resolutely as their opponents feared. At the same time they were very reserved and tactically adroit in winning the leading positions in the State Duma.

They got the post of the speaker, of a vice-speaker and nine out of 28 parliamentary committees. Other three factions got four committees each, while others went to some groups of deputies.

"In general the Communists are behaving much more moderately than earlier, they speak in a quiet, calm and just voice. They could have taken over all the committees, but adhered to the proportional principle",

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Pavel Bunich, the chairman of the property committee and member of the pro-government Our Home is Russia faction, told TASS on Tuesday.

However, he believes the Communists in future would act "politely, but toughly and aggressively in essence".

Bunich was backed by Irina Khakamada, an independent lawmaker from the "Russian Regions" group. She believes the Communists will be "quietly aggressive".

All their proposals would be aimed to revise privatisation in the country, to change the mechanism of financing the budget deficit and to print money "to pump up the social sphere to the maximum before (presidential) elections", she said.

Still many deputies believe there are chances for the normal work of the lower house.

"It is possible to counter the danger of turning the Duma into a battlefield on the eve of presidential elections only in one way — to concentrate deputies on a fully-fledged legislative activity, concrete work in the production of laws", said Gennadiy Burbulis, an independent deputy.

"Normal legislative activity is possible", said Konstantin Borovoy, an independent lawmaker.

He predicted clashes on many budget issues, but said the Communists, the democrats and the independents would "demonstrate an overwhelming unity in assessing the Chechen war".

Russia: Yabloko Collecting No-Confidence Vote Signatures

LD2301143196 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1414 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 23 (ITAR-TASS) — The State Duma parliamentary faction Yabloko, led by Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, on Tuesday [23 January] started collecting deputy signatures backing a no-confidence vote to the government, Yelena Mizulina of Yabloko said at the Duma plenary session.

For the no-confidence vote to be debated, at least 90 parliamentarians, or a fifth of the State Duma lower house, are to give their signatures.

If this number is obtained, rules of procedure require the Duma council to put the no-confidence issue on the agenda of a plenary sitting.

Mizulina told reporters that "the collection of signatures is going fairly actively and is bound to be finished within days."

Russia: Duma Chairman Meets With U.S. Presidential Aide

LD2301203596 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1911 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 23 (INTERFAX) — The performance of former first deputy prime minister Anatoliy Chubays regarding privatization "needs to be analyzed in the light of the recent criticism expressed by the president," Russian State Duma Chairman Gennadiy Seleznev said at a meeting today with the U.S. presidential Aide for Relations with the CIS Countries and Russia, Ambassador Jim Collins.

With regard to foreign investments in the Russian economy, Seleznev said that Russian law-makers were not interested in infringing on the rights of Western investors. He said State Duma deputies should focus on creating "a unified legislative basis for the economy" which would protect the interests of both Western investors and Russian entrepreneurs who, as he put it, now had to work "within the context of lawlessness."

Seleznev also said he considered it necessary for the new State Duma to adopt criminal and tax codes.

With regard to the Chechen problem, Seleznev said he believed that it could be resolved "by pulling out the aching teeth of [Chechen commander Shamil] Basayev and [Chechen commander Salman] Raduyev."

Nevertheless, Seleznev said he favored political settlement of the Chechen crisis, "because in the Caucasus, it is impossible to resolve problems by war."

The State Duma chairman and the U.S. presidential aide also discussed ratification of the SALT treaty by the Russian and U.S. legislatures and cooperation between the two countries' parliaments.

Russia: Seleznev: Left Plans No Counter-Revolutionary Coup

LD2301153696 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1407 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Jan 23 (INTERFAX) — Russian State Duma Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev has declared that the left, constituting 35 percent in the lower house of parliament, is not planning "any counter-revolutionary coups".

At a Tuesday meeting in Moscow with French Foreign Minister Hervet de Charette, he said the majority in the Duma wants earnest lawmaking, the quality of which will not be affected by the current presidential election campaign.

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The meeting was reported to INTERFAX by the parliamentary press service.

According to the French official, his country views the Duma election returns as an expression of popular will, sovereignty and political freedom.

The minister spoke of the French stance on Russia's membership in the Council of Europe. Russia's full membership in the council will be a result of democratic development in the country, he said.

Russia: Duma Speaker Opposes War in Chechnya

LD2301183996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1819 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW January 23 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian State Duma speaker Gennadiy Seleznev opposes the war in Chechnya, but believes Chechen separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev and his chief terrorists Salman Raduyev and Shamil Basayev should be eliminated.

The Chechen problem can be solved by "pulling out sick teeth - Dudayev, Basayev whose hands are stained with blood", Seleznev told US ambassador at large James Collins on Tuesday.

However, "problems in the Caucasus cannot be solved by war", he added.

Speaking on his attitude to foreign investments in Russia, Seleznev said "we are not interested in infringing on the rights of western investors. We want to create a unified economic legislative base which would protect the interests of western businessmen and of Russian entrepreneurs who are now working in conditions of legal arbitrariness".

Russia: Duma Speaker Seleznev Interviewed

MM2301140296 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Jan 96 pp 1, 2

[Account of press conference by newly elected State Duma Chairman Gennadiy Nikolayevich Seleznev on 18 January 1996, transcribed by Valentina Nikiforova; place not specified: "Without a Monopoly on the Truth" — first paragraph is introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Thursday [18 January] the new [State Duma] chairman held his first press conference, which immediately refuted the forewarnings by certain politicians to the effect that now that the Communists have arrived in the Duma, they will hold rallies and stifle it with their monopoly on the truth. To prove my point, I will cite some questions from journalists (not all, naturally) and the chairman's answers, as well as several questions exclusive to PRAVDA.

Economics, Economics, Economics

[Question] You have said that for the moment you will not be raising the issue of no confidence in the government, so that you can see which figures will fill the vacancies, although Yabloko has already declared no confidence in the government. Why are you waiting for reshuffles in the government: After all, you have stated that you did not intend to be part of it?

[Seleznev] It is not because we are waiting to be offered posts. We have seen that the president and the government have started implementing our aims, the aims of the opposition. After all, Chubays was the most odious and he has been removed, and other ministers whose work was poor are also being dismissed. We have heard that the president is insisting on and the premier supporting, the adoption of a separate program for the social protection of the population — these were our demands too. Incidentally, we will discuss the program in the Duma.

[Question] Which drafts do you consider to be priorities in economic legislation, and which laws would you suggest be reviewed?

[Seleznev] The economic committees have prepared a number of amendments to the law on banks — unfortunately the laws become obsolete very quickly. We must finally settle the question of the draft law on emergency measures to extricate Russia from the crisis — parliamentary hearings have been held, but the first reading stage has yet to be reached. The fate of the draft on the state order has not been resolved. Obviously we will insist on amending the law on the budget — the budget-funded sectors do not even get a pittance according to this law. And after all, the president himself threatened to punish the government for keeping back wages and pensions. [Seleznev ends]

For PRAVDA, the State Duma chairman added: "We will strengthen the articles concerning the defense industry, science, education, and culture. Plus we need to complete the draft law on nationalization."

[Question] In one of your speeches you said that the second phase of the privatization is not proceeding in accordance with the law. A group of deputies (Bratishchev and others) are proposing to conduct the nationalization of the basic sectors, such as the fuel and energy complex. Are the Communists aware of their responsibility for such statements and how do they imagine the nationalization of a company like Lukoil, for example?

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[Seleznev] Yes, they are. The State Duma rejected the program for the second phase of privatization precisely because it is supposed to run in parallel with the nationalization, but the pushy Chubays managed to get an edict out of the president on the start of the second (monetary) phase of privatization. But after all, the State Duma examined three versions of the law, and one basic one was chosen out of these — the one prepared by the Committee for Economics, in order to settle by law which enterprises should be put into which hands — whether private, joint-stock, or state hands. Believe me, no one will send revolutionaries off to Lukoil to say: "Your time has run out, gentlemen. The state is taking your shares and from this day on you are a state company."

Do you know why the Land Code, which was only given its first reading, is not in operation?

It is not because of the Communists' contrariness, you must not turn them into caricatures. The issue at stake is to prevent the sale of arable land, land which contains minerals. We will carefully work on every article of the land code to ensure that the main wealth, as Leo Tolstoy said, which we received from God, does not end up being given to some devil!

Chechnya, Terrorism — When Will It End

[Question] How do you see the role of the State Duma in settling the crisis in Chechnya? Do you consider it necessary to regulate the use of armed force within the country to ensure that operations to release hostages do not lead to their deaths and to the destruction of the villages occupied by terrorists?

[Seleznev] It seems to me that the Duma should not get off with mere political statements. For a start, a complex of measures is required, rooted in a serious legislative base. The law on the Security Council is being prepared — it should be well-informed and provide quick solutions to various problems. Today it is essentially a roundtable where everyone just expresses their opinion.

Second. A law on the Armed Forces and on military service which says that the Army cannot be used against its own people has been adopted. But these laws are constantly being violated. The deputies and the communist faction have appealed to the Constitutional Court, which has ruled that the war in Chechnya is an act of tyranny carried out by the president from its very outset. We believe that before starting combat operations, you should weigh everything up, how to calm down General Dudayev, rather than how to satisfy the vanity of Grachev, who organized the pre-New Year "outing" through Groznyy. Today we are reaping the harvest of this casual attitude. And the more time passes, the more difficult it is to solve the problem in this region. But I am sure that the correct solution will be found. I am convinced that prosecutors should speak to terrorists and bandits. I do not understand why the General Prosecutor's Office, which has an arrest warrant, has still not managed to arrest the culprits and start investigation proceedings.

To our misfortune we have also found out what international terrorism is. I believe that we have to fight it by toughening up the legislative base. Unfortunately I do not remember any famous trials in which even one terrorist was convicted and it was made clear on the basis of which article he was convicted and how he was punished. It is strange: There are plenty of terrorists, but in the courts there are no terrorism cases. The prosecutor ought to speak to terrorists.

[Question] Then there is banditry. I stood up for the investors in "Tibet," I was threatened, and the investors have already been beaten up.

[Seleznev] Write a letter to the general prosecutor, I will sign it.

[Question] The individual is unprotected.

[Seleznev] One of the first laws that will be adopted is the law on the human rights commissioner.

Speakers Will Meet, Peoples Will Be Brought Together

[Question] Do you propose to meet with the parliamentary speakers of the CIS countries, for example Ukraine and Belarus?

[Seleznev] Definitely. Then it will be easier for the presidents to mix with each other, and people have been waiting for this for a long time. I would very much like the new parliament to look differently at the CIS, and help develop economic relations and solve the problem of customs duties, borders, and the ruble area. The Duma has its Committee for International Affairs and groups of friendship with all parliaments in the world with whom diplomatic relations have been established. But the near abroad is more kindred, although we must not fence ourselves off from the world: We must convince the frightened world that horrors will not begin tomorrow with the arrival of the communists in the State Duma.

The President, the Constitution, and the State Duma

[Question] The State Duma has already raised the issue of making amendments to the Constitution with the

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aim of expanding parliament's powers. Will the present Duma raise these questions?

[Seleznev] Yes. The Committee for Legislation, which is now headed by V. Isakov, already has 15 amendments which have been seriously worked on. We will discuss them, in order to put right that hasty Constitution and strengthen the role of the legislators at least in questions of monitoring the government's activity, and maybe that of the president. There is not a single state where the executive works unsupervised, and the legislative organ cannot check how a law it has elaborated and adopted is being implemented.

[Question] The State Duma has come up against the opposition of the president — he has returned draft laws which have been adopted by deputies. How do you intend to build relations with the president? The previous speaker had good relations with him and took him flowers on his birthday.

[Seleznev] There were both objective and subjective reasons for returning the drafts. We voted immediately for some of the drafts, without examining them in three readings, although our lawyers warned us not to be hasty.

[Question] Do you intend to go through the motions or be a political figure?

[Seleznev] The State Duma chairman cannot just go through the motions, because the legislative organ adopts documents which direct the life of a huge country.

[Question] So, interaction with the president is vital?

[Seleznev] Yes. Maybe it is a good thing that the State Duma chairman represents the left-wing spectrum, the opposition. I know how carefully information is filtered for the president and the premier. Maybe they are interested in my opinion not only as chairman of the chamber, but also as the representative of left-wing forces?

[Question] Gennadiy Nikolayevich, PRAVDA readers are constantly asking about the party's property and funds formed from their contributions and taken away following the events of August 1991. Does the State Duma not intend to restore justice?

[Seleznev] I do not rule out the possibility that this question will be raised and may be settled in a positive way: This is a question of a part of property which has indisputably been formed using Communists' funds. The Constitutional Court ruling must simply be carried out.

[Question] Also, another question, just as important as the economic ones — television.

[Seleznev] The president has returned to us the draft law on the special procedure for the privatization of the first television channel. We must see what he disagrees with, but make sure that the unlawful privatization of the first channel is stopped. We must create a powerful state television structure which could include the first and second channels and maybe some of the Leningrad channels. Determine how many hours of state broadcasting we are paying for, and let the other companies buy up the remaining time. But the state should have television which is state television by status and by content. It must not be kept in a state of impoverishment, and it must not be forced to humble itself before shady structures and advertising companies. People who work there should feel that they are needed by the state. But now, by paying for 30-40 percent of needs, we ourselves are prompting them to look for sponsors.

[Question] Gennadiy Nikolayevich, what do you expect from PRAVDA?

[Seleznev] I expect it to continue to be an incisive left-wing opposition newspaper. To be interesting, so that you can read information in it which other newspapers do not provide, and to publish materials which will stir every family.

Legislative, Regulatory Documents 14-20 Jan

96P50038

[FBIS Report] The following is a listing of CIS legislation recently published in the press of the CIS compiled by FBIS. Numbers within parens indicate approximate wordage. Entries followed by the notation "Text" have been translated inio English and are available in FBIS publications.

RUSSIA:

SECTION I: ECONOMIC LEGISLATION (EXPORT-IMPORT, BANKING, PRIVATIZATION, AUCTIONS, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT)

Chernomyrdin-Signed 25 November Government Decree No. 1160 On Measures Related To Russia's Joining International Copper Research Group. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 96 p 4) (300)

Soskovets-Signed 25 November Government Decree No. 1664 Accepting Goskomimushchestvo Proposal On Privatization Of Buryat Republic Geological Exploration Expedition. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 96 p 6) (150)

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Chernomyrdin-Signed 12 December Government Decree No. 1230 On Approval Of Statute (Not Published) On Licensing Design And Exploratory Work Connected With Land Utilization, Accompanied By Linkov Commentary. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 96 p 6) (100/400)

Chernomyrdin-Signed 16 December Government Decree No. 1239 On Establishment Of State Fund For Conversion, Appointment Of Board Of Trustees. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 96 p 4) (1000) (Text)

Government 26 December Decree No. 1262 On Draft Presidential Edict On Measures To Guarantee Stabilization Of Economic Situation In Ingush Republic, Recommending Draft Edict Be Submitted To Yeltsin For Signing. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 96 p 6) (60)

Government 31 December Decree No. 1299 Amending Import Tariffs Applicable To Fresh Apples. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Jan 96 p 6) (400) Government 31 December Directive No. 1789 Approving Various Russian Ministries And Organizations And Federal Organs Of Executive Power For Implementation Of Russian-CIS Agreements In Sphere Of Currency And Export Control. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 96 p 11) (150)

Federal Law No. 1 Of 4 January Introducing Amendments And Additions To Article 5 Of Earlier Law On Amendments And Additions To Law On The Central Bank Of The RSFSR. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Jan 96 p 5) (200)

Yeltsin-Signed Federal Law No. 6 Of 10 January On Additional Guarantees Of Social Protection For Court Justices And Employees Of Court Apparatuses, Accompanied By Listing Of Salaries Of Justices As Percentage Of Salary Of Supreme Court Chairman. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 96 p 3 (1000/200)

Federal Law No. 8 Of 12 January On Interments, Funerals. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 96 pp 4-5) (6500)

Yeltsin-Signed 12 January Federal Law No. 9 On Amendments And Additions To Law On Foundations Of Federal Housing Policy. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 96 p 6) (400)

Presidential 13 January Edict No. 37 Amending 16 August 1995 Edict On Social Guarantees For Persons Combining Federal Post With Duties As Government Employee. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 96 p 4) (300)

State Duma Decree No. 7 Of 17 January Appointing G.N. Seleznev Speaker Of State Duma. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 96 p 1) (70)

Yeltsin 18 January Edict No. 61 Releasing Shakhray From State Duma Speakership. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 96 p 1) (80)

SECTION II: POLITICAL (INTERNATIONAL AND CIS AFFAIRS, ELECTIONS, CRIME, POLLUTION)

Government 12 December Decree No. 1227 On Certification Of Refugees, With Appended Statute On Procedure For Filling, Issuing, Exchanging Such Certificates, Detailed Description Of Blank Certificate. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 96 p 6) (150/750/600)

Government 18 December Directive No. 1732 Approving Use By Kabardino- Balkaria Of French Credit For Purchase Of Equipment For Manufacture Of Infusions And Medicines, With Commentary By A. Linkov On Rich Potential Of Republic For Economic Development, Especially Of Raw Materials Base But Lack Of Finance Available. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 96 p 6) (200) (Text)

Text Of Government 26 December Decree No. 1265 On Conclusion Of Russian Agreement With Azerbaijan On Oil Transit Via Russian Territory. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 96 p 11) (150) (Text)

Government 26 December Decree No. 1279 Listing Members Of State Commission For Defining Border Between Ingush Republic And Chechen Republic. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 96 p 6) (500)

Government 26 December Decree No. 1300 On Russia-Kyrgyzstan Agreement Regulating Foreign Economic Activity. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 96 p 11) (150)

Chernomyrdin-Signed 26 December Government Decree No. 1738 On Implementation Of Presidential Edict No. 159 On Establishing Information-Communication System For Federal Assembly's Federation Council. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 96 p 6) (300) (Text)

Supreme Court Plenum 26 December Ruling No. 9 Amending, Supplementing Certain Previous Plenum Resolutions On Application Of RF Code Of Criminal Procedure. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Jan 96 p 6) (2400)

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Government 31 December Decree No. 1303 On Russian-Belarusian Pricing Policy Agreement. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 96 p 11) (150)

Yeltsin 6 January Directive No. 10 Listing Members Of Working Group For Implementation Of Edict No. 8 Of 5 January On Convening Federation Council. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Jan 96 p 5) (500) (Text)

Yeltsin 6 January Edict No. 14 Ordering Foreign Ministry To Negotiate Consular Agreement With Monaco, Specifying That Consul General In Marseille Is Also to Become Consul General To Monaco When Agreement Is Reached. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Jan 96 p 6) (150)

Yeltsin-Signed 6 January Edict No. 15 On State Support For Russian Culture Fund, Accompanied By Commentary From Fund Presidium Chairman Mikhalkov. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 96 p 6) (600/750)

Government 8 January Decree No. 4 On RF, CIS Interstate Statistical Committee Agreement On Terms For Latter's Presence On RF Territory. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 96 p 11) (250)

Government 8 January Decree No. 5 On RF, Belarusian Agreement On Mutual Equivalence Of Documents Relating To Education, Academic Degrees. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 96 p 11) (150)

RF Government 8 January Directive No. 10 Authorizing Payment To Government Body For Preparation Of Excise Duty-Paid Stick-On Labels For Tobacco And Liquor Containers. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 96 p 4) (60)

Yeltsin 9 January Edict No. 18 On Procedure For Awarding Officer Rank To Citizens Who Have Completed Training Under Reserve Officer Training Program And Drafting Them For Military Service. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Jan 96 p 5) (900)

Yeltsin 9 January Edict No. 21 On Measures To Regulate Development, Production, Sale, Acquisition For Purposes Of Sale, Import Into And Export From Russian Federation, And Use Of Special Technical Facilities Designed For Secret Obtaining Of Information. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Jan 96 p 4) (800)

Federal Law No. 2 Of 9 January Introducing Amendments And Additions To Law On Protection Of Consumer Rights And RSFSR Code On Administrative Crimes. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Jan 96 pp 3-4, 5) (16000)

Yeltsin-Signed Federal Law No. 4 Of 10 January On Reclamation, Development. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 96 pp 3-4) (7000)

Federal Law No. 5 Of 10 January On Foreign Intelligence. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Jan 96 pp 4-5) (8000) (Text)

Government 12 January Decree No. 11 On Improving Information Provision For Russian Population. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Jan 96 p 6) (1400)

RF 12 January Federal Law No. 10 On Trade Unions, Their Rights And Guarantees Of Their Activity. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 96 pp 3-4) (8000)

SECTION III: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

RF Government 8 December Directive No. 1697 On Preferential Loan Of R15 Billion For Modernization Of Molecular Electronics Institute And 'Mikron' Plant. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Jan 96 p 1) (200)

Chernomyrdin 12 December Decree No. 1215 On Creating 'Tekhnopolis Zarechnyy' Scientific And Production Complex In Sverdlovsk Oblast. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Jan 96 p 1) (600) (Text)

Chernomyrdin-Signed 27 December Government Directive No. 1736 On Measures To Ensure Implementation Of Federal Law On Amendments And Additions To RF Law On Social Protection For Citizens Affected By Radiation Following Chernobyl Accident. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 96 p 5) (450)

Government 27 December Directive No. 1769 Appointing Officials For Suffa Radio Astronomical Observatory. (Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 96 p 11) (150)

KAZAKHSTAN:

Nazarbayev-Signed 23 December Edict On Real Estate. (Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jan 96 p 3) (2000)

Nazarbayev-Signed 25 December Edict On State Registration Laws On Real Estate, Transactions. (Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jan 96 p 4) (2000)

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TATARSTAN:

Mukhametshin-, Bakirov-Signed 6 June Decree No. 346 'On The Procedure For Supplying Pharmaceuticals And Medical Articles To The Public.' (Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN in Russian 15 Jun 95 p 2) (700) (Text)

Regional Affairs

Chernomyrdin Signs Agreement on Release of Funds for Miners

LD2401121796 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 24 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Postfactum agency has just reported that the miners' picketing of the government building has ended. This happened after Vitaliy Budko, chairman of the Russian Trade Union of Coal Industry Workers, read to the pickets the text of the agreement signed today by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and representatives of the Ministry for Fuel and Power Engineering, Rosugol and the miners' unions. According to this document, 600 billion rubles will be allocated from the federal budget to the coal industry during the next few weeks.

Russian Government Grants Kostroma Oblast R7,554 Million in Aid

MM2301151696 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Jan 96 p 1

[Untitled Russian Federation Government directive No. 1780 signed by Russian Federation Government Chairman V. Chernomyrdin in Moscow, on 31 December 1995 under the general heading, "Russian Federation Government to the Regions: To Kostroma Oblast"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The sum of 7,554 million rubles [R] is to be allocated to Kostroma Oblast Administration in 1995 [as published] from the Russian Federation Government contingencies fund to eliminate the aftermath of emergency situations, including R2,554 million to fund emergency rebuilding work at housing and municipal service projects and projects in the social sphere and R5,000 million at power generation projects.

[signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government

Russia: Volgograd Fails To Reach Draft Quota; Evasion Cited

MM2401101896 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jan 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "One in Three Is Draft-Dodger"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the first time in the past few years Volgograd has failed to meet Moscow's requirements by the official last day of the draft. Out of 4,380 potential servicemen, only 3,800 had been successfully registered and assigned by early January. Only one in eight urban rayons coped with their task. In several rayons the number of draft-dodgers came to more than a third of those drafted. The numbers are being made up, as is usually the case, with uncomplaining country people.

In this draft fewer Volgograders than usual were drafted to the president's regiment or to the Airborne Troops. On the other hand, one in every five Volga people serves in the Navy or on the border.

Russia: Bashkiria's 'Socioeconomic Well-Being' Reported

MK2401081296 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Jan 96 p 3

[Unattributed, untitled NEGA report]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bashkiria — The lowest unemployment level in the Urals regions in 1995 was registered in Bashkiria: 2.4 percent of the overall able-bodied population (2.6 percent in the region on average). Early last year, unemployment was 1.34 percent; 71 percent of the Bashkir unemployed are women.

Bashkiria is becoming a zone of growing migration. According to the migration service, 22,000 refugees and forced migrants have arrived in the republic, and their inflow is constantly growing. On one hand, the influx of refugees points to the republic's socioeconomic well-being, but, on the other, it increases the strain on the republic's budget. This process calls for legal regulation.

Ivankov Interviewed on 'Siberian Agreement' Association

964F0815A Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian 10 Jan 96 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Ivankov, general director of the Executive Board of the "Siberian Agreement" Interregional Association, by V. Maltseva; place and date not given: "For Whom the 'Siberian Agreement' Works"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Maltseva] Vladimir Ivanovich, the "Siberian Agreement" has been in existence for five years, and they have coincided with a time that has been characterized more by centrifugal than conciliatory trends. How realistic is the achievement of the goals declared in the name of the association?

[Ivankov] The "Siberian Agreement" is a unique formation, it is not a new management body, it is a public association. The association does not interfere in and does not direct the activity of the oblast, kray, or other

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authorities. But problems common to its participants are resolved thanks to the "Siberian Agreement."

We consider one of the main ones the health of each Siberian. It is influenced by many factors, the cleanliness of the air, the water, and the soil included.

The state of health of the population of Siberia, which was analyzed by scientists of the Siberian department of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences at our request, proved to be not as good as many people believe when they wish their near ones and dear ones "Siberian good health." This problem has become so serious that the members of the association council adopted a decision on the formation of the "Health of the Population of Siberia" federal program. We are now working with the government on the search for resources to implement it. One component of the program connected with the protection of mother and child is already being phased in. Centers for the care of newborn children are operating in almost every oblast, kray, and republic. These centers have been fitted with the most modern equipment. There is, in addition, a number of interregional specialized medical centers, which will render the most highly skilled assistance.

Sixteen such centers have been established: for genetics (Tomsk), the treatment of gallstone illnesses and ophthalmology (Krasnoyarsk), antipain, homeopathic and spinal disease (Novosibirsk), oriental medicine (Ulan-Ude), and others.

[Maltseva] And are people treated in these centers for money or how?

[Ivankov] For money. But the payment comes from the funds of the health care authorities that send the patient to a center for treatment. If the patient applies to a center on his own initiative, he himself has to pay.

We are prepared to consider all projects that meet three main requirements: relevance, short financial recovery period, interest of several territories.

[Maltseva] Based on the project requirements you have cited, the most relevant, rapidly recoverable, and interesting for all is the export of gold, furs, timber, and scientific developments.

[Ivankov] Your list would be very suitable for suicides. But none have been observed as yet among the Siberian leaders. The priorities for them are problems of social development. All the rest are even today built into this, it may be said, strategic program. And always the same principle: to prepare neither for death nor for life but to live today—interestingly and in full.

It is appropriate here to mention an international conference on the social rehabilitation of the handicapped which was held in Novosibirsk. Attempts were made there not only to find mechanisms of the interaction of various institutions to help the handicapped but also to undertake a kind of psychological restructuring: to consider distributive programs as part of the assistance, whose main objective is the integration of people with limited possibilities in society. There is a place for the handicapped in life, and they themselves have proven this, working effectively in various spheres of the economy.

[Maltseva] A considerable amount of money and other resources are needed for this, all the same. Where are they to come from?

[Ivankov] We could, as an example, take a look at the Kemerovo people's experience. Major community organizations, various foundations, and banks and commercial institutions are involved in the realization of social programs there. A 1 percent sales tax has been introduced, and the funds that are obtained are channeled into social needs.

[Maltseva] If I have understood you correctly, there are already many various projects of a social focus. At what stages of development are they?

[Ivankov] It would not seem possible to speak about all of them—this is very voluminous material. I shall, therefore, list several projects that concern our Siberian directly.

Without waiting for the adoption of the "Health of the Population of Siberia" program in full, we have prepared bills on Lake Baykal and on the Altay environmental and economic zone. And we recently considered in Novosibirsk together with representatives of a number of oblasts and the Ministry of Environmental Protection the draft Clean Ob program. The point being that the pollution of our Mother Ob is already becoming dangerous. It needs to be saved, but the efforts of just Novosibirsk Oblast alone are insufficient for this. We need to pool the resources of all the territories in the Ob basin, and the participation of federal institutions is essential also. We have reached agreement with the government that a Clean Ob federal program should be adopted.

We have managed to move from the "report" stage the Siberian Bus program: 30 vehicles have been assembled at the Kuzbassavtobus Stock Company, which was formed specially for this purpose. Three-fourths of the material, components, and units for this factory have been assimilated or are in the assimilation phase at 40 plants of Siberia.

The realization of this program will reduce to a considerable extent transport costs in the haulage of buses

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and spares from the European part of Russia to Siberia and will cater for the region's need for buses of 20 percent greater capacity. When rated capacity—500 buses a year—has been reached, there will be an additional 3,200 new jobs. Stage two of the project—2,000 buses a year—will provide work for a further 10,000 Siberians approximately.

The "Siberian Agreement" is also involved in one further serious problem for our cold climes—heating. The OSIN public association, which has been specially formed under the auspices of the association, has several individual heat-supply system projects. It is estimated that the heating system that is being developed will be 75 percent cheaper than the heaters of the German Wissman firm that are well known here.

Plans include cooperation with the Wolf firm—the heating system market leader. As soon as a certificate for the operation of these "little furnaces" in Russia has been obtained, we will acquire them on a mutually profitable basis.

Also of interest is one further "heating" program with the unfortunate, it is true, but, on the other hand, accurate, name of "Briquetting." We are talking about the production of fuel briquettes. So that people do not have to handle a shovel and a dirty coal bucket but a civilized briquette made of coal products. It is important that such production may be organized at any mine that is being closed down and also where there are peat bogs and anthracite, in Novosibirsk Oblast also, that is. After all, our peat reserves are very substantial, and we have anthracite also—well-organized production and treatment at the Sibantratsit Stock Company in Listvyanka.

A test model of the briquetting device is ready, and we are working with potential investors.

[Maltseva] Vladimir Ivanovich, in which areas are the programs in the most developed phase?

[Ivankov] As we say now, the "most advanced" are the programs in agricultural policy and food, health care, culture, and fiscal policy.

[Maltseva] To take the last of the areas that you mentioned, what real achievements may be described most briefly?

[Ivankov] I consider the most important achievement of the "Siberian Agreement" the fact that we prompted the government to consult with the regions when the budget is being drafted.

Last year we took an active part in work on the concept of Russia's budgetary and tax policy for 1996. Of the 26 fundamental amendments to the draft concept that we proposed, 20 were adopted at the preliminary discussions of the 1996 budget in Krasnoyarsk. The proposals include support for the commodity producers, a reduction in the tax burden and the level of arrears, and the restoration of order in trade.

[Maltseva] In trade? How?

[Ivankov] According to figures of the State Committee for Statistics, a citizen of Russia makes one out of every four purchases at the markets. We propose the compulsory licensing of all forms of trading activity. This means both the responsibility of the vendor and a source of growth of budget revenue via taxes.

At the present time we are working on the introduction of a system of bill circulation. Plans include the creation of a Siberian Bill of Exchange Union so that the bills of kray and oblast administrations may circulate freely within the framework of the "Siberian Agreement," alleviating the arrears and clearance payment problems.

[Maltseva] And in accordance with the residual principle of our economy, a few words about the culture of Siberia.

[Ivankov] Three interregional cultural programs are incorporated in the federal program and have this year via the Ministry of Culture acquired earmarked funding. These are programs of support for young talent, the development of folk trades and crafts, and the independent amateur arts. The question of the renovation of the prep school attached to the Novosibirsk Glinka Conservatory, which, with our assistance, has been allocated 1.5 billion rubles, has been settled also.

It cannot all be described all at once. Almost 20 coordination councils in various fields which I have not even had a chance to mention are at work in the "Siberian Agreement." Their entire activity is geared to what I mentioned at the start: the "Siberian Agreement" is working for each Siberian, to ensure that life be easier for him in our difficult times.

Economic Issues

U.S. Business Organization Assesses Russia's Investment Climate

MK2301131396 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 20 Jan 96 p 5

[Report by Vadim Bardin: "Now the Government Has Something To Read at Its Leisure"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The date of 17 December 1995 [parliamentary election] is a milestone not only on Russia's internal political road, but also on the

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road of promoting its relations with the West. The prospects of having the "leftward march" continued in the presidential election on 16 June 1996 makes Western partners draw certain conclusions. Two scenarios are possible in the area of credit and investment contacts over the next six months: The West will either stick to an unambiguous wait-and-see policy, camouflaged by verbal support for Russian reforms, or make an attempt to promote economic stabilization in Russia by activating contacts, thus enhancing chances for the continuation of the present course. As for the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia [ACCR], judging by its "white papers" on the Russian investment climate submitted to the Russian Government, it has already made its choice.

The Sweet

The American Chamber of Commerce in Russia has marked the second anniversary of its activity by a significant elevation in its status as regards relations with the Russian Government. Whereas earlier the Chamber assumed that its main objective was to establish informal contacts with governmental officials at all levels, to lobby for this or that project, or to defend the interests of investors who suffered from the excessive diligence of Russian fiscal services, now it has submitted to the Russian Government, for the first time ever, the results of its analytical activity, i.e., "white papers." This has been done within the framework of preparation for the sixth meeting of the Russian-U.S. Commission on Economic and Technical Cooperation, due to be held at the end of January, headed by Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin and U.S. Vice President Al Gore. The Chamber has started to prepare analytical reviews of the Russian investment climate in 1995, but whereas last year the official addressees of the "white papers" were members of U.S. delegations conducting negotiations with their Russian colleagues, now the Russian Government has also joined the circle of their readers.

True, the new readers have somewhat spoiled the solemn effect of this event: Whereas dinners and receptions given by the ACCR are eagerly frequented by leaders of the government and major economic agencies, at the "white papers'" transmittal ceremony the Russian leadership was represented by Mikhail Tarasov, an aide to Viktor Chernomyrdin, and Nikolay Drozdov, deputy minister of foreign economic relations and executive secretary of the Chernomyrdin-Gore Commission, who are definitely below the ceremonial level.

This notwithstanding, it is not by chance that the ACCR's influence has grown. At present, 240 U.S. companies are members of it, and the total estimated volume of their investments in the Russian economy amounts to $2 billion (according to the Economics Ministry, the total amount of foreign investment in Russia over the period from 1991 to October 1995 is $4.9 billion). It is noteworthy that the Chamber is ready to become internationalized by having opened its doors to all foreign companies acting in Russia (including those representing the CIS countries) and even Russian firms. Such a policy is aimed at becoming a serious partner of the Russian authorities.

The Bitter

The absence of those for whom the "white papers" were meant at the ceremony in the "Slavyanskaya" [hotel] can be attributed to the fact that their substance did not promise an easy life for the readers. The ACCR's release contains no revelations, which could well consist of promises of a flow of credits and investments. The American businessmen, however, have remained true to pragmatism. Their verdict was harsh: "A rise in investments is impeded by the existing legislation and tax system, inefficient bureaucratic machinery, and an undeveloped financial system, accompanied by excessive state control, a general weakness in infrastructure, and the uncertainty caused by the upcoming presidential election." Questions, therefore, arise: Is the government able to eliminate the above obstacles, and could a considerable rise in investments be expected under such conditions? The answers to both questions are surely negative. The adoption of the law "On Production Sharing" will hardly help either, although, according to Peter Sherou [name as transliterated], ACCR executive director, the law is not as bad as people say.

Russian Premier Upbeat on Economy, Reassures Foreign Investors

MK2301135496 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 23 Jan 96 pp 1, 3

[Report by Vadim Bardin: "Investors Have Come to Russia To Give Moral Support to Viktor Chernomyrdin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday the top of the Russian Government moved from the White House to the President Hotel, where a routine session of the Foreign Investment Advisory Council was held, chaired by Viktor Chernomyrdin. In spite of the fact that Russia's economic policy has recently been distancing itself visibly from Western recommendations, the possibility to enlist the moral support of the world investment community is something the Russian premier could use, especially considering that, according to some reports, Viktor Chernomyrdin will not attend this year's economic forum in Davos. The reason must be that the forum will take place in early February, and this

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is when Boris Yeltsin will give an official go-ahead to his presidential campaign.

Livshits Did Not Move Into Chubays' Chair

Both the organizers and the participants in the meeting did everything to make sure that yesterday's Advisory Council session did not in any way differ from previous ones. Indeed, there was the same oval table in the familiar hall of the President Hotel and the same leaders of foreign companies implementing major investment projects in Russia. There has been only one, and clearly positive, change among the foreign participants in the Council: Their number has grown to 26. This cannot be said of the Russian participants. On one hand, all of the leaders of the government economic departments were present. After replacing Tatyana Paramonova, Sergey Dubinin, who in his time represented the Finance Ministry, returned to the Council. But a gap in the Russian ranks was created by the resignation of Anatoliy Chubays, Viktor Chernomyrdin's recent deputy not only in the government but also in the Advisory Council. The premier's attempt to attribute Chubays' exit to reasons far removed from politics — yesterday Chernomyrdin said that cadre reshuffles in the government "are 99 percent not politically motivated" — looked rather clumsy.

The meeting organizers sought to compensate for Chubays' loss by inviting presidential economic adviser Aleksandr Livshits (so far Livshits has not taken part in the Council's work). But in effect there was no replacement that could provoke speculation about Chubays' future successor in the government. Aleksandr Livshits preferred the Kremlin to the President Hotel and the company of the president to the company of top government officials and foreign corporate leaders. He sat — to the right of Boris Yeltsin — waiting for the foreign investors to arrive at the Kremlin.

The Advisory Council session did not pass without a mini-sensation: Russian participants gave, to put it mildly, differing assessments of the current economic situation. First Chernomyrdin appraised the present moment as the finalization of the liberalization stage. In substantiation of that he said that 70 percent of the Russian GDP is produced in the non-state sector. As concerns the growth in prices, it has slowed down: In January, according to the government, it will not exceed 4 percent. Next, things did not appear quite so smooth. Stressing that inflation control remains the number one economic policy problem, the premier announced the government's readiness to introduce quarterly indexation for enterprise production assets, and this is a clear preference for supporting investments, not inflation control.

The premier's statement was followed by Economy Minister Yevgeniy Yasin's. His analysis and assessments were much tougher. He recognized that the production decline at the close of 1995 accelerated: That was the reaction by export producers to the strengthening of the ruble. According to Yasin, in 1996 Russia is in a position of unstable balance, from which fact the economy minister made two conclusions: "Either forward and upward on the path of reform or backward and downward." Therefore, the premier and his minister see Russia's future differently, which could mean that Yasin (incidentally, referred to by foreign participants in the session exclusively as professor, not minister) is ready to build his future elsewhere than in the government.

The Investors' Tax Concern

Naturally the Council's work was not reduced to analyzing the personal composition of the Russian Government and the prospects for changes in it. As usual, foreign investors used the Council to bring up the subject of softening the investment climate. Russian taxes were the favorite topic in this respect.

John Pepper, executive director of Procter & Gamble, made a comparative analysis of the tax systems of Russia and Great Britain. The conclusion is not encouraging for Russia: To ensure, with other things being equal (the main cost components), an equal profit margin from the realization of finished products in Russia and in Great Britain, prices in Russia should be 28 percent higher. What more is there to add, as they say. Predictably, a stock assortment of promises followed to alleviate the tax burden, in particular within the framework of the new Tax Code, which was said to be the first draft law the new Duma is to consider. But, first, the tax legislation depends not only on the position of the government. Second, despite the insignificant volume of direct foreign investment in Russia as it is, in the next six months the majority of investors will take a wait-and-see position, waiting for the outcome of the presidential elections in Russia.

True, there are some exceptions to this rule. According to information obtained by KOMMERSANT-DAILY's correspondent from representatives of BAT Industries, a newcomer in the Advisory Council, this firm will be implementing its investment plans — $150 million in 1994-1997 — regardless of who is elected in Russia or when. Investments in 1996 are estimated at $50 million; moreover, despite the increased import duties for tobacco, it is planned to organize in Russia the production of European-class cigarettes (Kent or Lucky Strike). So large investors also differ in their assessment of particular business risks.

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Russia: Most 1995 Economic Targets Achieved

MM2301145996 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jan 96 p 2

[Article by Otto Latsis: "Each Step Toward Stabilization Has Been Paid for at a High Price. The Economic Results for 1995"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian State Committee for Statistics [Goskomstat] has given the latest information on last year's main results: They are close to the forecasts made at the start of the year and in some respects are better than predicted. Only in the fight against inflation was the result more modest than the government promised.

Nevertheless, the fall in inflation is virtually the main economic policy success of the last year. The aggregate consumer price index rose by a factor of 2.31 over the year — the lowest figure since 1990. Let us recall that in 1991 prices rose by a factor of 2.6, in 1992 by a factor of 26, in 1993 by 9.4, and in 1994 by 3.24. Thus in the period since the open liberalization of prices on 2 January 1992 the aggregate index (December 1995 as against December 1991) rose by a factor of approximately 1,830 and if you include the inflationary "surge" in 1991 (that is, compared with December 1990), prices leapt by almost 4,800 times, according to the Goskomstat's figures.

The year's results in this sphere are clearer if you track the changes month by month. In January last year the price index rose by 17.8 percent over the previous month after which each month except October showed an improvement, albeit slight, until finally in December the price index rose by 3.2 percent — the smallest increase in the four years of the radical reforms. This is not the 1-2 percent promised by the government at the start of the year but it is considerably less than the opponents of tough financial stabilization were predicting. The inflationary surge that many people feared in the fall — memories of the disastrous "black Tuesday" of 1994 here — did not materialize. If we include the cost of the war, which was not included in the budget, it has to be admitted that the government financiers' error is minimal.

Life has thus confirmed that the laws of macroeconomics are working even in Russia. If budget-credit injections fall, inflation falls too. According to those laws, unfortunately, the fight against inflation also has an impact on the production and social spheres, as we have seen.

In November the industrial recession resumed and in the past two months industrial output was less than for the corresponding period in the previous year. This followed on from the May through October period when no industrial decline was recorded — the first time that this has happened since 1990. In 1995 as a whole industrial output was down 3 percent on the previous year (in 1994 the decline was 21 percent). GDP was down 4 percent (13 percent in 1994). The scale of the recession matches the discrepancy in the forecasts. For the first time we saw a growth in production in the major sectors: ferrous metallurgy (9 percent across the year as a whole), nonferrous metallurgy (2 percent), and the chemical and petrochemical industries (8 percent). The revival in these sectors is export-led. In sectors working for the domestic market the recession continues. It is especially large in the light industry (31 percent) and in the food industry (9 percent).

The social cost of the stabilization is the most sensitive indicator. Real disposable per capita money incomes fell by 13 percent in 1995 (the opposite of the 1994 result which showed a 13 percent growth in these incomes). The main reason for this fall in real incomes is the inflationary surge in late 1994-early 1995. Thus the social difficulties of last year — an election year — are not just the inevitable price of overcoming the crisis but also the cost of the slow and inconsistent economic policy in 1994.

Perhaps the most graphic success of the year is also the main harbinger of the recovery ahead — housing construction has started to rise. And it is a substantial increase: According to the preliminary estimates, the total area of apartments built was 9 percent higher than 1994, which in its turn was marked by a 6 percent decline. The construction of homes by the population at their own expense and by means of loans also rose considerably — by almost 50 percent.

The steady growth of foreign economic ties which has marked all the years of the radical reforms continues. Exports amounted to $77.8 billion, imports $57.9 billion, giving a balance of payments surplus of $19.9 billion ($4 billion higher than in the previous year). In trade with the CIS countries, however, there was a balance of payments deficit of $2.8 billion (as opposed to a balance of payments surplus in the previous year). Fuel and energy resources are still the main export item (41 percent of exports).

The Goskomstat cites statistics derived from the implementation of the UN Program for International Comparisons. Research showed that if you take Russia's GDP as 100, in 1993 the figure for Belarus was 88.7, Moldova — 49.7, Ukraine — 64.3, Poland — 98.3, Romania — 77.5, Croatia — 88.7, Hungary — 126.1, Slovenia — 192.5, and the Czech Republic — 175.8. When evaluating these statistics it is necessary to bear in mind that

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since 1993 certain correlations have changed, of course. Nor is there any doubt that the level of production does not match the level of consumption for a host of reasons. Finally, the statistics cited above are based on a parity of consumer baskets, which is in many respects more reliable than, but considerably different from, correlations based on the exchange rate. For example, the parity in the purchasing power of the ruble against the dollar in 1993 was 3.87 times higher than the ruble exchange rate and in 1995 was 1.65 times higher. Incidentally, the narrowing of this gap undoubtedly reflects the strengthening of the ruble which is accompanied by considerable problems, especially for Russian exporters. Whichever yardstick you use, however, Russia is clearly first among the CIS countries in levels of per capita production as a whole.

Russian State Property Committee Rejects Luzhkov Criticism

MK2301143596 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 23 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by Svetlana Lolayeva: "The State Property Committee Has Pointed Out to Yuriy Luzhkov His Mistakes in Calculating Privatization Revenues. There Is No Shortage of Those Who Wish To Correct Mistakes of Privatization Itself"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The press service of the State Property Committee [SPC] has refuted Yuriy Luzhkov's information regarding the volume of privatization revenues to the budget, which he disclosed at a meeting of the Moscow Government on Friday [19 January]. According to the press service, as a result of privatization, the SPC has received not slightly over 3 trillion rubles [R], as Mr. Luzhkov claims, but R7.2 trillion. Citing State Tax Service data, SPC staffers also refute the Moscow mayor's statement that Moscow has received far greater revenues from privatization (R4.3 trillion) than the SPC has for the whole of Russia. In reality, total gains from selling Moscow-owned enterprises in 1995 amounted to about R300 billion, of which slightly over R50 billion were transferred to the federal budget. According to the State Property Committee, this means that "even if Moscow has received R4.3 trillion, as the mayor claims, the bulk of this money has been gained from selling real estate and land lease rights." The State Property Committee believes that it is in general "wrong and incorrect" to compare the SPC's privatization revenues with the total receipts of the Moscow budget from privatization and auction sales of real estate and land lease rights not subject to any deductions for the federal budget at all.

The Moscow mayor's public arithmetic computations and the prompt response of the State Property Committee, which immediately pointed out to Mr. Luzhkov his mistakes in calculation, are a continuation of a drawn-out discussion regarding the methods and means of privatization. Yuriy Luzhkov once succeeded in obtaining presidential endorsement of the right to implement his own concept of privatization; now, offering figures to attest to the supremacy of the Moscow approach, he is possibly expecting that after the dismissal of his main opponent, Anatoliy Chubays, the government will show greater interest in assimilating an advanced experience.

Taking into consideration the fact that Mr. Chubays is being reproached, among other things, for mistakes in the conduct of privatization, as well as the fact that the premier has already announced the necessity of a transition "from mass privatization to targeted denationalization," Mr. Luzhkov's ideas — such as the one about selective nationalization of inefficient enterprises or those which have been privatized in violation of the law — can be called for.

Pavel Bunich, the new chairman of the Duma Committee for Ownership, Privatization, and Economic Activity, is also talking about the need to investigate, to the extent possible, wrongdoings made in the course of privatization. In his opinion, it would be helpful (not so much for the replenishment of the state budget as for appeasing public opinion) to take a number of demonstrative legal proceedings against those who have unlawfully made fortunes during privatization. If the vacant post of SPC head is filled by some champion of social justice (such as Aleksandr Ivanenko, the only deputy chairman left, who has worked in fair harmony with Vladimir Polevanov, a minstrel of re-privatization), the Chubays' course of privatization will be quite seriously adjusted.

Moscow Outstrips Property Body on Privatization Receipts

MM2301151396 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Jan 96 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Whoever Knows How To Trade Will Make a Profit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the data of the Russian Federation State Tax Service, the Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property [GKI] received 7.2 trillion rubles [R] from the sale of state property last year.

In particular, in Moscow alone the total proceeds from the sale of enterprises in city ownership came to approximately R300 billion.

As is known, when addressing the Moscow City Duma last week, Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov declared that

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Russia's capital received far more funds from privatization than the GKI made. According to him, last year Moscow received R4.3 trillion from the privatization and sale of real estate on a competitive basis and for the right to lease land, compared with the R3 trillion that the GKI received.

State Control Over Russian Savings Bank Enhanced

LD2301211596 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 23 Jan 96

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] The wave of cadre reshuffles has reached the Russian Savings Bank, the country's major bank in which the state has a controlling block of shares. It is the main keeper of the population's finances.

A new chairman was elected at an extraordinary meeting of share- holders today. Andrey Kazmin, who has held the post of deputy finance minister, has replaced Oleg Yashin who retired of his own accord last December. The Savings Bank will introduce no radical changes to its credit and monetary policy, its new head said. This is likely to mean that the Bank's customers should not expect higher interest rates on their deposits. The main change seems to be linked to considerably enhanced state control. The supervisory council, which defines the Savings Bank's strategy, now includes the entire state financial elite, including Sergey Dubinin, head of the Central Bank, and Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov. Sergey Dubinin did not see anything extraordinary in the decisions taken.

[Begin Dubinin recording] This does not mean a tendency to take under state control the Bank's resources or a return to the system of savings offices [sberegatelnyye kassy]. The Savings Bank must remain a fully-fledged bank. [end recording]

Russia: Gold Production Reported Down, Nonferrous Metals Up

MK2401081396 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Jan 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "There Is Less and Less Gold in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The amount of gold produced in Russia in 1995 dropped by 12 percent as against 1994 to stand at 111 tonnes. This information has been provided by the State Committee for Statistics. The production of gold in the Russian Federation dropped by 11 percent in 1994 and by 6 percent in 1993. Production in the nonferrous metallurgy grew in 1995 by 2 percent compared to 1994. The State Committee for Statistics notes in particular that the production of zinc is up 21 percent; nickel, 19 percent; magnesium and magnesium alloys, 16 percent; refined copper, 15 percent. At the same time, the production of lead declined by 6 percent.

Russia's Komitek To Join Timano-Pechora Oil Development Project

MK2401081496 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 23 Jan 96 p 7

[ANI report: "Komitek Intends To Participate in Developing One of Russia's Largest Oil and Gas Deposits"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian oil company Komitek (Komi), with support from the Nenets Autonomous Okrug administration, intends to join projects for the development of deposits in Timano-Pechora oil and gas bearing province, one of the largest in Russia. This was reported by sources in the Russian Fuel and Energy Ministry. The okrug administration has reportedly expressed its readiness, in particular, to help attract the company to participate in the projects of the Timan Pechora Company (TPC) [preceding four words in English], an international consortium engaged in developing the province. The administration also deems essential Komitek's participation in developing routes for the transportation of raw materials extracted in the northern region and in the Russian Arctic shelf. The okrug administration believes that the extensive experience of company specialists can increase the effectiveness of oil extraction in the Timano-Pechora deposit and enhance the position of the Russian side at negotiations with foreign investors. The TPC, created in 1994, includes Texaco, Exxon, [preceding two words in English] and Amoco [preceding word in English] of the United States, Norsk Hydro [preceding two words in Norwegian] of Norway, and Rosneft of Russia. Proven reserves of hydrocarbons in the TPC contract zone total about 400 million tonnes.

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International Affairs

Kuchma Briefs Media on CIS Stance, Relations With Russia

AU2401120096 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 23 Jan 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Leonid Kuchma: Integration at What Cost?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The CIS heads of state meeting has ended in Moscow.

Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma believes that the CIS has "great significance" largely as a "consultative council."

At a news conference for Ukrainian journalists after the end of the CIS heads of state meeting in Moscow, Kuchma said that "one can raise many questions during such meetings and get answers to them."

He rejected accusations that Ukraine refuses to become integrated with Russia that were sounded at the news conference held by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow. "Ukraine wants to develop cooperation with Russia and mainly with Russia, yet there is a question — in what way and at what cost?" said Kuchma. "We must primarily consider these relations from the point of view of Ukraine's national interests," stressed the president.

Kuchma also said that Ukraine had not taken part in discussing issues on the CIS flag and coat of arms, because it "had not adopted the CIS Statutes."

Kiev Against Moscow's Admission Into Council of Europe

LD2301192996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1827 GMT 23 Jan 96

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] STRASBOURG, Jan 23 (Interfax-Ukraine) — It is still untimely to admit Russia to the Council of Europe (CE), a member of the Ukrainian delegation to the ongoing session of the CE Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg, Vyacheslav Chornovil, told Interfax-Ukraine Tuesday [23 January].

According to the delegate, "Russia has not yet become a truly democratic state, the latest events in Chechnya being evidence of that."

However, the voting results are likely to be favorable for Russia due to the current layout of forces in the CE, he added.

It is the first time Ukraine is taking part in a session of the Parliamentary Assembly after it was admitted to the CE last November.

Kiev Only Signs Some Documents on CIS Summit Agenda

LD2301193596 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1755 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, Jan 23 (Interfax - Ukraine) — Ukraine signed only some of the documents which were on the agenda of the CIS summit last Friday in Moscow.

The Ukrainian delegation signed a protocol on the agreement on social and legal guarantees for servicemen, for people discharged from military service and for members of their families and the resolution to hold the first congress of art functionaries from the CIS member-countries, said head of the Foreign Ministry Department on CIS states Oleksandr Bozhko, speaking at a briefing in Ukraine's Foreign Ministry Tuesday.

Ukraine also signed an initiative to hold a conference of attorneys general from CIS counties in order to prepare a draft of standard treaties on the extradition of criminals.

Ukraine's delegation favors settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia (Georgia) and signed a document providing for corresponding measures on its settlement. However, Ukraine has not signed a resolution on prolonging the stay and expanding the mandate of collective peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone.

According to Bozhko, this decision was adopted "given the need to annul dual standards in peacemaking on the territory of the CIS member-countries and to expand participation of the United Nations and the OSCE in the conflict settlement."

Ukraine abstained from signing resolutions on prospects for forming customs and payment unions, a draft concept on a simplified order for accepting citizenship by the citizens of CIS member-countries, a concept for guarding the air space of CIS states, and a concept to prevent and settle conflicts on the territory of CIS member-countries. Kiev disagrees with the provision on collective peacekeeping forces in the CIS, with the decision on the creation of a Council of interior ministers of the CIS countries, and with the provision on the CIS flag and emblem "as they contradict to Ukraine's national interests and acting legislation."

Ukraine's delegation did not participate in discussing and signing documents of the Council of CIS Collective Security and those related to the activity of the collective peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan "because Ukraine is not a member-country of the corresponding agreements," Bozhko said.

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Ukraine's Oliynyk Elected Vice President of European Assembly

LD2301185096 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Borys Oliynyk, the head of the Ukrainian delegation at a session of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, has been elected vice president of the Parliamentary Assembly. [passage omitted]

Marchuk Favors Forming Club of Central European Premiers

LD2301193396 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1755 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] STRBSKE-PLESO (SLOVAKIA), Jan 23 (Interfax - Ukraine) — Ukrainian Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk today said he thought it necessary to consider the idea of creating a club of prime ministers from Central European countries.

Marchuk met with Slovakian Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar Tuesday to discuss proposals for the creation of such a club of prime ministers. The club would ensure permanent meetings between the prime ministers of neighboring countries, Marchuk said.

Creation of such a club would help stabilize the situation in Central Europe, Marchuk said. The club could discuss issues which are beyond the scope of ceremonial meetings, he said.

Ukraine, Russia Sign Accord on Transit of Nuclear Materials

LD2401105096 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1015 GMT 24 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — Ukraine and Russia have initialled an agreement on the transit of nuclear materials, the Ukrainian Ministry of Environment and Nuclear Safety told UNIAN on 24 January.

The agreement will determine the procedure for the two countries' cooperation to ensure safe shipment of nuclear substances including spent and fresh nuclear fuel through their territory, physical protection of nuclear materials, and liability for losses incurred in transit.

According to the document, a country is liable for nuclear losses incurred during the transit of materials through its territory. This provision, according to the Ministry of Environment and Nuclear Safety, somewhat strays from international conventions on civil liability for nuclear losses, which Ukraine intends to join. At the same time, Ukrainian experts believe it puts Ukraine at an advantage, since most of spent fuel from Ukrainian nuclear plants is shipped across Russian territory.

According to the ministry, the agreement will be finalized and signed within a month.

Ukrainian UN Peacekeepers Transferred to French Command

LD2401095096 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0800 GMT 24 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukraine's special battalion No. 240, operating within the UN peacekeeping force in former Yugoslavia, is being transferred to the command of a French division of the multinational forces. The division is deployed in Sarajevo. The number of servicemen in the battalion is due to be cut from 550 to 500. Ukraine has assumed full responsibility for the funding of the unit.

Article on Missile Silos Destruction, Perry's Visit to Ukraine

AU2301182296 Lvov ZA VILNU UKRAYINU in Ukrainian 16 Jan 96 pp 1,2

[Report by Myroslav Levytskyy: "The Explosion Near Pervomaysk Was Not Only Military in Character"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *In Ukrainian politics, the New Year started with a significant chord. On 5 January, in the vicinity of the town of Pervomaysk in Nikolayev Oblast, in the presence of the defense ministers of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia, the first in the series of missile silos (used for launching military missiles) earmarked for destruction was blown up. This event gave rise to a range of reactions in Ukraine.*

Diplomats believe that the visit to Ukraine by Russian and U.S. diplomats marked a success of Ukrainian diplomacy and Ukraine's growing role in the European security system.

Elimination of 36 percent of the missile silos is within the framework of the START-I Treaty that Ukraine, as a successor to the USSR, had to sign. Once this norm is fulfilled, specialists will determine what to do with other missile silos. It cannot be ruled out that, by then, a possibility for their efficient utilization may appear, as was stressed at one of the Foreign Ministry briefings.

In the United States, this problem is viewed in a somewhat different light. As the UNIAN Agency was told by the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, by November 1998, all the 130 missile silos in Pervomaysk and Khmelnytskyy will be destroyed in accordance with procedures stipulated by the START-I Treaty.

Inasmuch as, according to diplomats, the meeting of the defense ministers was of great political significance, I will quote the assessment by U.S. Defense Minister

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Perry: "The frequent meetings between the U.S. and Ukrainian defense ministers indicate the important place occupied by Ukraine in U.S. policy."

The head of the U.S. Defense Department and Ukrainian Defense Minister B. Shmarov signed a time-table for cooperation between the military departments of the two countries for the year 1996. The heads of the military departments noted the intensification of Ukrainian-U.S. cooperation in the military sphere and the coincidence of positions on many aspects of international life, particularly on issues of comprehensive and European security, the Bosnian conflict and ways for its joint settlement, and the development of control procedures for nuclear disarmament and the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Minister Perry underscored the importance of bilateral and tripartite ties in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. He pointed out the U.S. side's striving to cooperate with the Ukrainian military department in various directions, including joint exercises. In the opinion of the U.S. defense secretary, Ukraine has been scrupulously fulfilling its commitments on disarmament.

This issue is assessed in an entirely different way in the parliamentary milieu. On the New Year's eve, S. Khmara [chairman of the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party], disseminated a statement of protest against the destruction of the Pervomaysk missile silo.

He appealed to Parliament Speaker Oleksandr Moroz to convene an extraordinary meeting of deputies with a single issue on the agenda — Pervomaysk.

On the eve of the tripartite meeting, Khmara organized the collection of signatures under the deputies' statement-protest against the 5 January blowing up of the silo. In their statement, the deputies assessed such fireworks on Christmas Eve as a blunder on the part of the Ukrainian leadership; a blunder that inflicts economic damage on the state and undermines its national security.

In the course of Defense Secretary Perry's visit to Ukraine, Supreme Council Chairman O. Moroz refused to meet with Defense Secretary Perry. Borys Oliynyk, chairman of the Parliamentary Commission for Foreign Affairs and Ties with the CIS, supported this position at the 5 January news conference. According to him, it had first been planned to hold a meeting with U.S. and Russian Federation defense ministers, but later it was proposed that the meeting be only held with Secretary Perry, something that might be perceived in an ambiguous way.

According to the UNIAN Agency information based upon sources close to the leadership of Ukraine's Supreme Council, the scheduled meeting between O. Moroz and U.S. Defense Secretary Perry was canceled in connection with the publication of Stepan Khmara's statement in which he categorically opposed the destruction of the missile silos in Ukraine.

It appears that Secretary Perry was not really embarrassed by such a turn of events and he did not give one to understand that he was offended. However, as political scientists point out, that incident may leave a trace in the further development of the Ukrainian-U.S. relations. At present, voices are frequently heard on the U.S. side to the effect that Ukraine has departed from the declared course of reforms and that it does not receive the credits in full amount, and this may have negative consequences both in the economic and sociopolitical aspects.

After S. Khmara declared that he would not allow the destruction of the missile silo in Pervomaysk, even at the expense of his own life, he remained quietly in Kiev on the day of the detonation....

Opponents of silo destruction asserted that these facilities may be used for the needs of science and national economy. Among proposals for utilizing these facilities, there also were such that envisaged their utilization for storing various harmful waste, including radioactive.

With such a formulation of the question, a reciprocal question was asked on whether it would be expedient to pollute new territories and exclude thousands of hectares of black earth [chernozem] from agricultural use, despite the fact that Ukraine already has an exclusion zone.

Kiev Reaction to Lukashenka Statements on NATO, Nukes

WS2401120096 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0323 GMT 24 Jan 96

[Report by Halia Pavliva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Jan. 23 — Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka said at a recently concluded summit of Commonwealth of Independent States leaders that an abrupt NATO expansion will cause his country to locate Russian nuclear warheads on its territory, Ukraine's Foreign Ministry reported Tuesday [23 January].

One week prior to the summit, which was held over the weekend, Lukashenka was quoted by news services as telling his Parliament that he regretted Belarus's pledge to become a non-nuclear state.

Both Ukraine and Belarus were given security guarantees by the United States, Great Britain and Russia in

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December 1994, in return for their ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and START I treaties.

Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Serheev characterized Lukashenka's statement as a "completely natural reaction to NATO's artificial, spontaneous and intensive expansion to the East."

A security system in Europe, he said, should be built taking into account the interests of all European family members.

Olexandr Bozhko, head of the ministry's CIS department, said that Ukraine's reaction to the possible location of nuclear weapons on the territory of neighboring Belarus "should be looked at from the standpoint of Ukraine's international obligations."

Belarus still possesses 18 SS-25 ICBMs, and is reportedly reluctant to give them up to Russia as originally promised. The year-end 1995 disarmament deadline that Belarus agreed to in 1993 has expired, most recently postponed until September.

Economic Issues

Switzerland To Boost Investments in Ukraine's Economy

AU2201150796 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 18 Jan 96 pp 1, 2

[Unattributed report from Kiev: "Results of the Visit: A 40-Million-Franc Check and a Series of Accords"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Swiss Government has granted 40 million Swiss francs for restoring Ukraine's hydropower engineering and closing down the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. An accord on this was signed by Ukraine's Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko and Flavio Cotti, head of the Swiss Foreign Affairs Federal Department, who paid a two-day official visit to Kiev.

During the talks, the heads of the external political departments of the two countries stressed Switzerland's enhanced interest in trade and economic cooperation with Ukraine. An improvement in the investment climate in Ukraine contributed to doubling the volume of Swiss investments in the Ukrainian economy. They presently amount to 22.4 million Swiss francs.

The ministers believe that the signed bilateral intergovernmental accords on financial and technical assistance and on providing consultation services for restoring Ukraine's hydropower engineering will give a new impetus to investing in the Ukrainian economy.

Ukraine's Moroz, Coal Miners Discuss Jobs, Wage Payments

WS2301151596 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 1000 GMT 23 Jan 96

[From the "Current Events" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] As the Verkhovna Rada's [Supreme Council] press service reported on Monday, January 22, Verkhovna Rada Chairman Oleksandr Moroz met with senior officials of the Lvov Regional Council of the Coal Miners' Union and members of the Works' Committee of the town of Chervonohrad, as well as MPs Ya. Kendzyor and Ye. Zherebetskyy. Production in the Western Ukrainian coal mines, under the control of the Ukrzakhid Vugillya association, was disrupted towards the end of last year by industrial action. The action was over late payment of wages and has reportedly put the future of the mines in jeopardy. The issues around the strikes, the payment of wages, jobs, etc, were raised by the Miners' Union delegation and discussed during the meeting. But Mr. Moroz stressed the government's protection for domestic industries, as well as social welfare issues, should be given top priority in carrying out economic reforms in Ukraine. However, the Speaker of Parliament did pledge the Verkhovna Rada's support for social welfare issues during parliamentary debates on the draft national budget for the ensuing year.

Ukraine To Quicken Pace of Privatization

WS2401120296 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0323 GMT 24 Jan 96

[By Natalia Petiakh, "Special to INTELNEWS"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Jan. 23 — The president and his administration are attending a session on privatization issues this Wednesday [23 January].

According to presidential aide on economic issues Viktor Lytvytskiy, the session will provide an assessment of privatization and reviews on how to achieve privatization in small business and larger corporate ventures.

He noted that privatization will be implemented more dynamically in the future.

"The pace of privatization at the end of 1995 was sufficient to plan completion of small business privatization in 1996," said Lytvytskiy, adding that 15 million residents of Ukraine became shareholders.

"The tasks of small privatization are implemented by 60 percent and those of mass privatization are fulfilled by 40 percent. However, our record with corporate enterprises is not nearly so dynamic," he noted, pointing

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out that the Jan. 24 session will focus special attention on the privatization of state-owned parcels of shares to be completed this year.

According to Lytvytskiy, mass privatization by means of collectivization is not a favorable strategy for attracting investors.

"We have to lift obstacles for strategic investors. It's necessary to give them premises and lend into private property instead of rent. These issues, still unsolved, impede foreign investment in Ukraine."

Ukrainian Parliament Orders Government To Pay Wages

WS2401114096 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0323 GMT 24 Jan 96

[Report by Oksana Hasiuk]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Jan. 23 — Parliament ordered the Cabinet of Ministers and local governments to pay off government employees' 1995 salaries by Feb. 15.

Parliament also stated in its Tuesday resolution that the Finance Minister should be personally responsible for paying off salaries from state and local budgets.

"It is the right time to have personal responsibility of officials in the state," said Viktor Suslov, Parliament Finance and Banking Committee chairman.

As evidence of the committee's firm stance against Finance Minister Petro Hermanchuk, the government's UT-1 television channel reported that the committee decided Tuesday to include into the parliamentary agenda the issue of a no-confidence vote against him.

Parliament also decided on Tuesday that the Cabinet can not raise salaries for state officials or parliamentary deputies until all 1995 salary debts for government employees are cleared.

Parliament Speaker Oleksandr Moroz said the Cabinet is free to decide whether to make payments using monetary emissions.

"Parliament may agree to make an emission only by government request," said Moroz.

Parliament also ordered the Cabinet on Tuesday to work out by the end of the first quarter an agreement with on a simplified mechanism of subsidies for municipal services, gas and energy. The subsidies, according to the resolution, should compensate for recent municipal services price hikes.

Payment for municipal services, according to previous parliamentary resolutions, should not exceed 15 percent of family incomes.

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Belarus

Belarus Official Attends OSCE Session in Geneva

WS2401100296 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0800 GMT 24 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In Geneva, a meeting of representatives of member-states of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] began its work. The implementation of a document on economic cooperation in Europe adopted at the Bonn-based conference will be discussed at the meeting.

At the first plenary meeting, Belarusian delegation head Valeriy Tsapkala, first deputy foreign minister, made a statement in which a number of relevant Belarusian proposals were voiced. In particular, the first deputy foreign minister stressed: We are not asking for assistance from Western partners. We have an interest in mutually beneficial and equal cooperation. Resolving the gap in the economic development of the OSCE member-states is the only way to revive the all-European security system on a new basis.

Lukashenka To Seek Election for Second Term

LD2301165996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1539 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MINSK, Jan 23 (Interfax-West) — Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka announced he will run for a second term in the 1999 presidential elections.

"In order to strengthen state power," Lukashenka plans to invite leaders of the republic's six regional executive councils and of the Minsk city executive council and "to grant them the rights to liquidate commercial structures which do not work in the interests of the country," he said at an expanded session of the Cabinet of Ministers in Minsk Tuesday.

According to Lukashenka, there are 71,000 commercial structures among 102,000 economic entities registered in the republic. "We shall have serious talks with them," Lukashenka said.

In the near future, Lukashenka will sign a decree on protection of the Belarusian market.

Newly Elected Belarusian Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman on Tasks

WS2401120696 Minsk SVABODA in Belarusian 19 Jan 96 p 2

[Interview with Belarusian Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman Henadz Karpenka, by V. Tsyhankow; place and date not given: "Henadz Karpenka: 'I Understand That My Nomination Is Not the Most Ideal Version for the President'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **I suppose there is no great need to introduce Henahz Karpenka to our readers once again. SVABODA held an interview with the Supreme Soviet deputy chairman 30 minutes after his nomination.**

[Tsyhankow] In your opinion, how successfully can the Supreme Soviet chairman cooperate with his deputies?

[Karpenka] Undoubtedly, all the deputies represent different political viewpoints and orientations. However, I expect that we will be able to cooperate without abandoning our main principles. A similar political culture exists in the majority of European states, and their parliaments work to the advantage of those states.

[Tsyhankow] Do you not have any kind of dislike toward anyone among the people with whom you are going to cooperate?

[Karpenka] Differences in viewpoints do not mean at all that I should have hostile feelings toward my colleagues. On the contrary, I expect that through political accord we should find full sympathy toward each other, remembering at the same time whom we represent and what viewpoints we support.

[Tsyhankow] Do you not think that one of the Supreme Soviet deputies — Yuriy Malumaw — is going to represent primarily the interests of the executive power in the Supreme Soviet?

[Karpenka] It is difficult for me to talk about it since I have known Malumaw for only one week of the new Supreme Soviet's work. Currently, it is visible that he represents the presidential team and that he is going to support the interests of the vertical [executive power] in this Supreme Soviet. However, I would like to point out that the parliament in general is not against the idea of helping the executive power become stronger and more effective through the Supreme Soviet's activities, passing laws, and the taxation system. So far, the executive power has not dealt with these problems, the resolution of which is so necessary for our people.

[Tsyhankow] In your opinion, what is the president's stance toward the your nomination to the post of the Supreme Soviet deputy chairman?

[Karpenka] I understand that my nomination is not the most ideal version for the president. I suppose that he should approach this issue as a fait accompli.

[Tsyhankow] Are you going to continue judicial disputes with Lukashenka?

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[Karpenka] Actually, this is the most difficult problem for me. Undoubtedly, after my nomination I faced such a dilemma with all the acuteness it bears. I believe when we meet with the president and discuss this issue we will find a resolution to this problem.

[Tsyhankow] I cannot help asking the question asked by journalists, as well as the population: Why did "Civic Action" select you, and not Bahdankevich?

[Karpenka] Mr. Bahdankevich made this decision by himself, after the events connected with the speech delivered by Lukashenka at the behind-close-doors session. Mr. Bahdankevich's idea was supported by the faction. Undoubtedly, I am grateful to Mr. Bahdankevich for his courage and convinced that we will work like friends in harmony to our faction's benefit. I believe that this is not the last time when "Civic Action" selected to the leading post bright representatives of the intelligentsia or scientists, in other words — professionals.

[Tsyhankow] The majority of factions in the Supreme Soviet have demonstrated the capability of reaching agreements on personnel issues. Do you think that these factions will manage to reach agreements on such principled issues as the economy, the budget, and finances?

[Karpenka] I would like to underscore that, in my opinion, the new Supreme Soviet is characterized by a higher political culture than the old one. This gives me some grounds to believe that we will manage to reach accord faster on economic issues. Second, the legislative factions currently determine themselves more precisely and expressively, and all the work of the Supreme Soviet will be transferred to the factions. Therefore, all the issues and drafts will be discussed in a much faster and effective manner.

[Tsyhankow] I do not think that you regard your nomination to the post of Supreme Soviet deputy chairman as the pinnacle of your political career....

[Karpenka] I have never been concerned about my career, including political career. Currently, I fully understand that my future will primarily be connected with what I will do at this post.

Moldova

Moscow Defense Experts in Tiraspol for Dniester Pullout Talks

AU2401091196 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2100 GMT 20 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau/Tiraspol 20/1/1996 (BASA-press) — The Russian Defense Ministry expert commission, which arrived in Tiraspol two days ago, conducted talks with the Moldovan Defense Ministry on the conditions of Russian troops withdrawal.

The Russian commission is headed by the Russian Ground Troops Engineering Service head, Maj. Gen. Nikolay Antonenko, Russian vice defense minister.

According to sources in Tiraspol, the Russian commission met the head of the Moldovan National Army Artillery Troops, Gen. Vasile Grosu, and other officials from the defense ministry. It was a closed-door meeting.

Yesterday at a meeting with Russian troops command officers, Lt. Gen. Valeriy Yevnevich said the weapons were almost ready for shipment, apart from the jet missiles currently undergoing preparations. He said the withdrawal preparation were made in accordance with the agreement signed between Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova on the order and manner of Russian troops withdrawal.

Two weeks ago during the talks conducted by a commission headed by Maj. Gen. Antonenko in Tiraspol, Dniester authorities claimed 50 percent of the Russian troops military equipment. According to the agreement concluded by Chisinau and Moscow, 35 percent of all Russian troops properties will be conceded to Moldova. Members of the Women's Strike Committee have repeatedly stated they will oppose the military equipment withdrawal, and will resort to protests, including railway blocking.

Russian Commander in Dniester Specifies Troops Armament

AU2301222796 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2133 GMT 19 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tiraspol 19/1/1996 — (BASA-press) Gen. Valeriy Yevnevich, commander of the Dniester-based Russian troops, made public data on the Russian troops armament. Yesterday, Yevnevich told a group of diplomatic mission heads that the Russian troops have 120 tanks, 130 armored vehicles, 129 artillery installations, five choppers, and 33 anti-tank rocket vehicles.

Yevnevich said the Russian troops have three main tasks: "to provide stability and keep peace in the region; provide the security of the military equipment; maintain an adequate training level of the soldiers." Yevnevich said the most difficult task is to provide the security of the military depositories, adding that "ammunition could be just as well used in the maneuvers of the Russian military." 230 rockets for Uragan and Grad launchers were tested, and are ready for shipment to Russia. The remaining ammunition will be liquidated on

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the spot. Yevnevich said this has triggered an argument with the Dniester administration, "which hinders their destruction, giving as formal reasons the impact on the environment."

Moldova Supports Russia's Joining Council of Europe With Conditions

AU2401090696 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2100 GMT 20 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau 20/1/1996 (BASA-press) — The Moldovan delegation will support Russia's admittance to the Council of Europe (CE) on condition that the Russian Duma will ratify the Russian troops withdrawal agreement within a half of year, said Moldovan Deputy Speaker Dumitru Diacov on Moldovan parliamentary delegation's departure to Strasbourg.

According to a parliamentary press service representative, Diacov said Russia's admittance to the Council of Europe, which is to be considered by the current CE session, "will arouse tense discussions," implying that Moldova's vote might be extremely valuable.

Vladimir Voronin, leader of the Moldovan Communist Party, told BASA that "such conditions might have a negative influence on Moldovan-Russian relations." According to him, restoration of Moldova's territorial integrity is not affected by the presence of Russian troops, whose purpose is to stop NATO extension to the East.

To Voronin's mind, Chisinau is the messenger of forces which would like such an extension.

Moldova, Russia Initial Trade, Economic Cooperation Agreement

AU2301222696 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 2021 GMT 22 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, January 22 (INFO-TAG) — The governments of the Republic of Moldova and Russian Federation have coordinated and initialed the text of the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation in 1996-1997, a source in the Ministry of Economy told INFOTAG.

Economic cooperation between the two states will be based on contracts signed between Moldovan and Russian economic agents, state organs, organizations, and territorial administrative bodies with due observance of legislation.

The agreement envisages also rendering assistance to both countries' state organs in setting up joint financial-industrial groups, holding and leasing companies, and transnational agencies.

The document stipulates first-priority supplies of most important products — on an equivalent basis. Russia will be exporting energy resources to this republic, and Moldova — canned food, sunflower oil, meat, wines, brandies, tobacco, citric acid, as well as tractors, washing machines, freezers, pumps, etc.

Moldova Authorities Take Special Measures To Prevent Terrorism

AU2301222596 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2133 GMT 19 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau 19/1/1996 (BASA-press) — The Moldovan Police takes special security measures in connection with the terrorist acts committed in Russia and Turkey.

Constantin Lis, head of the Order Guarding Division, told BASA that police units are on alert and the guard of the most important buildings was intensified. At the same time, transport means entering Moldova are checked to prevent imports of guns or drugs. "The tactics of our actions consist of preventing terrorist acts," said Lis.

Valeriu Daraban, National Security Ministry spokesman, told BASA that "the ministry is bearing in mind the fact that terrorist acts were committed in Russia and Turkey." He failed to specify what measures have been taken.

In a speech in Parliament in the autumn of 1995, Security Minister Vasile Calmoi said "international terrorist organizations use Moldovan territory as a transit channel" for the armed groups.

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Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan Presidential Staff Appointments Announced

LD2201173696 Almaty Kazakh Radio First Program Network in Russian 0700 GMT 22 Jan 96

[All names as received]

[FBIS Translated Text] Some appointments have been made within the administration of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

On the orders of the head of state, Yerlan Idrisov has been appointed as an aide to the president; Aleksandr Sudin has been appointed head of the department for state service and personnel policy; Gulsha Tanirbergenova has been appointed head of the department for internal policy; Igor Romanov has been appointed head of the expert and information group; Yermek Kosherbayev has been appointed acting head of the protocol service; Lyudmila Degetayeva has been appointed head of the president's personal archives and library; and Tolen Artykov has been appointed secretary of the national council for state policy under the aegis of the head of state.

Decree on Presidential Powers, Rights

LD2201192196 Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Dec 95 pp 1,2

["Decree of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, with the force of constitutional law, 'On the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In accordance with article 1 of the law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 10 December 1993 "On the temporary delegation of additional powers to the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan and heads of local administrations," and with the aim of implementing provisions of the constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, I issue the present decree.

Chapter 1. The status of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Article 1. The president of the republic.

1. The president of the republic is the head of state, its supreme official, who determines the basic directions of the state's domestic and foreign policy and represents Kazakhstan inside the country and in international relations.

2. The president of the republic is the symbol and guarantor of the unity of the people and state power, the unshakeability [nezyblemost] of the constitution, and human and civil rights and freedoms.

3. The president of the republic ensures the coordinated functioning of all branches of state power and the responsibility of the authorities before the people.

4. The president of the republic has the right to speak on behalf of the people and the state.

5. The president of the republic and his honor and dignity are inviolable. Encroachments on the honor and dignity of the president of the republic shall be prosecuted according to the law.

Article 2. Elections for the president of the republic.

Elections for the president of the republic are to be held in accordance with constitutional law.

Article 3. Assumption of the office of president of the republic.

1. The president of the republic assumes office from the moment that he swears the following oath before the people: "I solemnly swear to truly serve the people of Kazakhstan, to strictly observe the constitution and the laws of the republic of Kazakhstan, to guarantee civil rights and freedoms, and to conscientiously execute the lofty duties of the President of the republic of Kazakhstan which have been entrusted to me." The president of the republic is to deliver the text of the oath in the state language. [passage omitted]

Article 4. The term in office of the president of the republic.

1. The president of the republic is to be elected for a term of five years.

2. The powers of the president of the republic are to cease from the moment that a newly-elected president of the republic assumes office and also in the event of the early dismissal of the president from the post or his death.

3. The powers of the president of the republic elected at special elections are to be exercised until the assumption of office by the president of the republic who is elected in the regular presidential elections due to be held five years after the special elections, on the first Sunday of December.

4. One and the same person cannot be elected president of the republic more than twice in succession.

Article 5. Restrictions connected with the president's period of office.

1. The president of the republic does not have the right to be a deputy in a representative body, to take other paid posts or to carry out entrepreneurial activity.

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2. The president of the republic is to discontinue his activity in a political party while he exercises his powers.

Article 6. [passage omitted]

Chapter 2. The powers of the president of the republic of Kazakhstan.

Article 7. Foreign policy powers of the president of the republic of Kazakhstan.

1. The president of the republic:

1) Holds negotiations and signs international treaties for the Republic of Kazakhstan;

2) Issues powers to hold negotiations and sign the republic's interstate treaties;

3) Submits interstate treaties concluded by the republic to parliament for ratification;

4) Signs instruments of ratification;

5) Takes a decision halting the validity of international treaties concluded by the republic which are not subject to ratification;

6) Submits to parliament requests for the denouncement of international treaties concluded by the republic.

2. The president of the republic appoints and recalls the heads of diplomatic missions of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

3. The president of the republic accepts credentials and letters of recall of diplomatic and other representatives of foreign states accredited to him.

Article 8. Powers of the president of the republic in ensuring the defense potential and security of the state.

The president of the republic:

1) Is the supreme commander of the armed forces of the republic and appoints and dismisses the supreme command of the armed forces;

2) In the event that the democratic institutions, independence, territorial integrity, and political stability of the republic and the security of its citizens are under serious and direct threat, and that the normal functioning of the constitutional bodies of the state has been breached, following official consultations with the prime minister and the chairmen of the chambers of the parliament of the republic, he takes measures dictated by the aforementioned circumstances, including the introduction of a state of emergency on the whole territory of Kazakhstan and in individual areas and the use of the armed forces of the republic, and he must immediately inform the parliament of the republic of this;

3) In the event of aggression against the republic or a direct external threat to its security, he introduces martial law on the whole territory of the republic or in individual areas and declares partial or general mobilization, and he must immediately inform the parliament of the republic of this;

4) Submits to a joint session of the chambers of parliament a proposal on the use of the armed forces to fulfill international obligations for maintaining peace and security;

5) Forms the guard service of the president of the republic and the Republican Guard, which are subordinated to him;

6) Approves the military doctrine of the Republic of Kazakhstan;

7) Takes a decision on conscription of citizens of the republic for fixed-term military service and the transfer of fixed-term servicemen to the reserve;

8) With the consent of the Senate of parliament, he appoints the chairman of the Committee for National Security; relieves him of his post; appoints and relieves the chairman of the State Investigation Committee; on the request of the chairman of the Committee for National Security and the chairman of the State Investigation Committee, he appoints their deputies; approves the regulations of the Committee for National Security and the State Investigation Committee; and hears reports from the chairman of the Committee for National Security and the chairman of the State Investigation Committee on the work of the aforementioned committees.

Article 9. The powers of the president of the republic in relation to parliament.

The president of the republic:

1) Sets the date for routine and extraordinary elections to parliament;

2) Appoints seven deputies to the Senate for the duration of the parliamentary term, observing the requirements determined by clause 4 of article 51 of the constitution, before the beginning of the first session of parliament; in the event of deprivation or discontinuation of the powers of the appointed members of the Senate, he shall within 10 days appoint deputies to the Senate for the remainder of the parliamentary term to replace those who have left;

3) Convenes the first session of parliament not later than 30 days following the date of publication of the election results;

4) Receives the oath of the deputies of parliament to the people of Kazakhstan;

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5) Proposes a candidate for the post of chairman of the Senate of parliament;

6) Opens sessions of parliament;

7) During the period between sessions of parliament, on his own initiative or on the proposal of the chairmen of the chambers or of not fewer than one-third of the total number of deputies in parliament, he may convene an extraordinary joint session of the chambers, which may consider only those matters that served as the reason for convening it;

8) Signs a law submitted by the Senate of parliament within 15 working days, promulgates the law or returns the law or individual articles in it for a second discussion and vote; signs the law within seven days if parliament approves by a majority of two-thirds of the votes of the total number of deputies in each chamber the decision adopted earlier;

9) Has the right to submit a bill making amendments and additions to the constitution for consideration by parliament;

10) Has the right to determine the priority for consideration of draft laws and also to submit to parliament a proposal to declare the consideration of a bill urgent, which means that parliament must consider this bill within one month from the moment of its submission. If parliament does not fulfill this requirement, the president of the republic has the right to issue a decree having the force of law, which shall be in effect until parliament adopts a new law according to the procedure established by the constitution;

11) Has the right to attend any joint sessions of the chambers of parliament or separate sessions of its chambers and to be heard;

12) Considers an appeal from the Senate or the Majles of parliament to relieve a member of the government of his post in the event that he does not execute laws adopted by the Senate or the Majles in accordance with the procedure stipulated by the constitution;

13) May dissolve parliament in cases and under the procedure stipulated by the constitution.

Article 10. The powers of the president of the republic in relation to the government.

The president of the republic:

1) With the consent of parliament, appoints the prime minister of the republic and releases him from his post;

2) On a proposal submitted by the prime minister within 10 days after his appointment, defines the structure of the government, appoints its members and releases them from their posts, and establishes, abolishes, and reorganizes central executive bodies of the republic which are not part of the government;

3) Takes the oath from government members;

4) Regularly hears a report from the prime minister on the main fields of the government's activities and all its most important decisions, during which the prime minister gives an account of the government's work;

5) On the prime minister's proposal, approves the single system of financing and wage payments for all bodies which are funded from republic's state budget;

6) Presides at government sessions on particularly important matters;

7) Instructs the government to submit bills to the Majles of parliament;

8) Cancels or suspends completely or partially the validity of government acts;

9) Takes a decision on a resignation tendered by the government or any of its members if they think that it is impossible to continue to exercise the functions with which they have been charged, or if parliament expresses a vote of no confidence in the government;

10) Within 10 days accepts or rejects a resignation tendered by the government or any of its members;

11) When rejecting the resignation of the government or its members, instructs them to continue to carry out their duties;

12) Has the right to take a decision at his own initiative to suspend the government's powers and to release the prime minister or any government member from his post;

13) Has the right to issue acts instructing the government to exercise executive functions, except those specified by the constitution and laws of the republic;

14) Gives legislative instructions to the government of the republic.

Article 11. The powers of the president of the republic in relation to the Constitutional Council.

The president of the republic:

1) Appoints the chairman and two members of the Constitutional Council, and under constitutional law has the right to release them from their posts ahead of schedule;

2) Appeals to the Constitutional Council in instances stipulated by article 72 of the republic's constitution;

3) Submits objections to decisions by the Constitutional Council either in whole or in part.

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Article 12. The powers of the president of the republic in relation to courts and judges.

The president of the republic:

1) On the basis of a recommendation by the Supreme Judicial Council, submits proposals for the election and release from their posts of the chairman of the Supreme Court of the republic, the chairmen of collegiums, and Supreme Court judges for consideration by the Senate of parliament;

2) On the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council, appoints the chairmen of regional and equivalent courts, the chairmen of collegiums, and judges of regional and equivalent courts;

3) On a proposal from the minister of justice, based on a recommendation by the Qualification Collegium of Justice, appoints the chairmen and judges of other courts in the republic.

Article 13. The powers of the president of the republic in relation to prosecution bodies.

The president of the republic:

1) With the consent of the Senate of parliament, appoints the prosecutor general of the republic for a five-year term and releases him from his post;

2) On a proposal from the prosecutor general of the republic, appoints the deputy prosecutors general of the republic and releases them from their posts;

3) Hears a report from the prosecutor general on the state of lawfulness in the country no less than once a quarter.

Article 14. The powers of the president of the republic in relation to the Central Electoral Commission.

The president of the republic:

1) Presents the chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and members of the Central Electoral Commission of the republic to the Majles of parliament for election and for release from their posts ;

2) Approves the regulations of the Central Electoral Commission;

3) Hears a report from the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission on the progress of preparations for republican referendums and elections of deputies to parliament and local representative bodies and members of local self-government bodies and on the results of the referendums and elections.

Article 15. The powers of the president of the republic in relation to the National Bank.

The president of the republic:

1) With the consent of parliament, appoints the chairman of the republic's National Bank and releases him from his post;

2) On a proposal submitted by the chairman of the National Bank, appoints the deputy chairmen of the National Bank and releases them from their posts;

3) Hears a report from the chairman of the National Bank on the work done by the republic's National Bank no less than once a quarter.

Article 16. The powers of the president of the republic in relation to the accounting committee for supervising implementation of the republican budget.

The president of the republic:

1) Appoints a chairman of the accounting committee for supervising implementation of the republican budget for a five-year term in office and has the right to relieve him of the post before the end of that term;

2) Approves the regulations of the accounting committee for supervising implementation of the republican budget;

3) Hears a report by the chairman of the accounting committee for supervising implementation of the republican budget on the work of the accounting committee for supervising implementation of the republican budget no less than once a quarter.

Article 17. The powers of the president of the republic in relation to akims [heads of administration].

The president of the republic:

1) On a proposal from the prime minister, appoints akims of regions, cities of republic-level importance, and the republic's capital;

2) Repeals or suspends fully or partially acts passed by akims of regions, cities of republic-level importance, and the republic's capital;

3) Gives instructions to akims on matters within his competence and hears akims' reports on their implementation;

4) Has the right, at his own discretion, to relieve akims of their post, as well as to dismiss akims of regions, cities of republic-level importance, and the republic's capital in the event that the relevant maslikhats [local councils] pass a vote of no confidence in them backed by two-thirds of the total number of deputies.

Article 18. The powers of the president of the republic in relation to a republic-wide referendum.

1. In accordance with constitutional law, the president of the republic adopts a decision to hold a republic-wide

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referendum on his own initiative or on the initiative of parliament, the government, or not fewer than 200,000 citizens of the republic with the right to vote, who in their numbers represent equally all the regions, the republic's capital, and cities of republic-level importance.

2. The president of the republic, in response to an initiative by parliament, the government, or citizens of the republic to hold a referendum, takes one of the following decisions:

1) To hold a referendum;

2) To deem it necessary to introduce amendments and additions to the constitution, constitutional law, or a republican law, or to take another decision on the matter proposed as the subject for the referendum without holding that referendum;

3) To reject the proposal to hold a referendum.

3. With the consent of initiators of the proposal to hold a referendum, the president of the republic has the right, before the referendum is held, to improve the clarity of the wording of the question (questions) being asked in the referendum in order to express the initiators' idea more precisely.

Article 19. Other powers of the president of the republic.

The president of the republic:

1) Delivers an annual verbal or written address to the people of Kazakhstan on the situation in the country and the main areas of the republic's domestic and foreign policy. If the address is delivered at a session of parliament, it is not discussed and no questions are asked on it;

2) Approves the republic's state programs;

3) Sets qualification classes; grants state awards of the republic, and bestows honorary, supreme military, or other ranks, class titles, diplomatic ranks, and qualification classes, and deprives holders of the aforementioned awards, ranks, titles, and classes;

4) Takes decisions on granting, maintaining, withdrawing, and restoring citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan;

5) Decides on the granting of political asylum;

6) Pardons citizens;

7) Appoints and relieves the state secretary of the republic of his post and defines his status and powers;

8) Defines the procedure, terms, and conditions of the functioning of the national currency;

9) Sets up state bodies directly subordinate and accountable to the president of the republic;

10) Forms the president's administration; appoints the head of the president's administration, and defines the structure, the staffing level, the powers, and the organization of the activities of the president's administration; approves the regulations of the president's administration;

11) Sets up the Security Council, the Supreme Judicial Council, and other consultative bodies;

12) Exercises other powers in accordance with republican laws.

Chapter 3. Acts of the president of the republic of Kazakhstan.

Article 20. Forms of acts of the president of the republic.

1. The president of the republic issues decrees and instructions having binding force on the whole territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

2. In the event envisaged by sub-paragraph 4) of article 53 of the republican constitution, the president issues laws, and in the event envisaged by paragraph 2 of article 61 of the constitution, he issues decrees carrying the force of law. In other cases outside the competence of parliament and its chambers, the president of the republic issues decrees and orders which are subject to the law.

3. Acts of parliament signed by the president of the republic, as well as acts by the president issued on the initiative of the government, are first countersigned, respectively, by the chairmen of each chamber of parliament or by the prime minister, who are to bear judicial responsibility for the legality of those acts.

4. A list of subjects on which the president of the republic issues decrees and orders, as appropriate, is defined by articles 21 and 22 of the present decree. In necessary cases the president of the republic, in exercising his powers, may independently define in what act, decree, or order the relevant powers are to be exercised.

Article 21. Decrees by the president of the republic.

1. Decrees by the president of the republic are issued on the basis and in observance of the republic's constitution and laws.

2. Decrees of the president of the republic:

1) Exercise the constitutional powers of the president which require the issue of an act by the president of the republic;

2) Settle matters relating to ensuring the coordinated functioning of all branches of state power defined by

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the constitution and by laws on the responsibility of the power structures to the people of Kazakhstan;

3) Exercise legal regulation of matters which are beyond the legislative competence of parliament and which do not fall within the competence of the government and other state bodies as established by laws;

4) Adopt decisions on strategic aspects of the economic, social, and political development of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

3. Only decrees may have the force of normative legal acts issued by the president of the republic.

Article 22. Orders of the president of the republic.

1. Orders of the president of the republic are issued on the basis and in observance of the constitution, laws and decrees of the president.

2. Orders of the president of the republic:

1) Settle administrative, management, operational, and individual matters;

2) In accordance with the competence of the president of the republic, appoint and relieve of their posts officials who do not have constitutional status.

Article 23. [passage omitted]

Article 24. The procedure for making amendments and additions to acts of the president of the republic and for their cancellation.

1. The introduction of amendments and additions:

1) To decrees of the president of the republic is performed by presidential decrees;

2) To orders of the president is performed by orders of the president of the republic.

2. The cancellation of decrees of the president of the republic is performed by decrees of the president of the republic, and the cancellation of orders of the president of the republic is performed by decrees and orders of the president of the republic.

3. In the event that divergences arise between acts of the president of the republic having the same legal force, one should follow the act which came into force later, unless an appropriate act of the president of the republic specifies the contrary.

Article 25. [passage omitted]

Chapter 4. Early dismissal from office of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Article 26. Early dismissal from office of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

1. The president may be relieved of his post before the end of his term by a decision of parliament in the event of consistent inability to perform his duties on account of sickness, in accordance with the procedure established by the constitution.

2. The president bears responsibility for actions performed in execution of his duties in the event of treason, meaning an intentional act committed in order to undermine or weaken the external security and sovereignty of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which is manifested by his going over to the enemy's side during a war or armed conflict or rendering assistance to a foreign state in carrying out hostile activities against the republic, and he may be dismissed from his post for this by parliament under the procedure established by the constitution.

3. The question of the dismissal of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan from his post may not be raised while he is considering the subject of terminating the powers of parliament before the end of its term.

Article 27. The acting president of the republic.

1. In the event of the early dismissal of the president from his post or his death, execution of the president's duties passes temporarily to the chairman of the Senate of parliament. In the event that the chairman of the Senate of parliament cannot assume the president's duties, they pass to the prime minister. Extraordinary presidential elections must be held within two months after the early termination of the powers of the president of the republic.

2. The acting president of the republic is not entitled to carry out the dissolution of parliament, terminate the powers of the government, set a republic-wide referendum, or submit proposals on amendments and additions to the constitution.

Chapter 5. Support for the activity of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Articles 28-32. [passage omitted]

Article 33. Consultative bodies, institutions, and organizations under the president of the republic.

1. The Security Council, the Supreme Judicial Council, and other consultative bodies and institutions and organizations under the president are set up in order to exercise the constitutional powers of the president of the republic and support his activities.

2. The president of the republic:

1) Determines the composition of the Security Council, the Supreme Judicial Council, and other consultative bodies, and also sets up institutions and organizations under the president of the republic;

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2) Appoints the leading officials of consultative bodies, institutions, and organizations under the president of the republic; and appoints people to the Supreme Judicial Council, the list of whom is determined by the constitution and the law which determines the status, establishment procedure, and organization of work of the Supreme Judicial Council;

3) Approves the regulations of the Security Council and other consultative bodies — with the exception of the Supreme Judicial Council — and institutions and organizations under the president.

4) Hears reports from the secretary of the Security Council and leading officials of the other consultative bodies on the work of these bodies.

3. The staff of the apparatus of the consultative bodies under the president are staff of the administration of the president of the republic.

Chapter 6. Former presidents of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Article 34. The status of former presidents of the republic.

1. All former presidents of the republic, except those dismissed from their post, have the title of ex-president of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

2. Ex-presidents are by rights life members of the Constitutional Council of the republic.

3. An ex-president of the republic is entitled to attend joint sessions of the chambers of the republic's parliament, ceremonial gatherings marking the accession of the president of the republic, and state holidays of the republic, and other functions held by the state.

4. An ex-president of the republic, and his honor and dignity are inviolable. Encroachments on the honor and dignity of an ex- president of the republic are subject to prosecution under the law.

Article 35. Support for ex-presidents of the republic.

1. Support, services, and protection for an ex-president of the republic are provided at state expense.

2. An ex-president of the republic enjoys the following for life:

1) On a decision by the president of the republic, a pension is set at 80 percent of the salary of the president of the republic. The pension of an ex-president of the republic, set under the terms of this decree, is raised taking account of increases in the salary of the president of the republic;

2) He is provided with an apartment and a state country house with the necessary service, personal protection, a personal car and driver, free travel throughout the country, medical services and treatment in sanatoria and spas;

3) He is granted the right to use documents in the archive of the president of the republic relating to his term in office as president of the republic.

Article 36. Guarantees of the rights of ex-presidents of the republic.

An ex-president may not bear responsibility for actions connected with his execution of the powers of president of the republic, with the exception of cases where treason has been committed.

Chapter 7. Concluding provisions.

Article 37. The application of other legislative acts in respect of support for the activity of the president of the republic.

The norms of legislation on state service or of labor and pension legislation do not apply to the president of the republic.

Article 38. The procedure for the present decree's coming into force.

This decree comes into force from the date of its publication.

[Signed] President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev, Almaty, 26 December 1995.

Tajikistan

Tajik Foreign Ministry Condemns Interference by 'Islamic States'

LD2301130396 Dushanbe KHOVAR in Russian 0700 GMT 23 Jan 96

[Statement by the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Tajikistan]

[FBIS Translated Text] 22 January 1996 [dateline as received] — Giving priority to settling inter-Tajik problems through political dialogue, the leadership of the Republic of Tajikistan is paying particular attention to the continuing round of the inter-Tajik talks in Ashgabat.

Unfortunately, certain circles which are not interested in moving the talks forward have not ceased to aggravate the situation in and around Tajikistan recently, and have committed acts that break agreements already reached, including provocations along the Tajik-Afghan border and terrorist actions within the republic. In 1995 alone, tens of terrorist and diversionary actions were

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committed, the overwhelming majority of which were carried out by armed groups specially trained abroad.

The most brazen of these acts was the vile act perpetrated against His Eminence Hoja Fathullo-khon Sharifzoda, mufti of the Muslims of Tajikistan. Late on the evening of 21 January, after carrying out religious rites, the mufti and four members of his household were brutally killed in their house.

There has always been an unbreakable law in the Islamic world that wars and hatred between people should cease and that peace and agreement should reign during the month of Ramadan. The murder of the mufti is a blasphemous challenge to the edicts of Islam, and an insolent attempt to destabilize the political situation in Tajikistan.

This action was taken at a time when our country has taken a sure course toward the further democratization of society and the consolidation of the country's political and economic independence.

The cruelty and inhumanity of this terrorist act has shocked everyone.

Mufti Fathullo-khon Sharifzoda enjoyed great authority in Tajikistan and, through his actions, helped to reestablish peace and accord in the long-suffering Tajik land.

The leadership of the Republic of Tajikistan, which regards this serious crime as a malicious act aimed at disrupting the peace process, wishes to indicate to those parties that are counting on terror and violence that their actions are inhumane and immoral, and that this method of achieving their political goals is futile.

In this regard, the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Tajikistan notes with regret that terrorist groups trained and financed by certain Islamic states have recently been sent to our republic. It cannot be ruled out that the murder of the mufti of Tajikistan was connected with international terrorism and political circles interested in destabilizing the situation in our state.

On the instructions of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, our country's Foreign Ministry, emphasizing its fundamental rejection of violent methods, states that the blasphemous crime against the mufti and the members of his household will be investigated swiftly, and that the criminals will meet their just punishment with the full force of the Law.

Turkmenistan

Communique on Results of Niyazov's Visit to Iran

LD2301194996 Ashgabat Radio Ashgabat Network in Russian 1400 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Communique on the results of the visit by President of Turkmenistan Niyazov to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

At the invitation of his excellency, President Hashemi-Rafsanjani, his excellency President of Turkmenistan Niyazov made an official visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran on 22-23 January 1996.

There were two stages of negotiations between the presidents during the visit, which was held in a spirit of full mutual understanding, mutual respect, friendship, and brotherhood. The leaders of the two states exchanged opinions on a wide range of political, economic, and cultural issues of mutual interest. The sides expressed deep satisfaction with the results of their regular summits and also of meetings between senior officials of Turkmenistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The presidents of the two states discussed the program of joint action for holding an event of historic importance — the official opening of the Tedzhen-Sarakhs-Mashhad railway with the wide participation of representatives of the countries of the world and international organizations. It was stressed that the new main railway, which links the transport networks of Asia and Europe, was important for the development of regional and inter-regional cooperation.

The sides agreed to hold the opening ceremony on 12-13 May 1996 and instructed the relevant organizations in Iran and Turkmenistan to supervise preparations for the event. The sides agreed that, simultaneously with the opening of the Tedzhen-Sarakhs-Mashhad railway, in accordance with earlier agreements, construction of the Tum-Merkhatum stage on the Tedzhen River would start.

Issues of cooperation with third countries, interaction between Turkmenistan and Iran within ECO, and rational, proper use of the Caspian basin by the littoral states were also considered in the course of negotiations. The sides underlined the need to implement earlier bilateral agreements in the sphere of political, economic and cultural cooperation. The signing of the agreement on mutual encouragement and protection of investments became one of the important achievements of the meeting. The sides recognized the importance of implementing such joint projects as the construction of a road from Ashgabat to Geok-Tepe, the reconstruction of the water-supply network in Mary, the construction of an

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fiber-optic communication line, of elevators among others.

The relevant document on implementation of these projects and on developing trade and economic relations between the two countries was signed by the central banks of Turkmenistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The sides expressed satisfaction with the results of trilateral cooperation between Turkmenistan, Iran, and Armenia, in particular with the signing of an agreement on mutual accounting, which is regarded as the basis for implementing trilateral operations and as an important step in the development of cooperation. The sides approved highly of the role of regional organizations in ensuring the peaceful and stable development of countries of the world and said it was necessary to strengthen the Economic Cooperation Organization by way of developing and intensifying links between its members. The sides underlined the need for a peaceful settlement of conflicts in the region, in particular in Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and in Nagorno-Karabakh, and confirmed their support for direct negotiations between the government of Tajikistan and the opposition. They expressed the hope that a just solution to this problem would be found as soon as possible. The Iranian side greeted the UN adoption of the resolution on Turkmenistan's permanent status of neutrality and said they were in favor of peaceful policy and expressed confidence that this would help strengthen stability and develop mutually beneficial cooperation in the region for the prosperity of the peoples living there.

After expressing their concern about conserving the natural resources of the Caspian basin and protecting its ecology, the sides agreed that the [Caspian] Sea should not be used unilaterally, without account being taken by all sides of the interests of all littoral states. With a view to ensuring that this unique basin is used rationally, the sides recognized the need for the soonest possible decision on the status of the Caspian Sea in accordance with international law and for the setting up of an organization for cooperation between Caspian littoral states. They called for a meeting of foreign ministers of the countries of the Caspian basin with this in mind.

President Niyazov expressed deep gratitude to the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the government and people of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the warm reception and invited Hashemi-Rafsanjani to visit Turkmenistan at any time convenient to him.

[Dated] Tehran, 23 January 1996.

Niyazov, Rafsanjani Reach 'Important' Agreements

LD2301180696 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1714 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By Oleg Kuzmin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TEHRAN, January 23 (Itar-Tass) — Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov wound up his visit to Iran on Tuesday after discussing matters of mutual interest with Iranian leader 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

The presidents reached several "important" agreements and unanimously described the visit as "useful and fruitful."

During a "short but very busy visit," according to Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the two presidents decided to develop oil and gas cooperation, to construct a dam on the Heri Rud River by a joint effort, and to unify the electric power grids.

Iran also decided to assist Turkmenistan in the construction of roads and grain elevators, and in the water supply for the Turkmen city of Mary.

The foreign and economics ministers signed four agreements, including those on banking cooperation and on the avoidance of double taxations.

The Iranian-Turkmen border was announced international, which means that it can be crossed by those who have passports in effect.

Members of the delegations had talks on the construction of gas pipe-lines for exporting Turkmen natural gas to Europe.

One of the main issues on the agenda was the opening of the Meshed-Sarakhs railway designed to link Central Asia with the Persian Gulf, restoring the Great Silk Route, according to Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

Russia, Turkmenistan Sign Accords on Russian Border Guards

MK2301150896 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by Nikolay Plotnikov]

[FBIS Translated Text] An accord has been signed between the border troops commands of the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan. Under the protocol confirming the structure and strength of the operational group of the Russian border troops in Turkmenistan, their number will be brought to 1,000. Understanding was reached with the Turkmen side on the border guards' priority functions and tasks. Also signed was a protocol on founding a staff of border troops advisers in Turkmenistan. Their task is to render assistance in training personnel for the national border troops, which are being created.

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Armenia

Bagratyan-Chernomyrdin Discussions Detailed

NC2301183696 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 0718 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, Jan 23, (NOYAN TAPAN)— Bilateral talks between Armenian and Russian governmental delegations are to start Tuesday [23 January] in Moscow.

Trade and economic cooperation in 1996, reactivation of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant, mutual fulfillment of credit obligations on construction of new atomic power plant and on maintenance of these power plants were discussed at a January 20 meeting between Viktor Chernomyrdin and Grant Bagratyan. To this effect Governments of the two countries were to prepare a package of documents for adoption of final resolutions at the current negotiations.

Government sources report that the two Prime Ministers expressed their content with the extension of Armenian-Russian cooperation.

Special attention was paid to transport and communications policies in the region, including development of a network of gas pipelines. The sides displayed interest in the possibility of establishing a joint corporation between "Armgasprom" and Russia's Gasprom enterprise, and purchase by the latter of Armgasprom's shares.

The two Prime Ministers also discussed the problem of Armenia's real estate in Russia, in particular, in Moscow. An agreement on presenting relevant documents to the Armenian side was reached.

Bagratyan and Chernomyrdin also discussed cooperation between the two Governments within international organizations.

Armenian Opposition Figure on Yeltsin Statement, Summit

NC2301182296 Yerevan SNARK in English 0746 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, January 23— (SNARK) The leader of the National-Democratic Union (NDU), Vazgen Manukyan, commenting on Boris Yeltsin's statement on the Karabakh problem and describing the results of the Moscow summit, said that the political leaders have to make restrained and well-considered statements while seeking peace resolutions to conflicts.

According to Manukyan, politicians who reserve the right to govern the fate of nations are responsible for terrorist acts which have become frequent in the world's various areas in the end of the century. The mankind gained a large experience in resolving conflicts by political means. Any armed confrontation is the result of political weakness of the parties.

The NDU leader emphasized that the struggle of the NKR [Nagorno-Karabakh Republic] people has its place in the context of the nations' struggle for independence in the second part of 20th century. Not many nations have shown heroism during their struggle.

A peace resolution to the Karabakh-Azeri conflict demanded highly educated politicians from different countries and political flexibility of the Armenian leaders. However, they are unable to settle issues related to foreign policy, added Manukyan.

Armenian Spokesman: Summit Adopts Document on Karabakh

NC2301201896 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 0831 GMT 22 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, Jan. 22 (Noyan Tapan)— Participants of the January 19 summit of CIS Heads of States adopted a document on the Karabakh conflict, which takes into consideration positions of the conflicting parties, Presidential Acting Spokesman Levon Zurabyan announced Monday [22 January].

Commenting on the document entitled "Address by the Council of CIS Heads of States to Presidents of Azerbaijan Republic, Republic of Armenia and Heads of Other States" Zurabyan stressed that it was the only official result, which the sides succeeded in achieving at the Moscow negotiations on the Karabakh conflict and the summit of CIS Heads of States. "The document takes into account efforts of all conflicting parties", he added. Mr. Zurabyan disagreed with the opinion that Russian President Boris Yeltsin tried to predetermine the future status of Karabakh in his statement made at the news conference after the summit. At that news conference Yeltsin was surprised that the Karabakh side demanded a higher than just autonomy within Azerbaijan status.

Mr. Zurabyan refused to report details of the negotiations, saying that publicizing of any information before the official accord is reached may interfere with the negotiations. He underlined that Armenia's position remains intact — the status of Karabakh must be determined on the basis of principle of self-determination.

President's Acting Spokesman announced that on January 18 Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan met with his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin as well as Russian Foreign Minister Primakov and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze. During the meeting Russian President suggested intensifying the negotiations on the peaceful settlement of the Azeri-Karabakh conflict.

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It was also suggested to use shuttle diplomacy to achieve political solution to the conflict. President of Russia charged Foreign Minister Primakov to go on shuttle mission to capitals of the contending parties — Baku, Stepanakert and Yerevan. The mission is due to begin in the near future.

Armenian President also stressed the necessity of intensifying the negotiating process.

The participants of the meeting also exchanged views on the problem of Karabakh.

More detailed discussion of the problem took place at the meeting between Levon Ter-Petrosyan and Primakov.

It was noted that 4-year diplomatic endeavors resulted in formation of major mechanisms of conflict settlement, due to which it became possible to establish and maintain cease-fire for 20 months as well as iron out some differences.

Similar meetings were held with the leadership of Azerbaijan.

As a result of the aforementioned meetings participants of the summit of CIS Heads of States adopted a document "Address by the Council of CIS Heads of States to Presidents of Azerbaijan Republic, Republic of Armenia and Heads of Other States".

Below is the full text of the Address.

"ADDRESS

by the Council of CIS Heads of States to Presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia and other states:

The Council of CIS Heads of State hails the more than 20-months-long cease-fire regime in Karabakh conflict region which was set up after a call by the Council of CIS Heads of State of April 15, 1994;

approves the resolution of the sides to maintain the achieved armistice until an Agreement to cease the military conflict is signed and settle the conflict peacefully;

is ready to continue supporting the persistent search for ways out on key problems of the political settlement basing on principles of UN and OSCE, with help of Russian Federation and within the framework of OSCE.

considers the achievement of a noticeable progress in negotiations and the soonest signing of the political Agreement to be the primary task. This Agreement will irreversibly stop the bloodshed and give a start to a consistent liquidation of the conflict's consequences. The CIS countries-participants are ready to promote strengthening of the results at the negotiations in order to evade resumption of military activities;

calls upon the sides to maximally use the negotiations process, consultations and shuttle diplomacy in order to attain a breakthrough to political settlement, establishment of peace and stability in the region which would be an important step for reinforcement of the CIS;

calls upon the countries-participants of the OSCE Minsk Process to support the current new steps for strengthening of the peace in the region".

Nagorno-Karabakh Envoy on Need For Self-Rule in Armenia

LD2301210296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2024 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By Tigran Liloyan]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] YEREVAN, January 23 (Itar-Tass) — A Nagorno-Karabakh envoy in Armenia said on Tuesday [23 January] no settlement to a lasting conflict over Azerbaijan's secessionist province is possible until local Armenians live under Azerbaijani rule. Envoy Aleksan Arutyunyan said even the highest security guarantees will not change the situation.

Arutyunyan noted that in the recent period, Russia has taken more active stance in the Karabakh settlement but he would not link it with either recent appointments in Moscow or forthcoming presidential campaign.

He also said the difference in the sides' approaches is that Azerbaijan calls for a step-by-step settlement whereas Nagorno- Karabakh would prefer a "package deal."

New Approaches Needed To Resolve Karabakh Conflict

NC2301205596 Yerevan SNARK in English 1547 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, January 23 (SNARK)—Aleksan Harutyunyan, NKR [Nagorno-Karabakh Republic] permanent representative in Armenia, stated at today's press conference that new approaches are necessary to continue peace talks on the Karabakh conflict.

Expressing hope the truce would be maintained in 1996 as well, he voiced no optimism over signing the Great Political Agreement (GPA) by the end of the year. According to him, the positions of the belligerents are far from accord. They need time to quietly size up the situation and be prepared to make compromises. The conflicting parties, Azerbaijan in particular are not ready to do this, added Harutyunyan.

The continuation and activation of the negotiation process stipulate further steps as well as new approaches

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to the resolution of the conflict. Otherwise, the belligerents will be unable to iron out their principal differences and thus to accord certain parts of GPA.

Harutyunyan said that Azerbaijan had not officially proposed to grant the most high autonomy status to NKR. According to the Azeri Constitution, Azerbaijan is a unitary state. The Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic is a state only de jure and the Azeri president himself appoints the head of the Nakhichevan Milli Mejlis [National Assembly]. Moreover, the Azeri Constitution does not allow the minorities to take up high posts in the republic.

Harutyunyan believes that Azerbaijan should not put forward proposals on the Karabakh status. Its earlier initiatives caused the war. Now the OSCE Minsk group is dealing with the NKR status issue. The group comprises all the conflicting parties, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore any decision can be made only if consensus is reached.

Azerbaijan

President Aliyev on Talks With Yeltsin, CIS Summit

LD2301224796 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 2020 GMT 23 Jan 96

[Interview with Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev for the "Moscow, Kremlin" program; place, date not given — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On the eve of the 19 January meeting of leaders of the CIS states, President Yeltsin held tete-a-tete meetings with the presidents of the Transcaucasian states and Uzbekistan. We asked Geydar Aliyev, president of Azerbaijan, about the results of his meeting.

[Aliyev] President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin and I discussed several important issues. The most important question we discussed was the final settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict connected with Nagorno-Karabakh. We exchanged opinions on this question. We discussed many possible variants of a settlement. Boris Nikolayevich has decided to become actively engaged in this problem and I consider this to be correct. We agreed on certain steps that should be taken to achieve a settlement of this conflict and a total cessation of military actions within a short time. I am very satisfied with this.

Boris Nikolayevich and I also discussed a number of questions of bilateral relations between Russia and Azerbaijan and I consider that, as the saying goes, we managed to complete the discussions of these problems in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and agreement.

Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin and I discussed our bilateral relations and several important questions of economic cooperation. One of these important questions is on the construction of an oil pipeline for the export of Azerbaijan's oil across the territory of Russia to the Black Sea. This issue has been worked on for several months; we had already reached a final decision and Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin and I signed the agreement — a very important agreement.

Boris Nikolayevich also touched on this question and was very satisfied when he heard that we had already signed the document.

Also, we signed — our prime minister and Viktor Stepanovich's deputy Aleksey Alekseyevich Bolshakov signed — an agreement on long-tern economic cooperation to the year 2000. We also signed a document on trade in 1996. So, I consider we did a lot and I am satisfied with those results. [passage omitted]

[Aliyev] The events in Chechnya worry Russia, I believe that they worry the world public and they worry Azerbaijan. We are suffering from this because, in connection with these events, the border is completely closed between Russia and Azerbaijan; it follows the border between the Dagestan Republic and the Russian Federation. Therefore, of course, we want peace in the Caucasus, in the Northern Caucasus and in this region which is directly adjacent to Azerbaijan. Therefore, we want this conflict to be resolved. However, I do not intend to say now how this conflict could be resolved, because in these circumstances this is not possible. But I think that the Russian leadership is taking measures and quite effective measures. I am sure the Russian leadership will resolve this problem. [passage omitted]

[Aliyev] There is a lot that linked us very strongly over these past years, particularly during the years of the existence of the Soviet Union. For example, the way the productive forces were distributed within the framework of the USSR, in the various regions of the USSR, led to the economy, and particularly the industry, of these republics being closely connected.

This also applied to people. Previously, there were no borders and people travelled freely all over the USSR. People settled in various places or went to live there. For example, there are now many Azerbaijanis living outside Azerbaijan, including in Russia. There are many of them in Moscow. Therefore, one cannot destroy all of this and insist on strict state borders.

The need to overcome the difficulties connected with the transitional period in the economy, in socio-political

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life, the transition from one socio-economic system to another make it necessary for us to be in a single commonwealth. Therefore, we joined the Commonwealth of Independent States. I believe we did the right thing. In the past two years that we have been members we have not lost anything; on the contrary, we have gained.

President Aliyev Meets With U.S. Envoy

LD2301203296 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2005 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BAKU, Jan 23 (Interfax) — A turn towards unbiasedness and justice occured recently in the approach of the world community, the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] Minsk Group and Russia to the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement, Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev told the former U.S. ambassador, John Mareska, in Baku Tuesday [23 January].

The main principles of the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement are the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the inviolability of its borders, Aliyev stated. If these conditions are met and followed by liberation of the occupied lands of Azerbaijan and the repatriation of refugees, then such issues as the new status of Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan and security guarantees will find their solutions, he added.

"Caring for their own territorial integrity, some states close their eyes at violations of the territorial integrity of other states," Aliyev said. International mediators should understand that the aggressor and the victim of aggression cannot be put on the same plane, he added. Armenia "seized Azerbaijani lands and therefore should be recognized as the aggressor," he underlined.

Turkey's Proposal To Finance Baku-Supsa Line Said Approved

TA2401073996 Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish 2200 GMT 23 Jan 96

[Omer Kebapcioglu report from Baku]

[FBIS Translated Text] Turkey's proposals concerning the construction of the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, which will transport Azerbaijani early oil, has been taken up at a meeting in Baku. Turkey's proposal to finance the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline project was adopted at the meeting. Representatives from Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the oil consortium company attended the meeting headed by Bilsel Alisbahan, chief adviser to the Turkish Prime Minister's Office and oil pipelines coordinator.

Turkey submitted two proposals at the meeting, both of them calling for the speedy implementation of the western line. Initially, the Turkish proposal to lay the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline on the build-operate-transfer model was assessed at the meeting. A unity of views was reached on the second proposal, which foresees Turkey's providing the financing of the Baku-Supsa project. It was decided at the meeting to finalize the issue after reviewing the detailed implementation program.

The final decision on the approximately $250 million project is expected to be taken during a second meeting, which will take place in Tbilisi in the first half of February.

Georgia

German Foreign Minister Kinkel Visits Georgia

Kinkel Meets Menagharashvili

LD2401103096 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Georgian 0930 GMT 24 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi [no date as received] — The official part of the visit to Georgia by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel started today, 24 January, with a meeting with Georgian Foreign Minister Irakli Menagharashvili.

At the beginning of the conversation, Menagharashvili noted that Georgia greatly appreciated Germany's assistance in the political and economic spheres. He briefed the eminent guest on the situation in Georgia and on the country's position regarding a number of regional and global issues. Special attention was given to the problem of the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity.

The guest said that Germany was impressed by the development of the democratic process in Georgia. Mr. Kinkel noted that Europe was well aware of the complexity of regional problems in the Caucasus and supported Georgia's regional policy. He said that Germany was ready to offer Georgia firm support in the restoration of its territorial integrity.

The sides also discussed bilateral relations.

In conclusion, Klaus Kinkel said that his visit was a testimony to the fact that Germany was sympathetic to Georgia's problems and would spare no efforts to assist in their resolution.

Abkhaz Leader Ardzinba Views CIS Sanctions

LD2301190196 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1817 GMT 23 Jan 96

[By Irina Shchegoleva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SOCHI, January 23 (Itar-Tass) — Leader of Abkhazia Vladislav Ardzinba stated today

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